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The exploration and production of offshore oil have
brought into existence varied legal questions heretofore
unanswered. With the oil industry being so complex and
the development of offshore equipment so rapid, there
remain several areas where the existing framework of
law and regulation may well be challenged. Already
signs of problems in oil-related insurance are emerging,
which extend beyond conventional insurance concepts.
There is clear support for the view that the severity
and breadth of the problems have become far more
apparent in recent years.
Offshore oil activities like construction and
drilling are highly hazardous operations. Despite
the taking of precautions, dangerous occurrences are
by no means infrequent. In this connection, it must
also be admitted that a single offshore accident can
generate potentially sizable losses and claims. This
being the case, there is a widespread consensus that
no offshore ventures can forego insurance coverages
against perils to which the parties may be exposed.
2
The cover required may differ from case to case
depending upon the nature of the operations and the
special needs for coverage. However, it is important
to bear in mind that there are uninsurable areas of
risk where the parties cannot avail themselves of
insurance protection. It should be further realised
that the sums insured are also subject to the limited
extent to which the underwriters are able to offer.
The present work outlines the principal insurance
requirements of the offshore oil industry as a basis
on which some legal considerations are to apply. An
account of the major parties involved in offshore
ventures is presented in Chapter 3, followed by a
survey of the liability risks confronting those parties.
Chapter 4 is an attempt to pinpoint certain problems
associated with limitation of liability and employer's
liability insurance, central to these problems being
the legal status of offshore installations. Coverages
against property damage are considered in Chapter 5
along with an assessment of the applicability of the
1906 Marine Insurance Act to oil rig insurance. Pollu¬
tion liability coverages are the central theme of Chapter
6, with emphasis being laid on the international legal
3
framework within which oil pollution insurance should
be effected. Adding to the complexity are the indemnity
provisions incorporated into many offshore contracts,
the existence of which can be crucial in implememting
offshore insurance contracts. Problems related thereto
are examined in Chapter 2 with a review of the relevant
statutes and judicial decisions. In addition to the
above, the study also illustrates certain significant
points by reference to recent tragic events.
One special characteristic of oil-related insurance
lies in the fact that one offshore accident may involve
various insurance coverages summarised above. While
certain perils are coverable under a single package of
insurance, some risks can only be insured against under
separate policies. In framing offshore insurance
programmes, account should always be taken of the way
in which the policies apply to the various phases of
the operations. Significantly, a feature of certain
coverages is that they are compulsory by law, which
necessitates special consideration.
A theoretical analysis becomes meaningless when
one discovers how different reality is. This being
so, a variety of insurance policies currently used or
4
developed are discussed where relevant, in the hope that
a realistic insight may be gained into the nature of the
problems. It should however be stressed at the outset
that such policies are not necessarily designed for
offshore operations.
Several distinctive features have been translated
into the policies. Offshore insurance policies can be
characterised by the multiplicity of the insureds.
Nonetheless, the guestion as to which party is legally
responsible for the purchase of insurance in a given
situation demands special attention. It should also
be observed that there are areas in which overlapping
between the coverages may occur. In considering the
form of the policy to be obtained, there has been a
clear emphasis on the type of the oil rig being used.
As is demonstrated throughout the discussion, the idea
of linking the type of the oil rig to the policy is of
vital significance. It is almost impossible to work out
an insurance scheme without fully appreciating the role
of the oil installation on which the operations are
carried out.
With offshore technology progressing, the insurance
practice in this field is virtually in the process of
5
evolution. It is pertinent to note that the writer has
endeavoured to base the discussion on updated information.
Legally speaking, oil-related coverages are embodied
in insurance contracts. However, the insurers' liability
may also be incurred indirectly on other relevant
agreements associated with the operations, e.g. drilling
contracts and joint operating agreements. It is
difficult to maintain that legal problems arising
therefrom are confined to those which could be
overcome by insurance law alone. There are other facets
of law to which the legal and insurance practitioners
should resort, such as contract, delict, and oil and
gas law. As offshore oil operations are of worldwide
interest, public and private international law are also
heavily involved. All this merely emphasises the
sophistication and novelty of offshore insurance
coverages. In contrast to conventional insurance,
however, there is relatively little judicial authority
on oil-related insurance. What creates more difficulty
is the fact that the governing law of oil rig insurance
policies in the UK jurisdiction has to date been left
in serious doubt. It is on this and other significant
issues that some comments are made and proposals offered.
6
As is shown in the present work, many problems
which remain unsolved have been magnified by the
continuing development of offshore technology. This
is too substantial a point to be overlooked.
7
CHAPTER TWO
INDEMNITY PROVISIONS IN OFFSHORE
CONTRACTS - AN INSURANCE CONSIDERATION
Background
The magnitude of the liability exposure involved
in the oil and gas industry, particularly in the offshore
area, has been increasingly appreciated. Legal and
insurance problems of considerable interest have to
date arisen in many cases regarding the contractual
distribution of responsibilities and liabilities.
Essential to any offshore contract in this connection
are the indemnity provisions regulating and establishing
the relationship among the parties for purposes of
liability. In brief, the principal effect of such
agreements is to provide a proper mechanism to allocate
all liabilities in the event of any loss or damage
arising during the operations. It may be relevant to
note that the provisions to such effect are not a
novel idea. They are virtually of very wide applica¬
tion and have become a vital ingredient in the legal
framework of many commercial activities.
8
A. Offshore hold-harmless agreements
Indemnity provisions may take various forms. Of
particular relevance to offshore oil activities is the
one commonly known as the hold-harmless agreement which
is almost invariably incorporated into any offshore
drilling contract. A hold-harmless agreement is some-
1
times referred to as an express indemnity whereby one
party could, subject to certain exceptions, even
eliminate liability for its own negligence.
It is not unusual to find that an offshore accident
may give rise to litigation involving all the potential
parties. With offshore operations being so complex,
however, the responsible party in many cases is not
easily identified. To this extent, some contracts may
therefore provide that each party to the operation shall
be responsible for its own employees and equipment. In
other words, both parties have excluded liability as
against each other, howsoever such loss or damage may
be caused, with each insuring against its own risks.
Naturally, parties of stronger bargaining power can
avoid or minimise their liabilities under some form
1. As opposed to an implied indemnity.
9
of hold-harmless agreement even if the loss or damage
is occasioned by the negligence, whether sole, joint
or concurrent, of the parties themselves. From an
operator's standpoint, for example, this might seem
justifiable in the sense that the party paying for the
operation should be entitled to indemnity as part of
2
the rate charged by the contractors.
Compared with operations on land, offshore drilling
operations are more dependent upon a system of indemnity.
For example, it has become standard practice for drilling
operations on land that the employer is liable for loss
or damage below the ground surface while the contractor
3
is liable for that above the ground surface. In the
case of offshore drilling operations, however, there
2. Cf. Acomb, "Indemnity As Applied to Offshore Oil
Activities," (1966-67) 14 Louisiana Bar Journal
209, at 210.
3. Dunn, "Contracts Relating to Infrastructure and
Support Facilities and Services; Employment Contracts
and Labour Relations; Agreements for the Construction
Maintenance and Operation of Terminals, Tank Farms and
Docks; Contracts with Geophysical, Drilling and Other
Constructions," Proceedings of the Petroleum Law
Seminar, Cambridge (8-13 January 1978) Vol. 1, p. 15.7.
10
may be argument as to which party should be liable for
the area between the sea bed and the sea surface in
4
the absence of a clearly defined clause.
As has been pointed out, indemnity provisions may
vary considerably both in form and extent, depending
upon the intent of the parties. Generally, those
provisions contained in offshore contracts are reciprocal.
B. The factor of negligence
1. A case-law approach
Like any other provision, an indemnity clause may
give rise to the question of validity and construction.
A further controversial point which always presents
much difficulty concerns the factor of negligence. Can
parties to an indemnity agreement validly contract to
such effect that the indemnitor should indemnify the
indemnitee against the indemnitee's own negligence?
In approaching indemnity clauses, the three
guidelines laid down by Lord Morton of Henryton in
5
Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. v. The King can be summarised
4. Ibid.




(1) If the clause contains language which expressly
exempts the proferens from the consequence of his own
servants' negligence, effect must be given to that
provision.
(2) If there is no express reference to the negligence,
the court must consider whether the words used are wide
enough, in their ordinary meaning, to cover negligence
on the part of the servants of the proferens.
(3) If the words used are wide enough for the above
purpose, the court must then consider whether the head
of damage may be based on some ground other than that
of negligence. The "other ground" must not be so
fanciful or remote that the proferens cannot be supposed
to have desired protection against it.
These principles, which had been stated by Lord
7
Greene in Alderslade v. Hendon Laundry Ltd., were
3
decided to be applicable to indemnity clauses. In other
6. Ibid, at p. 203.
7. [1945] K.B. 139, at p. 192.
3. In Canada Steamship there was both an exemption clause
12
words, the rules governing exemption clauses should
9
extend to indemnity clauses.
In North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board v. D & R
10
Taylor, the above-mentioned rules were accepted as
authoritative in the law of Scotland. Following with
approval the statement by Lord Greene in the Alderslade
case and the principles set up in Canada Steamship, Lord
Blades pointed out that the law of Scotland did not
11
differ from the law of England in that respect. The
and an indemnity clause. The reference by Lord
Morton to "such clauses" in the sentence preceding
the tests at p. 208 revealed that the tests were
meant to apply both to exemption and indemnity clauses.
This approach was then virtually followed and confirmed
in subsequent cases. For example, these guidelines
were explicitly held to apply to a clause of indemnity
as to an exemption clause since "the one is in
essence the correlative of the other." Per Buckley
L.J., Gillespie Bros, v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd.,
[1973] Q.B. 400, at p. 420.
9. It should however be added that the general principle
that a bailee may exempt himself from liability for
the negligence of his servants had been well
established. See, e.g. Travers & Sons v. Cooper,
[1915] 1K.B. 73; Rutter v. Palmer, [l922] 2 K.B. 87.
10. 1956 S.C. 1.
11. Ibid, at p. 3.
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rule that such clauses should be construed contra
proferentem was reiterated. The indemnity provision
involved in North of Scotland provided s
"The cobtractor shall indemnify the Board against
all claims from third parties arising from his
operations under the contract..."
There was no express reference to negligence. Having
found the board solely negligent, the Second Division
rejected its claim for indemnification.
Mention must also be made of Gillespie Bros, v. Roy
12
Bowles Transport Ltd., another leading case, in which
Lord Denning M.R. felt justified in taking the position
that the words employed in the indemnity provisions at
issue, especially the word "whatsoever", were wide
enough to cover negligence. Lending his support to the
view expressed by Lord Denning, Buckley L.J. stated that
the indemnity clause in dispute did contain an agreement
in express terms that the d indemnitor should indemnify
the indemnitee against all claims and demands including
any arising from the negligence of the indemnitee, for
the purpose of thedfirst test laid down in Canada
12. [jl973] Q.B. 400; supra note 3.
14
Steamship. These conclusions were reinforced by the
proposition Orr L.J. put forward that the word
"whatsoever" was itself plainly inconsistent with
any exception or qualification.
The rationale of the court's holding in Gillespie
failed to gain approval in Smith v. U.M.B. Chrysler
13
(Scotland) Ltd., a later House of Lords decision. It
was stipulated in the indemnity agreement involved in
the case at bar that the suppliers should keep the
purchasers indemnified against -
"...(b) Any liability, loss, claim or proceedings
whatsoever under Statute or Common Law (i) in
respect of personal injury to, or death of, any
person whomsoever, (ii) in respect of any injury
or damage whatsoever to any property real or
personal, arising out of or in the course of or
caused by the execution of the order..." (Emphases
added)
Allowing the appeal from the suppliers, Lord Fraser
of Tullybelton held that this clause was not to be
construed as giving the purchasers any indemnity
against their own negligence. A clause could not
"expressly" exempt or indemnify the proferens against
13'. 1978 S.C. (H.L. ) 1.
15
his negligence, his Lordship reasoned, unless it contained
the word "negligence" or some synonym for it. The
dominant view in the House was that the word "whatsoever"
under consideration could not be read as eguivalent to
14
an express reference to negligence.
2. The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
The Act, which came into force on 1st February 1975,
has reflected a substantial departure from the rules
reviewed above. Part I of the Act which covers England
15
and Wales as well as Northern Ireland provides in
section 2(1) as follows:
"A person cannot by reference to any contract term
or to a notice given to persons generally or to
particular persons exclude or restrict his liability
for death or personal injury resulting from
negligence."
It is therefore clear that an indemnity clause excluding
or restricting the indemnitee's liability for death or
14. Such a narrow interpretation provides a stark
contrast to the liberal construction of the
indemnity provisions involved in The Albion,
[1953] 2 All E.R. 679 (C.A.).
15. As distinguished from Scotland which is covered
by Part II of the Act. A general part (Part III)
is however applicable to both.
16
personal injury resulting from his own negligence is
made completely ineffective by the section as quoted
16
above. In the case of other loss or<[damage, e.g.
property damage, liability for negligence cannot be
excluded orrestricted except in so far as the contract
17
provisions satisfy a test of reasonableness. It is
important to note that insurance contracts are
virtually removed from the scope of the Act.
With the inception of the Act, the general guidance
evolving from the judicial decisions previously discussed
and a number of other similar decisions, may have become
to a very considerable extent less important than it
was. Nevertheless, a careful reading of some of the
decisions would suggest that they have raised another
significant point which merits particular analysis and
will be demonstrated later in the Chapter. In the pages
that follow, an attempt is made to approach the insurance
16. For detailed analyses of the Act, see Lawson,
Exclusion Clauses After the Unfair Contract Terms
Act (reprinted with Scottish Supplement 1979); see
also Reynolds, "The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977,"




factor already heavily involved in indemnity issues with
a view to ascertaining the way this contributing factor
and indemnity clauses inter-relate. For this purpose,
the afore-mentioned cases will be referred to in greater
detail where relevant.
C. Indemnity and insurance
1. Insuring an indemnity clause
Amongst factors which should normally be taken into
account for reaching an indemnity agreement is to ensure
that the party granting the indemnity has the capability
to make the agreement operable. Many, though by no means
all, indemnity agreements therefore require that the
indemnitor should purchase insurance as an instrument
to cover that assumption of liability. It is also
essential that the indemnitor procures the proper type
of insurance to provide adequate coverage. In the
offshore area, drilling and service contracts
frequently contain provisions whereby parties oblige
themselves to procure insurance which parallels the
18
hold-harmless clauses. Some contracts even require
18. E.g. the International Daywork Drilling Contract
drafted by the International Association of Drilling
18
that the certificates of insurance evidencing the
required insurance be furnished to ensure that the
coverage in line with the indemnity provisions has
been purchased. This is of major concern in relation
19
to offshore activities. As will be further noted,
a General Comprehensive Liability policy or a P & I
policy obtained by a drilling contractor, for example,
does not necessarily cover contractual indemnity
liability. Thus a separate contractual liability
Contractors (hereinafter the I.A.D.C. contract). The
contract is further noted in Chapter 3.
There are similar provisions in offshore service
contracts. Referring to a Frigg Field contract on
the TCP2 Compression Project, one author points out
that by purchasing adequate insurance covering this
contractual liability small firms would not be able
to compete with larger firms which are financially
strong enough to refuse to accept such liability.
See Kolrud, "Liability and Indemnities in the
Offshore Contracts - Contractors' Viewpoint," in
Conference on Contracts and Taxation in the Norwe¬
gian North Sea, Bryne, Norway (24, 25 October 1977)
pp. 35-41, at p. 38. Nevertheless, it is not
unusual to find that the cost of insurance is
actually added to the price of the work to be per¬
formed. See below, p. 19.
19. See below, Chapter 3.
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policy may be desirable. Alternatively, of course, an
endorsement to the General Comprehensive Liability
policy will suffice in appropriate circumstances.
Once it is decided that the hold-harmless agreement
should be insured, the question follows whether the cost
of insurance should add to the price of the work to be
performed by the indemnitor. Clearly the cost of the
indemnitor's services would become expensive by insuring
the indemnity provisions and may result in the inclusion
of the indemnity being undesirable as far as the
20
indemnitee is concerned. In addition to the foregoing,
the reluctance on the part of some insurers to accept
indemnity liabilities is another main difficulty likely
to be encountered.
Insurance carriers who offer the indemnity coverage
should always keep in mind their policyholders' relation-
21
ships with the parties that may be involved. Their
professional advice is of vital importance in assessing
20. Cf. McGillicuddy, "Insurance Coverage in Oil and Gas
Operations," (1972) 23rd Annual Institute on Oil and
Gas Law and Taxation 111, at p. 119.
21. Some policies require that the indemnity agreements
should be presented to and accepted by the insurers
20
the feasibility of certain insurances. For instance,
it is customary in the oil and gas industry for the
operator to indemnify the drilling contractor for
22
pollution damage. This is one of the risks which
contractors cannot insure against. The loss of product
due to a blowout, on the other hand, is virtually an
uninsurable exposure to risk. It would therefore be
pointless to obligate the indemnitor to cover the risk
by insurance.
2. Some US decisions
A number of judicial decisions in the United States
courts have disclosed complex problems confronting legal
and insurance practitioners associated with offshore oil
and gas operations. Subsequent paragraphs of this
section describe some of the cases which are chiefly
related to indemnity clauses.
It seems appropriate to approach the relevant points
before coverage is afforded. For a typical example
of such policies, see Sabey, "Indemnity and Insurance
Clauses in Joint Venture Farmout and Joint Operating
Agreements," (1970) 8 Alberta Law Review 210, at p.
214.
22. See below, Chapter 6.
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on a case by case basis by commencing with Bisso v.
23
Inland Waterways Corp., a landmark case which has been
the subject of much discussion. In that decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that a towage agreement
providing that the tug owner's liability for his own
negligence should be passed to the owner of the barge
24
being towed was unenforceable and invalid. The Supreme
Court indicated that they felt economic pressure was
being applied by the tug industry against those in
need of their services. Thus, contractual provisions
intended to release a tug from liability for its
negligent towage were invalid as against public policy.
The court also based its holding on the reasoning that
23
wrongdoers should be discouraged from being negligent.
Of the several decisions following Bisso, Dixilyn
26
Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing and Salvage Co. is a
23. 349 U.S. 85 (1955). This case is also the subject of
a note in (1956) 42 Virginia Law Review 77.
24. Frankfurter J., joined by Reed and Burton JJ.,
dissented.
25. For a summary of pre-Bisso decisions on the subject,
see Note, "Admiralty - Exculpatory Clauses in Towage
Contracts - Public Policy," (1955-56) 30 Tulane Law
Review 133.
26. 3/2 U.S. 697 (1963)
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remarkable one "which was decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1963. In that case the parties entered
into an agreement providing for the towage of a submer¬
sible drilling rig. The towing contract provided that
"...any damage claims urged by third parties as well as
any claim which may be urged by virtue of damage to the
drilling rig in the course of the towage shall be for
your Cthe rig owner] account and account of your under¬
writers." The contract further stipulated that the
amount of insurance coverage should equal the value of
the hull policy and amounted to four million dollars as
to third-party claims. The drilling barge was then
brought into collision with a bridge, giving rise to a
subsequent claim by the owner of the bridge. The tug
owner contended that all liabilities arising therefrom
should rest with the rig owner by virtue of the agree¬
ment. In an attempt to distinguish the case from Bisso
because of "the peculiar hazards of towage and other
factors", the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision in
the lower court and held that the tower was entitled
to full indemnity from the rig owner and its insurer
for all claims of third parties even arising out of
the negligence of the tower. However, the Supreme
23
Court on certiorari rejected the opinion of the Fifth
Circuit, indicating that the Bisso decision was still
the law and the Fifth Circuit's ruling was squarely in
conflict with Bisso.
The rationale of the Supreme Court's holdings in
Bisso and Dixilyn was seemingly resisted in the case of
27
Twenty Grand Offshore Inc. v. West India Carriers Inc.
The primary issue raised was whether the provisions of
a towage contract, requiring the owners of a tug and
tow to fully insure their respective vessels and to
obtain in each of the policies a waiver of subrogation
and a designation of the other party as an additional
insured, were invalid and unenforceable as exculpatory
clauses contrary to public policy. The evidence showed
that the tug owner complied with its contractual obli¬
gation by having the barge owner named as an additional
insured and by securing a waiver of subrogation. The
barge owner, however, breached its corresponding obli¬
gation. In addition, there was no evidence that the
barge owner was over-reached by the tug owner, or that
the tug owner was in a position to drive hard bargains.
27. 492 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Regardless of these elements, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida held the
towage contract invalid. Admitting that the clauses
present in Bisso were not insurance clauses, the District
Court pointed out however that the sole risk provision
in Bisso was exculpatory and against public policy. The
towage contract between Twenty Grand and West India,
according to the District Court, was an indirect attempt
at exculpation because the effect of the waiver clauses
was the same as the Bisso-invalid clauses.
The Circuit Court disagreed and reversed, responding
that the contention that compulsory insurance clauses
were exculpatory per se in the context of Bisso was
unsound. Such a doctrinaire interpretation, it went
on, was not supported by the reasons undergirding Bisso.
The Circuit Court further stated that the towage contract
did not relieve the tug owner or the towboat of its
liability to the barge owner as the result of the towboat
negligence. Rather, it simply precluded the barge owner'
insurance company from suing and recovering from the tug
owner losses which it had paid or was obliged to pay to
the barge owner on account of an insured casualty. The
tug owner's liability to the barge owner was unaffected
25
by the insurance clauses. The Circuit Court thus
concluded that the provisions were not invalid or
unenforceable as exculpatory clauses contrary to
public policy, and failure of the barge owner to
obtain such waiver and designation therefore barred
the recovery for damage to the barge as a result of
the tug's negligence.
It is evident from the ruling of Twenty Grand that
the parties to a maritime towing contract may effectively
contract to obligate themselves to carry certain
insurance, with the other party to the contract being
named as an additional insured and the subrogation
against the other party being waived. In essence, the
Twenty Grand rule has led to the strong implication
that a desired indemnity can be achieved by way of
insurance clauses without employing an indemnity clause
condemned by Bisso, with the result that the insurer
actually becomes the indemnitor.
Accidents in connection with marine towing, as shown
in the three decisions examined above, are indicative of
the potential hazards involved in offshore oil and gas
ventures. In the following cases, some distinctive
features other than towing - coupled with indemnity
26
issues - are also illustrated.
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Aymond v, Texaco, Inc. would appear to be one of
the notable decisions in this area. While working on
a fixed platform off the Louisiana coast, a member of
an oil drilling crew was injured when a steel cable
snapped allowing metal tongs to which it was anchored to
swing into and damage his knee. He instituted a negli¬
gence action against Texaco, the owner of the platform.
Texaco as a result filed a third-party complaint against
the drilling contractor, with which it had a drilling
contract containing the following indemnity language:
"Contractor (Falcon) agrees to protect, indemnify
and save Texaco harmless of and from all claims,
demands and causes of action in favor of third
parties on account of property damage other than
property damage expressly described in subparagraph
10(c) above which arises out of the work to be
performed by Contractor or Contractor's agents and
employees. Contractor also agrees to protect,
indemnify and save Texaco harmless of and from all
claims, demands, and causes of action in favor of
Contractor's employees on account of personal
injuries or death or on account of property damage,
no matter how such claims arise."
On the indemnification issue, Texaco claimed that the
clause "no matter how such claims arise" clearly and
28. 554 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1977).
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unequivocally indicated that Falcon was to indemnify
Texaco for negligence claims by Falcon's employees
against Texaco.
Affirming the judgment rendered by the District
Court, the Fifth Circuit held that failure to use the
word "negligence" and the ambiguity residing in the
clause led to the presumption that the indemnitee did
not intend indemnity to be given for its own negligence.
The holding in Aymond largely echoed, but should be
29
distinguished from, Stephens v. Chevron Oil Company.
Again, the contractor's employee suffered injury while
disembarking from a boat onto a wharf both owned by
Chevron when returning from an offshore platform. The
suit was against only Chevron and alleged the negligence
of only Chevron.
The contract between Chevron and the contractor
included an indemnity clause whereby the contractor
agreed:
"...to defend and hold Company (Chevron) indemnified
and harmless from and against any loss, expense, claim
or demand for: (a) Injury to or death of Contractor's
(Axelson) employees...in any way arising out of or
29. 517 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1975).
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connected with the performance by Contractor of
services hereunder... Company shall have the right,
at its option, to participate in the defense of any
such suit without relieving Contractor of any
obligation hereunder..."
Chevron, after making an offer to Axelson that they
should take over the defence which was refused, success¬
fully defended the claim in a jury trial finding that
Chevron was free from negligence. As Axelson refused
to accept defence of the suit, Chevron filed a third-
party action against Axelson and its insurer for
indemnification and reimbursement for legal expenses
and costs.
Reversing the decision of the District Court, the
Circuit Court held that the terms of the indemnity
agreement at issue did not entitle Chevron to be
indemnified against its own negligence. An intention
to indemnify an indemnitee against his own negligence,
the court reasoned, would not be presumed in the
absence of a clear and specific contractual stipulation
to that effect. That followed from the presumption
made by Louisiana jurisprudence that one did not
normally intend to indemnify another against his own
negligence.
29
Nevertheless, Chevron's negligence had not caused
the loss in the case at bar, the court pointed out.
The loss was caused becaused Axelson's employee pressed
an invalid legal claim. There was no reason why Chevton
should incur the cost of defending against this invalid
claim. In the total absence of Chevron's negligence,
the court concluded, the manifest intention of the partties
was that Axelson would defend and indemnify against
work-connected claims.
The judicial attitude reflected in Aymond and
Stephens, which is roughly comparable to the correspond-
30
English principles enunciated in Canada Steamship, may
give way where insurance factors are present. An
obvious example would appear to be Day v. Ocean Drilling
31
and Exploration Company, a 1973 case in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.
Ocean Drilling and Exploration Company (ODECO), a
drilling contractor, entered into a service contract
with Houma Welders in which a typical indemnity clause
was included. By virtue of the contract, Houma Welders
30. Supra note 5.
31. 353 F.Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1973).
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was to carry employer's liability insurance and
comprehensive general liability insurance in stipulated
amounts. Such insurances should additionally cover the
contractual liabilities and indemnities assumed by Houma
with minimum limits of 2300,000. The policies were to
waive subrogation against ODECO.
Plaintiff Day, an employee of the sub-contractor
Houma, suffered bodily injury as a result of an
explosion while passing by a compressor owned and
operated by ODECO on a fixed platform.
The court upheld the indemnity, holding that the
contract clearly reflected the parties' intention to
require Houma to protect ODECO against all risks of
harm to Houma's employees, not merely by assuming this
risk itself, but by carrying insurance to cover it.
Houma was to take out not only comprehensive general
liability insurance. Since the contract would cause
it to assume risks not normally covered by such
insurance, it was to add contractual liability and
indemnity coverage. And Houma could have taken the
cost of this insurance into account in determining
the cost of the work.
Apart from the fact that insurance factors are of
31
particular importance in assessing the enforceability
of indemnity provisions as revealed in the Day case,
insurance requirements contained in indemnity clauses
may also serve as a decisive test as to the extent to
which the indemnitor is liable. Here account should
32
be taken of Dickerson v. Continental Oil Company, in
which the indemnity provisions provided, inter alia,
as follows:
"Comprehensive General Liability Insurance with
bodily Injury limits of not less than $100,000 for
one person and $300,000 for any one accident, and
with a property damage limit of not less than
$25,000 for each accident..."
The indemnitee was found liable for awards of a larger
amount than $300,000 as a result of an accident on an
offshore oil rig. The court held that the indemnity
provisions obligating the indemnitor to obtain general
liability insurance with limits of not less than $300,000
for any one accident clearly stated the limits of the
indemnitor's liability, thus limiting the indemnitor's
liability to that amount.
Bearing in mind the judgment in Dickerson, specific
attention must also be paid to Hicks v. Ocean Drilling
32. 449 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1971).
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and Exploration Co. ODECO, this time the owner of a
submersible oil storage facility known as the Round
Barge, entered into a master service contract with a
contractor which supplied labour crew for the Round
Barge. Three employees of the contractor were injured
when an accident occurred due to a removal of ballast.
34
Jones Act suits were then brought against the contractor
and ODECO. ODECO filed cross claims and a third-party
action against the labour supplier, seeding indemnity
under the...master service contract. The contract
reguired the contractor to carry comprehensive general
liability insurance. Such insurance, according to the
contract, should additionally cover the contractual
liabilities and indemnities assumed by the contractor
with minimum limits of $500,000. Attached to the contract
between ODECO and the contractor, however, was a certi¬
ficate of insurance providing for $300,000 liability
coverage. Among other contentions, the supplier argued
that the recovery against it by ODECO, if any, should
33. 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975).
34. The application of the Jones Act to offshore claims
is further discussed in Chapter 4.
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be limited to 2300,000. The supplier claimed that the
certificate showing insurance of a lesser amount than
provided in the contract, and the introduction of the
contract in evidence with the certificate attached
effected an amendment to the contract. The court,
finding no principle of contract amendment, waiver or
estoppel to be applicable under the circumstances, held
that 0DEC0 was entitled to recover for the full amount
1
of the judgments against it.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. The Mobile
35
Drilling Barge Mr. Charlie involved a mobile drilling
rig. As the rig was towed out to perform drilling
operations in the Gulf of Mexico under a Drilling and
Rework contract between the rig owner and the lease
operator SIGNAL, it submerged and came in contact with
a Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (TRANSCO)
20-inch gas pipe line buried in that area. It was
undisputed both in the trial court and on appeal that
TRANSCO was entitled to damages. Having determined
that the lease operator and the rig owner were both
negligent and that the negligence of each was a proximate
35. 424 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1970)
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cause of the damage to the pipe line, the court turned
to the issue of the proper distribution of the liability
as between SIGNAL and the rig owner.
In the indemnity provisions incorporated into the
Drilling and Rework contract, the rig owner agreed:
"To protect Company (SIGNAL) against liability for
damage, loss or expense arising from damage to
property or death of any person or persons arising
in any way out of, in connection with or resulting
from the work provided for hereunder and, without
limiting any of Contractor's obligations or
liabilities under this contract, Contractor shall,
during the progress of the work and throughout the
term of this contract, carry and maintain, at its
sole expense, in reliable insurance companies...the
minimum insurance coverages set forth in Exhibit B,
annexed hereto and made a part of this contract for
all purposes..."
Paragraph E of Exhibit B provided:
"Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless
Company and its co-lessees for damages and
liabilities of every kind arising out of or
being incident to the operations of Contractor
hereunder and resulting from the negligence or
wilful misconduct of Contractor or its officers,
agents or employees. Contractor shall furnish
Company with cdrtificates evidencing coverage
insuring this hold-harmless agreement... Such
insurance shall contain an agreement whereby
the insurer waives its right of subrogation
against Company and its co-lessees."
The Circuit Court admitted that the contract need not
35
contain the talismanic words like "even though caused,
occasioned or contributed to by the negligence, sole
or concurrent of the indemnitee" or like expressions.
It must however clearly reflect such a purpose, the
court added. Having determined that nothing either in
the language of the contract itself or in the situation
surrounding its making that clearly indicated the
intention to indemnify for the indemnitee's negligence,
the court concluded that the lease operator was not
entitled to indemnity under that contract.
As to the insurance issue, the court stated that it
was not intended to cover the negligence of the
indemnitee. Rather, the drilling contractor was to
furnish insurance only for its own negligence. The court
rejected SIGNAL's argument that because the contractor
was to bear the cost of liability insurance, the contract
also reflected an intention that the rig owner should
bear all the liabilities.
In view of the decisions previously noted, it is
felt that the judges' approach to the construction of
the indemnity provisions in Transcontinental was to
some extent without apparent justification. To put it
precisely, the guestion whether the contractor's insurance
36
policies actually provided coverage for the indemnity
liability should be adequately considered. If, as quite
possible in that factual situation, the policies did
cover the contractual indemnity liabilities including
that against the indemnitee's own negligence, could it
not be viewed as a convincing pointer to the parties'
intention?
36
In Lanasse v. Travelers Insurance Company, a judgment
similar to that in Transcontinental - but convincing
even though still subject to some criticism - was
rendered. It is submitted that the way the court
scrupulously dealt with the insurance issue in Lanasse
is to a great measure exemplary.
In Lanasse, Chevron Oil Company was the charter of
a tender and the operator of the offshore platform Zulu.
On April 25, 1964, the tender was operating in the Gulf
of Mexico under a written time charter between Cheramie
and Chevron. Chevron ordered the vessel to proceed to
its platform Zulu for the purpose of moving a welding
machine from the sest to the east side of the platform.
In the performance of the operation, a crew member of
36. 450 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1971)
of the vessel was injured due to the negligence of
Chevron's crane operator. It was found that the vessel
was not unseaworthy and no member of the vessel's crew
was guilty of negligence. The District Court entered
judgment against Chevron for the full amount paid by
the tender owner in settlement of a claim for maintenance
and cure and damages asserted by the crewman. Chevron
appealed, arguing that even though the mishap had been
the result of its own negligence, any resulting
liability fell on the vessel owner under the indemnity
provisions in the time charter. Chevron's liability,
it claimed, was also covered under the terms of the
charter. The P & I coverage was expressly extended to
Chevron as an additional assured and the underwriters'
right of subrogation against Chevron was expressly
waived.
According to the indemnity provisions incorporated
into the time charter, the vessel owner agreed to
indemnify and hold harmless Chevron against any and
all claims for damages, whether to person or property,
and howsoever arising in any way "directly or indirectly
connected with the possession, navigation, management,
and operation of the vessel." Agreeing with the
38
conclusion of the District Court, the Circuit Court
stated that the indemnity provisions did not impose on
the vessel owner liability for consequences of negligent
operation by the charterer's crane operator where crane
operation was not even remotely related to operation,
navigation or management of the vessel.
The P & I policy in dispute provided:
"In consideration of the premium and subject to
the warranties, terms and conditions herein
mentioned, this Company hereby undertakes to pay
up to the amount hereby insured and in conformity
with lines 5 and 6 hereof, such sums as the assured,
as owner of the Vessels as per Schedule shall have
become legally liable to pay and shall have paid..."
(Emphasis added)
The court found that the vessel and her crew were
absolved from all wrong or unseaworthiness. Chevron
was found at fault Tor the manner in which the crane
was operated. The vessel, according to the court,
offered nothing further than a condition or locale for
the accident. The court further indicated that the
P & I policy did not cover Chevron's claim because
Chevron as an additional assured did not become liable
as owner of the vessel.
It should be stressed that Lanasse has once again
demonstrated judges' determination to take into
39
consideration the insurance issues in reaching their
judgments. In approving an indemnity, however, it is
egually essential that the insurance should closely
parallel the indemnity provisions.
The Chief Judge of the Circuit Court in Lanasse
raised a guestion - which was not raised by the parties -
arising on the face of the P & I policy. Chevron was
an additional assured. It was not allowed to claim
the affirmative benefit of the coverage, since the
liability imposed was not that of a vessel owner.
However, the Chief Judge rightly pointed out, it was
a claim by the vessel owner and presumably its
underwriters for recoupment of the sums paid to the
crewman. If the defence of the vessel owner and part
of the settlememt was in effect made by the underwriters,
then the underwriters could not in their own names
recover against Chevron in the face of the policy
provision waiving subrogation. The usual rule indepen¬
dent of a contractual provision was that an underwriter
could not recover by way of subrogation against its own
assured.. Thus, th court remanded for a determination
of whether this protection was waived by Chevron.
40
3. A critical review of the English and Scottish cases
Having regard to the relevant decisions in the United
States courts, it would seem pertinent to revert to the
English and Scottish cases already briefly remarked
which had been decided before the introduction of the
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, with particular reference
to the insurance aspects for purposes of clarification
and contrast.
37
In Canada Steamship, there was no clear reference to
negligence in the indemnity provisions under consideration.
A fire was occasioned by the negligence of the servants
of the Crown (the lessor), causing damage to a shed
and consuming all the goods therein owned by the lessee
(indemnitor) and third parties.
An insurance clause (clause 9) was incorporated into
the lease agreement between the Crown and the lessee to
the following effect -
"That the lessee shall, in addition to the payment
of the yearly rental hereunder, at its own sole
cost and expense, insure, concurrently with the
execution of this lease or as soon thereafter as
possible, and thereafter keep insured during the
currency of this lease with an insurance company
37. Supra note 5.
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or companies satisfactory to the Minister of
Transport the said shed against fire and other
casualty in the sum of ..." (Emphasis added)
Among other contentions, counsel for the Crown relied
on the fact that under clause 9 of the agreement the
lessee was bound to insure the shed, as an indication
that the Crown did not intend to be liable for any
damage howsoever it might arise. In considering this
point, the court admitted that this argument was not
without force as applied to the shed. The insurance
clause made no reference to the goods within the
shed, however, which gave rise to the action.
Judging from the reasoning underlying the decision
in so far as the insurance issue is concerned, it may
reasonably be inferred - though not explicitly declared
by the court - that the insurance requirements, being
connected with indemnity clauses in one way or another,
should be given weight by courts in deciding the validi¬
ty of the indemnity clauses and the extent to which
the indemnity clauses are meant to cover.
At this point, nevertheless, it is important to
inquire whether the court would have reached a different
decision in the Canada Steamship case, had clause 9 in
that case required the goods as well as the shed to be
42
insured. Whatever the answer may be, it should be
indicated that what an indemnitor owes to an indemnitee
under an indemnity agreement is, in a strict legal
sense, a contractual liability. It follows therefore
that any other insurance arrangement than a liability
coverage parallel to that effect would appear to be of
relatively little assistance in reflecting the genuine
38
intention of the parties to the indemnity agreement.
The insurance issue, which was not raised in the
39
North of Scotland case, was again encountered in
40
Gillespie Bros, v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd.
Gillespie Brothers ordered three watches from Swiss
manufacturers which were for resale to other buyers.
When the parcel containing the watches arrived in
London, Gillespie Brothers asked their forwarding agents
to arrange for the trans-shipment. The forwarding
38. The insurance arrangements purporting to cover the
contractual indemnities in the above-mentioned US
decisions are clearly supportive of this proposition.
However, it does not follow that such coverages are
available under any liability policy. See Chapter 3.
39. Supra note 10.
40. Supra note 12.
43
agents for this purpose hired a van and a driver from
Roy Bowles, the carriers, with the driver remaining the
carriers' servant. The parcel was then stolen from the
van while the driver was signing for it in the ware¬
house. Upon the finding that the driver had been
negligent, the owners (Gillespie Brothers) succeeded
in an action against the carriers for the value of the
parcel and interest thereon.
The carriers brought third-party proceedings
claiming to be indemnified by the forwarding agents
imder clause 3(4) of the Road Haulage Association's
41
Conditions of Carriage which were incorporated into
the contract between the carriers and the forwarding
agents.
By clause 3(4) it was provided that the forwarding
agents should save harmless and keep the carriers
indemnified against all claims or demands whatsoever
made in excess of the carriers' liability under the
conditions.
41. The Road Haulage Association's Conditions of
Carriage were directly at issue in a recent case,
see Acme Transport v. Betts, [l93lj 1 Lloyd's Rep.
131.
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Apart from the construction issue already discussed
above, lawyers for the carriers took the position that
parties should be given the certainty enabling them to
be aware of the area where a particular risk might fall
and to insure accordingly. If there was an uncertainty
due to the interpretation of the conditions which were
standard throughout the industry and which were often
incorporated by reference into contracts, then each
party in the present case might insure against the
same risk, thereby increasing the cost to the customers.
The main instrument to eliminate double insurance, as
42
the lawyers put it, was the indemnity clause. They
further pointed out that for some loads the customer
did not bother to take out insurance since he knew that
he had an absolute cover against the carrier; but if the
customer had a very valuable load it was right that he
should pay the premium for the excess above the carrier's
liability, in this case £300 a ton.
It was however asserted by counsel for the forwarding
agents that the position of the forwarding agents
»
vis-a-vis insurance was that they would need to have,
42. Supra note 12, at p. 405.
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if the carriers were right (i) a general policy to
cover the goods handled - -which might be difficult
to obtain, or (ii) a special policy each time they
received a consignment. This in turn would mean that
even before they took delivery of the goods they would
have the insurance burden which ought to be borne by
the carriers who were already covered by insurers who
43
knew. That did not make for fairness.
In disposing of the insurance issue, Lord Denning
reminded the parties that it had been the common
practice of carriers to make conditions limiting
their liability to specific sums and to leave the
goods owner to insure if he wanted greater cover.
Carriers based their charges - and the insurers
calculated their premiums - on the footing that the
limitation was valid and effective between all concerned.
According to Lord Denning, the law should support this
44
course of trade and uphold the limitation.
43. Supra note 12, at p. 407.
44. At p. 412.
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Some observations and comments derive from the
contentions by the lawyers representing the two sides.
In brief, it is probably true to say that counsel for
the forwarding agents erred in directing his assertion
at the availability and feasibility of the insurance
covering indemnity liability. They should in no event
be viewed as a determining factor as to the liability
of the parties. Inasmuch as the incorporation of the
indemnity provision into the standard conditions may
very likely impose potential liabilities upon the
forwarding agents, they must have considered whether
they should in the end resort to a liability policy
of one form or another, even though the carriers'
negligence is excluded from the coverage. Alternatively,
they could opt to self-insure the risk - as apparently
the case - and assume any resulting consequence.
Lawyers for the carriers took the view - seemingly
endorsed by Lord Denning - that the main instrument to
eliminate double insurance was the indemnity clause.
In putting forward this proposition, it may be thought
that they were avoiding another accusation that failure
by the carriers clearly to refer to negligence in the
47
standard clause was actually the main cause of double
insurance, if any. In other words, had the word
"negligence" been inserted in the clause, then both
the carriers and the forwarding agents would have
discerned their respective liability. To that extent,
double insurance would be a remote possibility.
Opinion among the law lords was divided on the
insurance question in Smith v. U.M.B. Chrysler (Scotland)
45
Ltd., in which William Smith, an electrician employed
by the suppliers, brought an action against U.M.B.
Chrysler (purchasers) for reparation for personal
injuries due to an accident wholly caused by negligence
on the part of the purchasers. The purchasers claimed
against the suppliers both a contribution under the Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions)(Scotland) Act 1940
and also a contractual indemnity in respect of any
damages and expenses which they might be found liable
to pay to the injured electrician.
Insurance requirements were stipulated in the
indemnity clause whereby the suppliers should "insure
against and cause all sub-contractors to insure against
45. Supra note 13.
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their liability hereunder", and should also produce to
the purchasers on demand the policies of insurance with
current renewal receipts therefor.
Lord Fraser viewed the provisions dealing with
46
insurance as obscure. Noting that reference to sub¬
contractors insuring against their liability under the
clause was inept as no sub-contractors were parties to
the contract, his Lordship held that the insurance
provisions were intended to cover the liabilities of
both the suppliers and sub-contractors, if any, arising
from their respective acts or omissions. Otherwise the
effect of the insurance provisions would be to require
double - or multiple - insurance by the suppliers and
sub-contractors against liability arising from acts or
omissions of any party including the purchasers. It
seemed to Lord Fraser "most unlikely" that this could
47
have been intended.
Obscure as the provisions may be, it should however
be remarked that the "most unlikely" insurance
arrangement, as Lord Fraser termed it, had been
46. Supra note 13, at p. 13.
47. At p. 14.
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associated with a number of commercial activities, of
which the oil industry is a remarkable example.
Lord Keith of Kinkel opined that the insurance
provisions were extremely difficult of construction.
It was very uncertain whether "their liability
hereunder" referred to liability under the indemnity
clause or general liability that might be incurred by
reason of the contract. In his concluding remarks,
Lord Keith stated that the insurance provisions were
not in any event significant for the purpose of
48
ascertaining the extent of indemnity obligation.
It is of little doubt that Lord Keith's proposition
in this regard may invite criticism, in view of an
appraisal of the different but significant roles the
insurance factors played in the United States decisions
previously discussed.
4. Taking the 1977 Act into account
The inception of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977,
49
as noted above, has changed the situation drastically.
A reading of section 2 in Part I of the Act would
48. Supra note 13, at p. 18.
49. See above, p. 15.
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suggest that an indemnity agreement excluding liability
resulting from the indemnitee's own negligence is
50
unenforceable whether or not there is in behind an
insurance coverage guarding against that liability. The
51
insurance coverage, being unaffected by the Act, would
unfortunately be of little practical function. Against
such a legal background, there seem to be two options
opent to the indemnitee. He can protect himself either
by obtaining his own policy covering liability for death
or personal injury resulting from his own negligence, or
by naming himself as an additional assured in the
52
indemnitor's policy.
It is therefore submitted - tentative as it may be -
that in view of the insurability of the contractual
liability against indemnitees' negligence, indemnity
agreements indemnifying indemnitees' own negligence
50. Subject to certain exceptions with which the present
discussion does not intend to deal in detail.
51. Schedule 1, s. 1(a).
52. See below, p. 59.
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should be given effect if the agreements are fully
insured to that extent. To do this would further
strengthen the idea that parties can successfully
pass their negligence liability to their insurers,
as has been clearly reflected in the proviso that the
1977 Act does not extend to insurance contracts.
From a practical standpoint, the extent to which
the indemnity provisions inserted in offshore contracts
can be affected by the 1977 Act still remains undecided.
Judicially, there are signs that the insurance factor
has been given increasing weight in situations involving
contractual allocation of liabilities, one manifestation
being Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd.,
a recent House of Lords decision.
The contract containing an exclusion clause involved
in the case was entered into before the passing of the
1977 Act. Although the decision in favour of the
contractual distribution of responsibilities was based
solely on the common law of contract, the law lords did
53. [jl980] 2 W.L.R 283 (H.L.(E.)). This case was referred
to in the judgment of Port Jackson Ltd. v. Salmon &
Spraggon Ltd., [l9Slj 1 W.L.R. 138.
53
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make some reference to the effect of the 1977 Act. The
following passages are taken from the judgment of Lord
54
Wilberforce:
"But since then Parliament has taken a hand: it has
passed the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. This Act
applies to consumer contracts and those based on
standard terms and enables exception clauses to be
applied with regard to what is just and reasonable.
It is significant that Parliament refrained from
legislating over the whole field of contract. After
this Act, in commercial matters generally, when the
parties are not of unequally bargaining power, and
when risks are normally borne by insurance, but only
is the case for judicial intervention undemonstrated,
but there is everything to be said, and this seems to
have been Parliament's intention, for leaving the
parties free to apportion the risks as they think fit
for respecting their decisions." (Emphases added)
The proposition Lord Diplock put forward is equally
55
noteworthy:
"In commercial contracts negotiated between business¬
men capable of looking after their own interests and
of deciding how risks inherent in the performance of
of various kinds of contract can be most economically
borne (generally by insurance), it is, in my view,
wrong to place a strained construction upon words in
an exclusion clause which are clear and fairly
susceptible of one meaning only even after due
54. Supra note 53, at p. 289.
55. At p. 296.
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allowance has been made for the presumption in
favour of the implied primary and secondary
obligations..." (Emphases added)
It seems plain enough that the opinion expressed by
their Lordships has reinforced the belief already
advocated by the writer in the unique relationship
between insurance and contractual allocation of
liabilities. Nevertheless, it is not easy to assess
whether the decision is an indication of the willingness
and seriousness with which the courts are to deal with
the indemnity provisions involved in offshore contracts.
Is it a safe assumption that judicial intervention in
that instance will remain "undemonstrated"? Is it the
willingness of the courts, rather than the Act itself,
or both, that will be decisive?
D. Some further observations
1. Waiver of subrogation
Two further relevant points which appear to present
some difficulty concern waiver of subrogation and naming
the indemnitee as an additional assured in the indemnitor's
policy.
It should be realised that insurance contracts and
indemnity clauses are different and independent
agreements. In instances involving both indemnity and
54
and insurance, these two different agreements are
related to, but separate from, each other. An insurer,
on the other hand, is in normal circumstances not a
party to an indemnity agreement which is entered into
between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. Therefore,
the insurer's right of subrogation against the indemnitee
is not automatically affected unless the waiver of
subrogation is granted.
Where waiver of subrogation is required in the
indemnity agreement and the waiver is effectively
56
.obtained from the insurer, the insurer loses its right
of subrogation. The same applies when the insurer waives
its right for one reason or another without the indemnity
57
agreement so requiring.
A rather different and observable situation may
emerge in which the waiver is stipulated in the agreement
56. The insurer can waive its right of subrogation by
agreement with the insured. See, e.g. Thomas & Co.
v. Brown, (1399) 4 Com. Cas. 136.
57. Such a waiver in the present context should however
be distinguished from the situation in which insurers
waive their rights of subrogation by agreement with
other insurers. Cf. Birds, "Contractual Subrogation
in Insurance," (1979) The Journal of Business Law
p. 126.
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and the indemnitor fails to procure it from the insurer
The indemnitor in this case may be liable for damage
arising therefrom as he breaches his contractual
obligation towards the indemnitee, whereas the insurer
is not barred from exercising its right.
While it is beyond the purview of this Chapter to
consider the extent to which an insurer may exercise it-
right of subrogation against an indemnitee, it seems
relevant to discuss the decision in State Government
59
Insurance Office v. Brisbane Stevedoring Pty. Ltd.
A worker was awarded damages for personal injuries
sustained by him against his employer and the owner of
a mobile crane. Both the employer and the owner were
found negligent. The mobile crane, with its driver,
was hired by the employer under an agreement containing
an indemnity clause whereby the employer agreed to
indemnify the crane owner from all or any claims for
injury arising out of the use of the crane. The court
apportioned responsibility between the employer and the
owner. Holding the indemnity clause enforceable, the
58. E.g. Twenty Grand Offshore, Inc. v. West India
Carriers, Inc., supra note 27.
59. (1969) 123 C.L.R. 228.
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court ordered the employer to indemnify the crane
owner, and ordered the employer* s insurer which was
joined in the action as a third party to indemnify the
employer completely.
The insurer (appellant) disclaimed its liability,
contending, among others, that by entering into the
hiring agreement which contained an indemnity clause
preventing the employer from being able to assert a
right of contribution, the employer was in breach of
a duty which it owed to its insurer not to defeat or
diminish the rights to which the insurer might become
entitled by way of subrogation.
The court rejected the insurer's contention by
stating that nothing in the policy or in the general
law reguired the employer to create rights for the
benefit of the insurer. To hire a crane in terms that
it should acguire no rights against the crane owner
was not in breach of any obligation resting on him.
Where an insurance was effected without disclosure of
an arrangement whereby a possible future right of the
insurer to have recourse against a third party was
negated, the court went on, the question whether the
non-disclosure was a concealment of a material fact
57
depended upon whether the insurer, to the knowledge
of the insured, was accustomed to charge a higher
premium in a case where there was to be no right of
recourse than in a case where there was to be such
a right.
As the information available in the holding failed
to throw ample light on the exact relationship between
the indemnity clause and the insurance coverage in
dispute, an exhaustive analysis in this respect may
prove to be impossible and impractical. Having said
that, nevertheless, the very proposition that "nothing
in the policy or in the general law required the
employer to create rights for the benefit of the
insurer" would merit some remarks. It should be con¬
ceded that an insured has no obligations whatsoever
to create rights for the benefit of his insurer. It
is however equally true that the insured must do no
act by which the insurer may be prejudiced and ensure
that the insurer enjoys the full benefit of subrogation
60
which is inherent in the insurer's disposition. As has
60. See Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law (4th
ed. 1979) pp. 508, 509.
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been hinted at in the foregoing discussion an insurance
coverage parallel to an indemnity agreement is fairly
difficult to procure. This may also be evidenced by
the fact that comprehensive general iability policies
51
normally exclude this particular risk. And insurers
would hardly give up their right of subrogation against
the indemnitees without adequate consideration, e.g.
much higher premium. It would therefore be unfair and
misleading if the presumption derived from that propo¬
sition in favour of insureds should prevail in a
typical insurance-indemnity axis as has been repeatedly
illustrated. As a matter of fact, even though an
insurer has granted the waiver of subrogation in a
indemnity-associated situation, he may still resist
his commitment, thus further complicating the picture.
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Fluor Western Inc. v. G & H Offshore Towing Co. Inc.,
another United States case, may be viewed as represen¬
tative of a set of decisions sharing the same nature.
In Fluor, the underwriters argued that the waiver
61. See below, Chapter 3.
62. 447 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1971).
59
of subrogation in effect absolved the towing company
(indemnitee) of responsibility for negligence and this
63
was inconsistent with the Bisso-Dixilyn rule. Having
found no evidence showing that the waiver of subroga¬
tion resulted from an unconscionable inequality in
bargaining positions, the court rejected that conten¬
tion, holding that the Bisso rule was not applicable
in that situation.
2. Naming the indemnitee as an additional assured
It remains to be decided whether naming the
indemnitee as an additional assured in the indemnitor's
64
policy is practically desirable in any instance, bearing
in mind, for example, the decision in Stolberg v. Pearl
65
Assurance.
Pearl Assurance issued a policy covering S.M.C.O.
and two other insureds in respect of liability for
63. See above, pp. 21-23.
64. For an affirmative view, which is not shared by
the writer of this work, see Hancock, "Some Pitfalls
in Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance Clauses
in Drilling and Service Contracts," (1973) 24 Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Institute 535, at p. 662. Cf.
"North Sea Problems," Insurance Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan.
1975) p. 24.
65. £l970j 2 Lloyd's Rep. 421.
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bodily injury and death. An enforsement to that policy
was then issued which added Stolberg (plaintiff) as an
additional assured. In April 1965, when the policy was
in effect, an employee of S.M.C.O. was killed due to
negligence of Stolberg. Stolberg claimed indemnity
from Pearl Assurance for damages awarded against him
in respect of the death of the employee. The defendant
insurer disclaimed the liability, pleading a policy
condition which excluded liability in respect of
bodily injury and death sustained "by any employee of
the Insured..."
Plaintiff argued that the exclusion covered only
employees of the "Insured". Inasmuch as he was the
insured and the employee was not employed by him but
by S.M.C.O., the exclusion clause was inapplicable.
The British Columbia Supreme Court, rejecting the
plaintiff's contention, stated that the plaintiff
confused the situation by identifying the words "the
Insured" with the word claimant. "The Insured" under
the policy at issue included the plaintiff and three
other companies. Stolberg, although the only claimant,
was not the only insured. On a fair reading of the whole
policy, the court reasoned, it was clear that the
61
intention of the exclusion clause was to exclude claims
made in respect of liability to any employee of the
three companies named as "Insured". The liability in
respect of the death of that employee was meant to be
excluded.
Account must also be taken of a hypothetical
situation in which.the policy excludes the liability
arising from the insured's own negligence. While the
indemnitee, expecting additional security by adding
his name in the policy, happens to be negligent, the
insurer would not hesitate to disclaim its liability
in that the indemnitee is also a named assured. Thus
the resulting effect would probably be different from
that as desired.
E. Concluding Remarks
The present discussion has sought to show the
potentially decisive importance of the insurance factor
in implementing indemnity clauses, which have been
regarded by parties interested in offshore ventures as
a necessary means of allocating liabilities and
responsibilities. Clearly the validity of indemnity
provisions and the extent to which they are legally
enforceable are a point on which offshore underwriters
62
and their assureds are sensitive. With contractua
indemnity likely to remain a dominant feature in
66
offshore oil-related activities, it may appear rational
to minimise legal constraints "whatsoever upon such
widely-adopted practices, as long as back-up insurance
coverages are obtainable. In this particular respect,
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 seems to have given
cause for disquiet.
In drafting an indemnity clause, it is important to
66. Offshore contractual indemnities have recently been
extended to cases like Tharos, a Japanese-built
semi-submersible with advanced fire-fighting,
emergency support, maintenance and diving facilities.
It has been reported that the Occidental North Sea
consortium, the owner of the Tharos, tried to form
an "insurance club" which would allow other nearby
operators emergency use of the rig at a rate well
below the estimated £140,000 a day it would normally
cost third parties. In return "club" members would
pay a portion of the rig's operating cost and be
required to sign cross indemnification agreements
which would relieve the Tharos owner of responsibili¬
ty for damage caused to a rig or platform while
answering an emergency call. See Financial Times,
February 13, 1930, p. 9.
63
ensure that the insurance protection behind the scene
operates in a constructive and parallel way rather than
obscure the purpose to be intended. Nevertheless, such
precautions alone cannot totally relieve the concern of
parties to an indemnity agreement without also a helping
hand from the courts. While there can be no assurance
that the courts would honour any contractual indemnity,
their determination of fully scrutinizing the insurance
element involved therein could be a significant comfort
to offshore venturers.
Taken as a whole, the guidelines deducible from
the United States decisions in considering an indemnity-
insurance axis cannot merit too much emphasis. To this
extent, the lengthy description elsewhere in the Chapter
of those cases seems worthwhile.
Broadly, it would appear that the insurance aspect
associated with contractual indemnity has so far been
more significant than the British courts have acknowledged.
In the offshore area, on the other hand, there are
instances in which the point under consideration still
remains perhaps a somewhat unknown factor, which is
resistant to change. Nowhere is this indifference more
obvious than in the model clauses contained in the
64
present UK production and exploration licences. It is
stipulated in the licences that the licensee "shall at
all times keep the Minister effectually indemnified
against all actions proceedubgs cost charges claims
and demands whatsoever which may be made or brought
against the Minister by any third party in relation to
or in connection with this licence or any matter or thing
67
done or purported to be done in pursuance thereof." If
there is any defect in the clause, apart from its
enforceability under the 1977 Act, it is that no
insurance is required throughout the model clauses to
keep these indemnity clauses effectual. While there
has been a clear tendency in the United States
jurisdiction to treat an insurance-backed indemnity
as the norm, such an attitude has not generally been
adopted in the UK.
67. CI. 37 of the Model Clauses for production licences
in seaward areas and cl. 19 of the Model Clauses for
exploration licences in seaward areas.
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CHAPTER THREE
INSURING AGAINST LIABILITIES OF THE MAJOR
PARTIES INVOLVED IN OFFSHORE OPERATIONS
A. The operator and other participants in a joint venture
With the sums of money involved in the oil and gas
industry being astronomical, almost all offshore
exploration and production operations have been carried
out on a joint venture basis. The contractual arrange¬
ments made between the co-licensees under a licence are
usually embodied in an agreement, commonly called the
1
joint operating agreement, within which the respective
interests in the venture and the manner in which the
operation should be conducted, are agreed upon. As a
1. Joint operating agreements are fully considered in
MacWilliam and Muir, "Offshore Operating Agreements,"
(1973) 11 Alberta Law Review 503; Bond and Webb, "UK
Offshore Operating Agreements," The Law Society's
Gazette (11 January 1978) pp. 10, 11; Hill, "Joint
Operating Agreements," Proceedings of the Petroleum
Law Seminar, Cambridge (8-13 January 1978) Vol. 1,
paper 14. For a recent judical decision involving an
operating agreement, see B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya)
Ltd. v. Hunt (No. 2), [l98l] 1 W.L.R. 232 (C.A.).
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matter of fact, a certain degree of uniformity to date
has been achieved in joint operating agreements, with
very limited variations to meet particular circumstances.
The purchase of insurance, which is essential to any
offshore venture, is also specified in a typical
operating agreement.
It is the invariable practice for the parties to
a joint operating agreement to designate one of the
participant to conduct all the operations on behalf
of the co-venturers. In the United Kingdom, the
granting of a production licence is conditional upon
the appointment of such a participant - now familiarly
known as the operator - satisfactory to the Secretary
2
of State for Energy.
It is outside the scope of this work to enter into
a detailed exposition of the legal status of the
operator. Broadly speaking, however, the operator
should act in the capacity of a principal in its
relations with third parties in appropriate circumstances
so that the inconvenience of the non-operators being
2. The Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, Schedule
5, cl. 22(1), as amended by the Petroleum (Production)
(Amendment) Regulations 1978, S.I. 1978, No. 929.
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directly involved in any potential dispute can be
3
minimised. Among other obligation, the responsibility
for insurance is usually vested in the operator.
As the operator is in most cases not remunerated
by non-operators, a question of major importance
arises as to whether the operator should be solely
liable for damage to third parties. The answer to
this depends mainly upon the wording of the operating
agreement and could vary from case to case. In
principle, the operator should not be liable in
4
excess of its participating interest share. The view
is now spreading that liabilities incurred by the
operator towards thirds parties could be charged to
non-operators. To this extent, the operator's
liability insurer, after indemnifying the loss,
becomes subrogated to the rights of the operator
against other co-venturers.
In conducting the operations, the operator is
equally likely to incur liabilities to the non-
operators. An insurance coverage covering such
3. Hill, op cit (supra note l) at p. 14.5; cf. Daintith
and Wilioughby (eds.), A Manual of United Kingdom Oil
and Gas Law (1977) p. 44.
4. Hill, op cit (supra note l), at p. 14.9.
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liabilities would be desirable. In this connection,
a particularly noteworthy point is that under the
Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930
the operator's rights against its insurer shall be
conferred on the co-venturers in the event of the
5
operator being insolvent or in certain other events.
Subject to certain conditions, complete withdrawal
6
by a participant - even by the operator - from the
licence and the joint venture is normally allowable.
In the wake of the recent disasters in the offshore
7
area, it is hardly surprising that there has been a
marked tendency towards increasing the control over
the operator by non-operators. These tragic events,
5. The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act
1930, s. 1(1)(b).
6. For example, the American operator Mesa Petroleum
of the Beatrice field has sold all its UK interests
to the British National Oil Corporation, as reported
in Financial Times, April 4, 1979, p. 1.
7. E.g. the Ixtoc I blowout and the Alexander Kielland
disaster. See below, Chapter 5.
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accompanied by a number of problems unsolved, have
highlighted the importance of liability insurances
involved in offshore ventures, which will be examined
in the later part of this Chapter.
B. Contractors and sub-contractors
1. Independent contractors, generally
The majority of offshore drilling and service
contracts contain an independent contractor clause
clearly stating that the contractor is an "independent
contractor" free of control or supervision by the
employer (operator) as to the means or manner of
8
performing a particular work. This clause is of
particular interest to parties concerned with the
oil and gas industry, in that an employer in general
is not liable for the negligence of his independent
contractor to the same extent as he is liable for
9
the negligence of his own servants. Where a negligent
8. Some contracts only stipulate that contractors in
performing their obligations shall be independent
contractors, without giving further definitio or
explanation thereof. See, for example, art. I,
cl. 106 of the I.A.D.C. contract, which has been
briefly noted above at p. 17, note 18 and is further
discussed elsewhere in this Chapter.
9. See Munkman, Employer's Liability at Common Law
(8th ed. 1975) p. 96.
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act is committed by an independent contractor, in other
words, it does not of itself render the employer
10
liable.
In most cases, an employer is not responsible for
11
the delicts of his independent contractor. Nor is he
liable for any tort committed by the servants whom
the independent contractor may have engaged for the
12
actual performance of the work. However, the mere fact
that the act complained of is one delegated to an
independent contractor does not excuse the employer
from his own negligence, subject of course to a valid
indemnity agreement.
While an employer is under a statutory obligation
to execute a particular work and entrusts the execution
of the work to an independent contractor, he is still
10. 28 Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed.) 23, with
cases.
11. E.g. Johnston v. Mills, (1917) 37 D.L.R. 767.
12. The judicial authorities include Penny v. Wimbledon
Urban Council, [l899j 2 Q.B. 72, C.A. ; Holliday v.
National Telephone Co., [l899j 2 Q.B. 392, C.A.
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responsible to third parties for any injury sustained
by them in consequence of the improper execution of the
13
work by the independent contractor. In addition, an
employer cannot escape from his personal duty of care.
It has been held that an employer's personal duty
cannot be delegated so as to divest him of responsi¬
bility as far as it concerns plant, place of work and
14
method of work. It is therefore clear that by means
of an independent contractor clause incorporated into
an offshore contract, the operator may well be
delegating at least part of his duty to the independent
contractor as long as the performance of the contract
15
does not involve the operator's personal duty.
2. "Control"
The distinction between an independent contractor
13. Hardaker v. Idle District Council, [jl896j 1 Q.B.
335, C.A.; Robinson v. Beaconsfield Rural Council,
C1911j 2 Ch. 183, C.A.
14. Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. Ltd. v. English, ^1938]
A.C. 57; [jl937j 3 All E.R. 628. Scottish cases
include Baird v. Addie, (1854) 16 D. 490; Macdonald
v. Wyllie, (1898) 1 F. 339.
15. The same conclusion has been reached by Kitchen in
his book Labour Law and Off-shore Oil (1977) p. 151.
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and a servant is virtually a question of both law and
fact. The most decisive test, which has been generally
accepted and supported by a number of decisions, lies in
the nature and degree of control on the part of the
16
employer over the performance of the contract. So far
as the oil industry is concerned, particular reference
may be made to Marine Pipeline & Dredging Ltd. v.
17
Canadian Fina Oil Ltd. Nevertheless, it is exactly
this factor of "control" which has proved to be most
controversial as applied to offshore activities,
particularly drilling. The problem that frequently
arises in practice is whether the employer's act in
co-ordination with the contractor has resulted in
some form of control over the work undertaken by the
16. Performing Right Soc. Ltd. v. Mitchell & Booker
(Palais De Danse), Ltd., [l924(] 1 K.B. 762; Short v.
J.W. Henderson, Ltd., [19463 S.C. (H.L.) 24, at p. 34;
Gould v. Minister of National Insurance, [l95l3 1 K.B.
731, at p. 734.
17. 46 D.L.R. (2d) 495.
It may be relevant to note that in Newspapers Inc. v.
Love, 380 S.W. 2d 582 (Tex. 1964), the Supreme Court
of Texas held that testimony as to actual control was
evidentiary only, and that it was the right of control
rather than actual control which was the ultimate
legal issue for determination.
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contractor and thereby destroyed that unique relation-
18
ship. This is largely attributable to the fact that
in many cases the contractor is obligated under the
contract to perform certain functions as "required" or
"directed" by the operator. And there are occasions
upon which the operator will furnish materials or
equipment and its inspectors or technical supervisors
will consult with the contractor concerning the work
being performed. However, the right to inspect without
actually controlling the work does not in any way affect
19
the status of an independent contractor. It has been
suggested that a drilling contract can create the status
of an independent contractor for some acts in the drilling
20
operation and refrain from doing so as to other parts.
3. Exceptions to general rules
It should be noted that there are some other
circumstances in which the employer is still liable
to certain extent for acts committed by his independent
contractor, whilst the employer-independent contractor
18. Cf. "The Liability of a Drilling Contractor," (1966)
5 Alberta Law Review 108, at p. 116.
19. Ibid, at p. 117.
20. Ibid.
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relationship remains unaffected. Of particular
21
relevance to the oil industry is Rvlands v. Fletcher,
a landmark case which deserves mention.
In bridf, the litigation arose when the owners of
a land employed independent contractors to construct
a reservoir on their land. In the course of the work,
the contractors struck some old shafts connected with
the mines of a neighbour. When the reservoir was
eompleted the water burst through the shafts and
flooded the neighbour's mines. The owners of the land
were found not negligent, yet the contractors had been.
The court held the owners liable even though there was
no fault on their part.
The Rylands rule has been applied to impose
liability for the escape of water, electricity, gas,
22
oil, fire and explosions. Be that as it may, there
has been controversy as to how far the rule is applicable
21. [1366] L.R. 1 Ex. 265, affd. [l363] L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
22. For recent cases applying the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher, see 36(1) Law Digest 443.
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23
in Scotland. Broadly, the liability under the Rylands
rule is strict and it is no defence that the object
escaped -without the owner's (employer) wilful act,
default or neglect, or even that he had no knowledge
24
of its existence. However, it is important to point
out that to fall within the rule there must be, among
others, a non-natural use of the land. While the unique
nature of the ruling cannot be ignored by parties
associated with oil and gas ventures on land, it appears
most unlikely that the Rylands rule would eventually be
extended without change to offshore activities.
Another exception to the general rule that a
employer is not liable for the acts of his independent
23. This was also the question which the then Lord
Advocate put to the Law Reform Committee for Scotland
in 1964. See the Thirteenth Report of the Law Reform
Committee for Scotland, Cmnd 2348. The majority
recommended that the law should not be changed.
Professor T.B. Smith dissented, contending that
the law should be clarified by a statutory declara¬
tion that the principle enunciated in the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher should not apply in the law of
Scotland. For commentary, see 1964 S.L.T. (News) 225.
24. For a complete list of cases, see 28 Halsbury's Laws
of England (3rd ed.) 145.
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contractor, which is probably of more interest to
persons involved in offshore operations, is based upon
extra hazardous or inherently dangerous acts. It has
been established that where the work which the indepen¬
dent contractor is employed to do is of a character
likely to be dangerous to the public, unless done with
proper precautions, the employer is responsible to any
member of the public who sustains injury in consequence
25
of the manner in which the work is done. It is also
quite conceivable that when the act or operation is
likely to cause injury to others unless special precau¬
tions are taken, the degree of care required is
26
proportionately high. Courts are thus inclined to the
view that the responsibility for the negligence of an
independent contractor in such circumstances should be
25. Recognised in decided cases, in particular Daniel v.
Rickett Cockerell & Co, , Ltd. and Raymond, [jl938j 2
K.B. 322; ^1933]] 2 All E.R. 631; Balfour v. Barty
King, Hyder & Sons (Builders), Ltd., [l957j 1 Q.B.
496, C.A.; [l957] 1 All E.R. 156. For Scottish
authorities, see Walker, The Law of Delict in
Scotland (1966) Vol. 1, pp. 165, 166. Note however
Cloggie v. J O'Donoqhue (Reinstatements) Ltd., 1981
S.L.T. 10.
26. 28 Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed.) 13.
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27
imposed upon his employer.
Regrettably, there is no legal classification of
28
work or things as dangerous or not dangerous, although
it has been decided that operations connected with the
29 30
handling of petroleum and the distribution of gas call
for special precautions. So far, there has been little,
if any, judicial authority in the UK on the issue as to
whether offshore oil activities - or any part of the
activities - can be termed extra hazardous or inherently
dangerous. Some decisions in the United States courts,
nevertheless, have supported the position that oil and
27. Honeywill and Stein, Ltd. v. Larkin Brothers, Ltd.,
[l934] 1 K.B. 191, C.A. This case is discussed in
Williams, "Liability for Independent Contractors,"
[l956] Cambridge Law Journal 180, at p. 186.
28. 28 Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed.) 56.
29. Century Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Northern Ireland Road
Transport Board, [l942] A.C. 509, H.L. ; [l942] 1 All
E.R. 491.
30. Jackson v. Carshalton Gas Co., (1888) 5 T.L.R. 69;
Dominion Natural Gas Co., Ltd. v. Collins and Perkins,
[1909] A.C. 640, P.C.
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gas operations are not per se dangerous as to apply the
31
absolute liability doctrine.
It is not proposed in this work to deal with the
status of sub-contractors. It must however be remembered
that the contractor's - or its underwriter's - liability
depends partly upon the nomination of sub-contractors.
This may be gauged by the fact that the contract between
the operator and his contractor usually requires the
contractor to be liable for and indemnify and keep
indemnified the operator against all losses and claims
for damage not only to the contractor himself, but also
to the sub-contractors, which may arise out of or in
consequence of the performance of the work by the
32
contractor. In such a case, if the operator still
reserves the right to nominate the sub-contractors - as
is sometimes the case - it is submitted that the
31. E.g. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96
S.W.2d 221 (1936), as cited in Canuteson, "Insurance
and Liability Problems Relating to Drilling and
Servicing Operations," (1967) 13th Annual Institute
on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 131, at p. 185.
32. See, for example, the Thistle Field Contracting
Agreement (final copy), cl. 14.3.
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stipulation should be subject to the rule of
unconscionability. According to the terms of the
contracts mostly involved, however, it seems plain
enough that use of sub-contractors by the contractor
will not on the whole relieve the contractor from
any liability under the contract.
4. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.
33
Olsen v. Shell Oil Co. involved an accident which
occurred in federal waters off the Louisiana coast
aboard a fixed platform owned by Shell Oil Co. Drilling
was conducted from the platform by an independent
drilling contractor known as Movible Offshore Inc.
(Movible). To carry on the operations, Movible had
located its modular and movable drilling rig on the
platform. In addition, Mobible had attached its
modular living quarters to the platform. Significantly,
34
the modular living unit was fully movable. When the
drilling rig was moved from one platform to another,
it was picked up as a unit by a derrick barge and then
33. 561 F.2d 1178 (1977)
34. Such a structure should however be distinguished
from a tender moored alongside a fixed platform.
See below, Chapter 4.
80
transported to a new site. The living quarters unit
was attached to a drilling platform in such a way that
cutting and burning of metal would be required to
remove it. The living quarters unit was equipped with
two electric water heaters which were wholly owned, as
was the unit, by the independent contractor.
As a result of an explosion of one water heater on
May 6, 1970, some workers employed by the independent
contractor were either killed or injured. Apart from
the workmen's compensation benefits under the Longshore¬
men' s and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the present
action was brought by the representatives of decedents
35
and the injured workers against Shell Oil Co.
The plaintiffs set forth two theories of liability.
They asserted that Shell had breached certain federal
35. Workmen's compensation benefits under the Longshore¬
men' s Act are the exclusive remedy against the
worker's employer. However, the employee's tort
action against any third party who might be
responsible for his injury remains unaffected.
Where an oil company owning a platform employs an
independent contractor to conduct drilling operations,
the oil company becomes the injured worker's most
likely third party defendant.
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regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior
pursuant to the statutory authority under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act. In rejecting this
contention, the court held that the Act dis not create
a private cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs
against the platform owner for breach of the regulations
where there was no negligence on the part of the
36
platform owner.
In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that
Shell was strictly liable to the plaintiffs, regardless
of its lack, of personal negligence, under the Louisiana
Civil Code art. 2322 which provided:
"The owner of a building is answerable for the
damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused
by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result
of a vice in its original construction."
It is important to note that the definition of
"building" had been extended in Louisiana to include
37
oil platforms. Having applied this interpretation to
36. This has been echoed by Bourg v. Texaco Oil Co Inc.,
578 F.2d 1117 (1978), in which the court held that
such regulations did not create any form of vicarious
liability on the part of a platform owner.
37. Vinton Petroleum Co. v. L. Seiss Oil Syndicate, Inc.,
19 La. App. 179, 139 So. 543 (1st Cir. 1932).
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the case at bar, the court turned to the main issue
of contention between the parties, i.e. whether an
owner of an offshore drilling platform could be held
strictly liable pursuant to art. 2322 for injuries
sustained by employees of an independent contractor
present on the platform for the purpose of conducting
38
drilling operations.
The general rule enunciated in the Louisiana
39
Supreme Court's holding in Cole v. Louisian Gas Co.
was that "the servant of an independent contractor
must look to him (and not to the person with whom he
has contracted) for injuries which they receive
through his fault or negligence." It was also held
40
in Henson v. Traveler's Ins. Co., that an injury to
the employee of an independent contractor caused by
the contractor's negligence did not impose strict
38. For a discussion of art. 2322, see Comment, "Article
2322 and the Liability of the Owner of An Immovable,"
(1967) 42 Tulane Law Review 178.
39. 121 La. 771, 46 So. 801 (1908).
40. 208 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 1968).
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liability on the building owner. One exception to the
general principles which governed a situation involving
an independent contractor appeared to be where "the
contract directly reguires the performance of a work
41
intrinsically dangerous, however skillfully performed."
Noting that there was an absence of clear and controlling
precedent directly applicable to the present case, the
federal court found it unable to reach a decision as
to whether an independent-contractor defence was
available to the defendant.
Adding to the difficulty were other grounds-upon
which Shell based its contentions. Shell argued that
it could not be held strictly liable pursuant to
art. 2322 because it did not own the modular drilling
rig containing the hot water heater, nor did it own
the soil upon which the platform was placed. Shell
further contended that the water heater was not an
immovable by attachment within the meaning of Cothern
42
v. La Rocca, because the water heater was not placed
41. Vinton Petroleum Co. v. L. Seiss Oil Syndicate, Inc.,
19 La. App. 179, 182; 139 So. 543, 545. supra note 37.
42. 255 La. 673, 232 So. 2d 473 (1970).
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on the premises by the owner of the building as
43
required by art. 467 of the Louisiana Code. It was
also argued that the accident had not resulted from
"ruin" within the purview of art. 2322, but rather
had been caused by the negligence of Movible.
Instead of rendering a judgment on the plaintiffs'
second theory of recovery, the federal court chose to
certify certain questions to the Louisiana Supreme
Court. The questions were:
"(l) Whether the owner of an offshore drilling
platform can be held strictly liable pursuant
to Article 2322 of the Louisiana Civil Code
absent the existence of intrinsically dangerous
work and absent the exercise of control of the
premises - when employees of an independent
contractor hired by the owner are injured while
on the platform by the explosion of a hot water
heater located in the living module which caused
part of the platform to fall or collapse, and
when the employees are on the platform for the
purpose of conducting drilling operations and
not for the purpose of repairing or constructing
the platform or any appurtenances or attachments
thereto.
(2) Assuming that an owner cannot be held strictly
liable to employees of an independent contractor
without the existence of an intrinsically
43. The court in Cothern recognised that an appurtenance
or an immovable by attachment may come within the
ambit of "building".
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dangerous activity, -whether drilling for oil on
an offshore drilling platform constitutes
"intrinsically dangerous -work" within the
meaning of Vinton Petroleum Co. v. L. Seiss
Oil Syndicate, Inc., 19 La. App. 179, 139 So.
543 (1st Cir. 1932),and as applied to Article
2322 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
(3) Whether injuries sustained by an employee of an
independent contractor are the result of "ruin"
of the building within the meaning of Article
2322 of the Louisiana Civil Code, when the fall
or collapse of the building is caused by the
explosion of a hot water heater attached to the
living module of the platform.
(4) Whether a modular and movable drilling rig
which is attached to an offshore drilling
platform in such a manner that cutting and
burning would be required to remove it, and
which is not owned by the owner of the platform
to which it is attached, constitutes an
"immovable by attachment" within the meaning
of Cothern v. La Rocca, 255 La. 573, 232 So.
2d 473, 477 (1970), and as applied to Article
2322 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
(5) Whether an owner of an offshore drilling
platform can be held strictly liable pursuant
to Article 2322 of the Louisiana Civil Code
for injury sustained upon the platform, even
though ownership of the underlying soil is
not vested in the owner of the platform."
(Empha se s added)
In response to the above-quoted questions, the Louisiana
44
Supreme Court first stated the three requirements for the
44. In Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 355 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978).
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application of art. 2322: (l) there must be a building;
(2) the defendant must be its owner; and (3) there must
be a "ruin" caused by a vice in construction or a
neglect to repair, which occasions the damage sought
to be recovered.
As far as the first requirement was concerned, the
Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated, but added little
45
to, the holding in the Vinton case.
The majority in 01 sen easily disposed of question
(3) by holding that an explosion did fall within the
46
definition of "ruin". The Louisiana Supreme Court also
concluded that question (4) should be answered affirma¬
tively. In addition, the court cited the 1978 re-
enactment of Civil Code art. 464 for the proposition
that a building may be an immovable separate and
distinct from the land on which it was situated when
owned separately, thus rejecting Shell's contention
reflected by question (5).
45. Supra note 37.
46. Such an approach has been criticised by a writer,
see Note, "Olsen v. Shell Oil: Expanded Liability
for Offshore Oil Platform Owners," (1979-80) 40
Louisiana Law Review 233, at p. 241.
37
In addressing question (l), the court took the
view that the living unit and its component parts
constituted an appurtenance of the building. The
unit should be included within the term "building"
for purposes of determining the platform owner's
delictual responsibility. Accordingly, any ruin of
an appurtenance may be considered a ruin of the
building. Most significantly of all, the owner of
a building had a non-delegable duty to keep his
building and its appurtenance free of injury-causing
defects. In the court's view, the owner may be
exculpated from the strict liability imposed by
art. 2322 only if the victim was injured not because
of the defect, but because of the fault of the injured
person or of some third person. In that context, the
"third person" should be a stranger rather than a
person like Movible who acted with the consent of the
platform owner in the performance of the owner's non¬
delegable duty.
On these considerations in favour of the plaintiffs,
the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that it was
unnecessary to that extent to answer the question posed
by the federal court as to whether offshore drilling
88
constituted intrinsically dangerous -work.
47
As one writer has mildly suggested, the decision
of 01sen would provide a broader basis of liability for
platform owners. This being the case, it is extremely
questionable as to whether the approach adopted by
the Louisiana Supreme Court could be justifiably
maintained.
So far as the decision is concerned, the analogy
with "building" may not be completely misplaced. Be
that as it may, that a building owner's liability
could be extended to the structures not owned nor
controlled by him would seem to be a strained analogy,
by which one can hardly be persuaded. The argument
from "appurtenance" appears to be equally thin. Can it
not be successfully argued that the platform constituted
an appurtenance of the drilling rig?
Above all, it must be stressed that the theory
of independent contractor is based upon sound legal
grounds. In bringing rationality to the laws which
govern the situations involving independent contractors,
the courts should by no means exaggerate or enhance the
47. Supra note 46.
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derogations from the established general principles.
Have such principles been given great weight in
reaching the 01sen decision?
More is now being heard of the view that major
parties involved in offshore oil activities should
each bear the risk in respect of their own employees,
which has been rightly reflected by the majority of
48
offshore drilling contracts. The courts may be
justified in imposing severe strains on platform
49
owners and subjecting them to "enterprise liability"
despite the contractual commitments. This is not
necessarily how the liability insurers see the issue.
In view of the sophistication of offshore liability
coverages, it is only in a situation in which the
parties' liabilities are specifically defined that
viable liability insurance can be expected.
50
As has been previously noted, the duty to obtain
liability insurance is usually vested in the operator
in a joint venture. It has also become standard
48. E.g. els. 1003 and 1004 of the I.A.D.C. contract.
49. As used by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
50. See above, p. 67.
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practice that a drilling contract is entered into
between the drilling contractor and the operator who
51
is not necessarily the platform owner. In this
connection, the holding in Olsen does create a
possibility that the platform owner could be subjected
to the expanded liability whereas the platform is not
owned or solely owned by the operator. Difficulty
could thus arise in regard to the implementation of
52
the operating agreement. From an insurance standpoint,
is it safe to conclude therefrom that the owner of the
platform is in a better state to frame the liability
insurance?
By the foregoing accounts, it appears to be
impossible to come to any other conclusion than that
the louisiana Supreme Court erred in its treatment
of the Olsen case.
5. Between drilling and other service contractors
There are in the offshore area a variety of situations
51. In Olsen, Shell was not only the owner of the platform,
but also the operator. This is discernible from the
fact that the drilling contract was agreed upon
between Shell and Movible.
52. See above, pp. 55-67.
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involving various contractors with different functions.
The possibility of suits by one contractor against
another arising from liability or indemnity cannot be
excluded. A practical illustration of this aspect may
be found in Tri-State Oil Tool Industries, Inc. v. Delta
53
Marine Drilling Company, a case which merits fuller
scrutiny.
Fontenot was a roughneck and member of a drilling
crew employed by Delta Marine Drilling Company. He
was seriously injured aboard Delta Marine's submersible
drilling rig after being struck by a pipe which fell
from an elevator belonging to and furnished by Tri-
State Oil Industries, Inc, a service contractor. This
accident involving an operation of lifting a wash pipe
out of the hole was performed by Delta Marine under
the general supervision of Tri-State but under the
immediate control of Delta Marine. Fontenot filed a
complaint under the Jones Act and the general maritime
law against Delta Marine and its insurer, and in
maritime tort against Tri-State and its insurer. On
the basis of his findings of negligence on the part of
53. 410 F.2d 173 (1969).
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Tri-State and of the unseaworthiness of Delta Marine's
drilling rig, the District Court judge held both
defendants liable, dismissing the cross-claims for
indemnity filed by Delta Marine and Tri-State against
each other. Both Delta Marine and Tri-State appealed
that dismissal only.
Delta Marine contended that it was entitled to
indemnity from Tri-State who negligently furnished
defective equipment to the drilling rig thus rendering
the rig unseaworthy. Tri-State argued, among others,
that neither of the cross-claimants was entitled to
indemnity from the other because there was no contractual
relationship between them. Delta Marine and Tri-State
contracted independently with the operator of the oil
lease.
The Circuit Court concluded that the right of
indemnity existed between parties, one of whom was
guilty of active or affirmative negligence, while the
other's fault was only technical or passive. That
right was equitable and it derived from the legal
principle that everyone was responsible for the
consequences of his own wrong.
Significantly, cases like Tri-State have shed some
93
light on the novel and potential exposures to risk
which would otherwise be unknown to offshore liability
underwriters.
C. Further points to watch
1. The Ryan doctrine
No discussion of the liability in.connection with
unseaworthiness as has been revealed in Tri-State will
54
be complete without also referring to the Ryan doctrine
which has brought another marked effect on offshore
liability insurances. In summary, the Ryan doctrine
was enunciated in a decision in which the United States
Supreme Court allowed recovery by way of indemnity
against the employer of an injured party where the
employer had contracted to perform stevedoring operations
for a ship owner and the injuries were caused by the
unsafe stowage of the ship's cargo. The Supreme Court
stated that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, although it was the exclusive remedy
by an employee against his employer in that situation,
did not preclude recovery by the ship owner who had
54. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp.,
350 U.S. 124, 76 S. Ct. 232 (1956).
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paid a judgment in satisfaction of the claim of the
injured employee. And this right of recovery in favour
of a ship owner was inherent in the contract undertaken
between the parties.
55
In Whisenant v. Brewster-Bartle Offshore Company,
the Ryan rule was tried for the first time in a
situation involving an oil rig instead! of a conventional
ship. This suit arose out of an accident which killed
Ray Whisenant, an employee of Loomis Hydraulic Testing
Co, Inc. (Loomis), while he was engaged in specialised
testing of an oil well drill aboard a submersible drilling
barge owned by Brewster-Bartle Offshore Company (Brewster-
Bartle). At the time of the accident the drilling rig
was drilling an oil well off the coast of Louisiana
pursuant to a contract with Texaco Inc. (Texaco). Texaco
had contracted with Loomis to perform certain specialised
services on the drill pipe. No privity of contract
existed between Loomis and Brewster-Bartle. It was
found that the unsafe method of procedure devised by
Loomis' employee Whisenant was the proximate cause of the
accident.
In the aftermath the decedent's widow sued the rig
55. 446 F.2d 394 (1971).
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owner; the rig owner filed a third-party complaint
against Loomis, the decedent's employer; and the
decedent's compensation insurer intervened for benefits
paid. The rig owner settled the cause of action
brought against it by the decedent's widow without
notifying Loomis or the compensation insurer of the
settlement negotiations. And Brewster-Bartle did not
submitted the proposed settlement agreement to Loomis
for approval. Following that settlement, the District
Court decided that since Loomis' breach of its implied
warranty of workmanlike service proximately caused
the accident and thereby rendered the drilling barge
unseaworthy, the barge owner should be indemnified
by Loomis pursuant to the Ryan doctrine, the compensation
insurer's claim for intervention was denied. Both Loomis
and the compensation insurer appealed.
On appeal, Loomis argued that the Ryan doctrine of
indemnification should not be extended beyond the
traditional stevedore-vessel relationship to a situation
in which a specialised service company came aboard a
drilling barge and rendered it unseaworthy. Loomis'
second contention was that the absence of a contractual
relationship between Loomis and Brewster-Bartle should
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have been fatal to the owner's Ryan claim of indemnifi¬
cation against Loomis since the warranty of workmanlike
performance did not extend to the barge owner when
there was no privity of contract between the barge
owner and the company performing the services.
The Circuit Court rejected Loomis' first contention,
part of its holding reads as follows:
"Given the implied warranty of workmanlike service
owed by the special contractor (Loomis) to the
drilling barge, we fail to see, on the facts now
before us, any reason to treat the scope and
measure of recovery for its breach in a manner con¬
ceptually different from that applied to the warranty
of workmanlike performance owed by the stevedore to
the vessel owner in Ryan... In both cases, therefore,
we think it appropriate that the party whose fault
caused the injury should be held responsible to
indemnify the party compelled to pay an injured
claimant because of its technical or vicarious
liability."
In dealing with the second contention based upon privity
of contract, the court reasoned that the basis of the
obligation was an implied warranty of workmanlike
service and the obligations which arose from the
implied warranty were not limited to the confines of
the usual action on contract; the zone of responsibility
might extend to parties who were not in direct
contractual relationship.
Appellant Loomis further contended that the District
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Court erred in awarding Brewster-Bartle indemnity for
its settlement with the widow of the deceased in the
absence of evidence that Brewster-Bartle tendered the
proposed settlement to Loomis for approval or
negotiation, or offered it the opportunity to defend
the action. The Circuit Court accepted this conten¬
tion and remanded this phase of the case.
Apart from the main cause for remanding the case,
it must be admitted that the applicability of the Ryan
doctrine to offshore oil and gas activities is a
substantial one.
2. Occupiers' liability
Occupiers' liability adds a further important facet
to the nature of offshore liability insurances. The
fact that people other than oil-field workers may be
on board an oil rig, whether or not invited, has
necessitated a decision as to whether from a legal
viewpoint the occupiers' liability incurred offshore
should be treated as that incurred elsewhere.
To a considerable extent, the common law rules
governing occupiers' liability has been replaced by
56
the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957. And the duty which
56. The Act does not apply to Scotland, which is covered
by the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland) Act 1960.
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"an occupier of premises owes to his visitors in
respect of dangers due to the state of the premises
57
or to things done or omitted to be done on them" is
now specifically regulated by the Act.
It is outside the scope of this work to consider
in detail the application of the existing law to
offshore installations. As far as occupiers' liability
is concerned, however, attention should be drawn to
section 1(3) of the 1957 Act which provides:
"The rules so enacted in relation to the occupier
of premises and his visitors shall also apply, in
like manner and to the like extent as the principles
applicable at common law to an occupier of premises
and his invitees and licensees would apply, to
regulate -
(a) the obligation of a person occupying or having
control over any fixed or movable structure,
including any vessel vehicle or aircraft,
(b) the obligations of a person occupying or having
control over any premises or structure in
respect of damage to property, including the
property of persons who are not themselves his
visitors." (Emphasis added)
In the absence of any obvious inconsistency with the
rules controlling the application of existing law to
offshore installations, it appears reasonably clear
57. Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, s. 1.
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that offshore facilities should fall within the
definition of "premises" or "fixed or movable struc-
58
tures". And ship-shaped drilling rigs are also covered
by the Act.
It is however important to note in this connection
that the existing common law rules which determine the
person on whom the duty to show care is incumbent,
still prevail by virtue of section 1(2) of the Act
59
and the corresponding Scottish Act.
The employer-independent contractor relationship
as has been discussed earlier has a significant bearing
on the placing of occupiers' liability. In brief, the
60
rule laid down in Thomson v. Cremin, in which the
House of Lords held that an occupier could not escape
58. Cf. Kitchen, op cit, (supra note 15), at p. 159.
59. Section 1(2) of the Occupiers' Liability (Scotland)
Act 1960 provides:
"Nothing in those provisions shall be taken to
alter the rules of the common law which determine
the person on whom in relation to any premises a
duty to show care as aforesaid towards persons
entering thereon is incumbent."
Section 1(2) of the English Act makes a similar
provision.
60. [1953] 2 All E.R. 1185.
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liability for injury to an invitee resulting from the
faulty work of an independent contractor, has been
changed due to the inception of the 1957 Act. Section
2(4) provides:
"In determining whether the occupier of premises
has discharged the common duty of care to a visitor,
regard is to be had to all the circumstances, so
that (for example) -
(a)...
(b) where damage is caused to a visitor by a
danger due to the faulty execution of any
work of construction, maintenance or repair
by an independent contractor employed by the
occupier, the occupier is not to be treated
without more as answerable for the damage if
in all the circumstances he had acted
reasonably in entrusting the work to an
independent contractor and had taken such
steps (if any) as he reasonably ought in
order to satisfy himself that the contractor
was competent and that the work had been
properly done." (Emphases added)
61
In A.M.F. International, Ltd. v. Magnet Bowling, Ltd..,
the employer and the independent contractor were both
held to be occupiers and were liable under the Occupiers'
Liability Act 1957 for failure to take reasonable care
in regard to temporary precautions against flooding.
61. [1968] 2 All E.R. 789; [l968] 1 W.L.R. 1028.
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In the offshore area, as a matter of fact, it is more
likely that there may be more than one occupier at any
one time, and that exclusive occupation of an offshore
installation can hardly be warranted.
The common duty of care which extended by virtue
of the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, section 1(3) to
persons occupying or having control of a structure, is
imposed on the sub-contractors if the structure is not
in the main contractor's occupation and control but in
62
that of the sub-contractors. But if the main contractor
retains the control of the structure, they owe the
common duty of care under the Act to an injured employee
of another specialist contractor employed by the main
63
contractor.
Occupiers' liability may serve as an example of
the various statutory liabilities being imposed upon
the parties involved in offshore ventures.
D. Offshore liability coverages
1. Some unique features
In the preceding pages, certain distinctive elements
62. On authority of Kenarney v. Eric Waller, Ltd., [[1965]
3 All E.R. 352; [l967] 1 Q.B. 29; [l966] 2 W.L.R. 208.
63. Bunker v. Charles Brand & Son Ltd., [[1969] 2 All E.R. 59.
102
underlying the liabilities involved in offshore
activities have been peripherally examined. It is
apparent that only if parties are aware of the likely
effect of those factors, can adequate and feasible
coverage be expected.
Before portraying the whole fabric of offshore
liability insurances currently available, the writer
proposes to outline some particular features which
characterise the sophistication of the coverage.
Firstly, offshore operations virtually take place
at sea, which presents hazards not previously
encountered by those engaged in oil operations on
land. As a result, losses are generally multiplied.
It is obvious that the introduction of marine perils
necessarily affects insurance arrangements. In other
words, an offshore liability insurance programme must
be implemented on the basis that certain marine perils
have been adequately insured against. However, it
does not follow that general liability exposures, e.g
third parties liability, are less probable while on
board an offshore installation than on land. To this
extent, coventional liability coverages are equally
important.
103
Secondly, all the liabilities policies currently
in use are not tailor-made. Although substantial and
significant strides have been tahen towards the
achievement of ideal standard forms specially designed
for offshore exposures - and actually some forms have
been made available - conventional forms based upon
old established clauses with amendments and changes
being adapted to particular circumstances are still
widely used. The application of old clauses with
conventional wordings is usually the area where
difficulties lie. Whatever the advantage of having
standard forms may be, the indications are that in
appropriate circumstances conventional clauses are
functioning in a fairly effective way. Until a
wholly satisfactory answer emerges, it would seem
that old clauses tempered by tailor-made provisions
are by far most preferable.
Thirdly, there are areas in which overlapping
between different liability policies may occur. In
addition, the principal methods of obtaining offshore
liability coverage are not confined to liability
policies. Certain liabilities are covered under
combined policies aimed primarily at both liability
104
exposures and property (physical) damage, which is
very likely to cause confusion.
2. Major types of insurance
Offshore drilling contracts almost invariably
oblige the drilling contractor to carry certain
liability insurances. Although the contracts do
not usually require the operator to undertake insurance,
both the operator and the drilling contractor - together
with all the other contractors and sub-contractors -
are virtually principal assureds in any offshore
liability insurance plan. In the following sections
of this Chapter, an attempt is made to approach the
four major liability coverages, i.e. Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance, Protection and Indemnity
(P & I) Insurance, Construction, Installation,
Commissioning and Maintenance (C.I.C.M.) Insurance,
and Excess Liability Insurance. In this connection,
the corresponding Norwegian P & I policies are also
touched upon where relevant.
3. Comprehensive General Liability Insurance
General liabilities to the public form an essential
part of any offshore insurance framework. Briefly, a
typical Comprehensive General Liability policy under-
105
takes to indemnify the assured within policy limits
the sums which the assured shall become legally
liable to pay as damages because of bodily injury
or property damage caused by an occurrence. Coverage
of this kind is available subject to capacity and, is
to be expected, to certain important exclusions.
The standard Comprehensive General Liability
policy contains what is termed a "watercraft exclusion"
whereby the insurer excludes the liability resulting
from the ownership, maintenance, operation, use,
loading or unloading of any watercraft. for the
drilling contractor who usually owns the drilling
rig, this exclusion is detrimental and should be
54
deleted. From the standpoint of the operator, who
normally owns or rents various kinds of supporting
vessels, the removal of this exclusion is also
necessary. It is however important to point out that
54. This view has the support of many writers. See, e.g.
Mead,"Insurance Coverage of Offshore Drilling and
Production Operations," (1958) 32 Tulane Law Review
207, at p. 211; Gregg, "Drilling Contracts in the
Tidelands," (1958) 32 Tulane Law Review 231, at p.
239; McGillicuddy, "Insurance Coverage in Oil and
Gas Operations," (1972) 23rd Annual Institute on Oil
and Gas Law and Texation 111, at p. 130.
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this particular coverage is normally afforded under
65
P & I policies. Therefore parties may turn to a P & I
insurance as an alternative for that part of the
coverage. A significant point to note here is that
the operator is not eligible for the membership of
66
a P & I club, as far as the drilling rig is concerned.
The operator in that case is only a named assured
under the drilling contractor's P & I policy. It is
relevant to remark that the P & I substitution for
this coverage at the drilling contractor's option
67
has been endorsed by the I.A.D.C. contract.
68
In Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service, a United
States decision in which the watercraft exclusion
was the key issue, the insurance carrier disclaimed
65. See below, p. 109.
66. That a P & I insurance is a matter directed to the
convenience or protection of the owner has been
mentioned in a recent decision: West of Scotland
Ship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity
Association (Luxembourg) v. Aifanourion Shipping
S. A. , [^1980^] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 403.
67. See below, p. no.
68. 412 F.2d 1011 (1969).
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its liability. The assured, a supply company, had
supplied pumps to be used in discharging water from
tanks on a barge, and an employee of the assured
undertook to service the pumps. The court found
negligence against the assured for violation of the
ship repair safety regulations. The insurance carrier
contended that if the assured was subject to those
regulations, the policy afforded no coverage due to
the presence of the watercraft exclusion. The court
held that even though the assured company was performing
work which federal law might designate as work of a
ship repairer, this did not amount to maintenance
of a watercraft so as to exclude coverage.
For service contractors or sub-contractors
involved in offshore activities, the factual situations
like that in Grigsby call for special attention,
bearing in mind that courts of other jurisdiction
may decide otherwise.
It should be further emphasised that contractual
liabilities like those arising from a valid indemnity
clause or those delegated to the contractor by virtue
of an independent contractor clause, as has been
previously discussed, are not covered by the standard
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Comprehensive General Liability policy. Contractual
liability coverage is not afforded under P & I policies,
70
either, subject to limited exceptions. As a corollary,
an endorsement to the Comprehensive General Liability
policy or a separate contractual liability insurance
seems inevitable.
71
Mention must also be made of Nations v. Morris,
another United States decision. Plaintiff was an
oil-field worker who sustained bodily injury on a
drilling platform 40 miles off the Louisiana shore
through the alleged negligence of a fellow employee.
Plaintiff sued his fellow employee Morris and the
liability insurer of the employer, a drilling company.
Under the Omnibus provisions of the general liability
policy, the insurer was thereby the liability insurer
of Morris. Noting that the Longshoremen's and Harbor
69. Two other major exclusions which are of particular
relevance to operations on land, i.e. care, custody,
or control exclusion and underground damage
exclusion, are noted in Canuteson, "Insurance.and
Liability Problems Relating to Drilling and
Servicing Operations," (1967) 18th Annual Institute
on Oil and Gas Law and Texation 181, at pp. 197, 198.
70. See below, p. 111.
71. 483 F.2d 577 (1973).
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Workers' Compensation Act was the whole source of
rights and remedies, under which an employee could not
recover against his fellow employee, the court rejected
recovery. Plaintiff argued that the immunity was
personal to that fellow employee and was no defence
to the employee's liability insurer. The court reasoned
that the Act completely obliterated the rights at
common, civil or maritime law against employer and
fellow employees. The Act adjusted and re-arranged
the rights of maritime and other specifically covered
workers. The fellow employee's immunity was a defence
"inherent in the nature of the obligation" which could
be asserted by the liability insurer. Thus the insurer
was held not liable for the fellow employee's negligent
acts.
4. P & I Insurance
P & I insurance covers liabilities incurred by the
assured, as vessel owner, for the loss of life and
personal injury to the people aboard the insured
vessel. The principal risks insured against under
P & I, in addition to the above, also include damage
to docks, piers, buoys and the like, and additional
collision liability not covered by the hull insurance.
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Although it is possible to obtain in the insurance
market the liability coverage normally afforded by
P & I Associations (or Clubs), this kind of market
outside the Clubs is a comparative rarity.
As far as drilling rigs are concerned, the
situation is bound to be different. From the infor¬
mation now available, it is clear that the drilling
rigs which are being covered by P & I insurance -
even though they are not necessarily ships or vessels
72
in a strict legal sense - are relatively few. The
Clubs provide coverage for those rigs by means of
the Clubs' conventional policies designed for
conventional ships, with changes and amendments
to meet particular requirements. The I.A.D.C. contract
does not require the contractor to carry P & I
73
insurance on the drilling rig. However, this does
72. Cf. Summerskill, Oil Rigs: Law and Insurance (1979)
pp. 208, 209.
73. Appendix B, cl. B of the standard contract provides:
"Comprehensive General Liability Insurance with the
watercraft exclusion deleted covering all operations
of Contractor, including, among other risks, the
contractual liability herein assumed by Contractor,
with a combined single limit of 510,000,000 for
bodily injury and property damage liability in any
Ill
not lead to the inference that the contractor is
exempted from insuring against P & I risks. In other
words, the protection under the Comprehensive General
Liability policy as required by the I.A.D.C. contract,
with watercraft exclusion deleted or course, covers
P & I risks to a considerable extent. If parties
maintain both the Comprehensive General Liability
policy and the P & I insurance, overlapping can hardly
be avoided.
The P & I insurance on drilling rigs usually
excludes contractual liabilities. However, if the
rig incurs those contractual liabilities under the
drilling contract, e.g. liability to indemnify the
operator due to an indemnity clause contained therein,
and the drilling contract has been submitted to the
Club and approved, then the contractual liabilities
74
are covered. Contractual liabilities other than those
one occurrence. (Protection and Indemnity Insurance
may, at Contractor's option, be substituted for this
coverage of marine liabilities.)"
74. Summerskill, op cit (supra note 72) pp. 215, 216.
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under the drilling contract, which are usually not
normal to drilling activities, are therefore excluded.
Contractual towage liabilities by virtue of the
indemnity clause in a towage contract are covered by
P & I Clubs in respect of conventional ships. In the
case of a drilling rig, these liabilities are
explicitly excluded. Nevertheless, it has been
indicated that the coverage may still be afforded
to certain extent for an appropriate additional
75
premium.
As the P & I insurance also undertakes to indemnify
the owner of the vessel (or the drilling contractor in
the case of an oil rig entered in the Club) for his
legal liability for such claims as loss of life, personal
75
injury to the crew, it bears much resemblance to an
employer's liability policy. Functionally, these two
insurances share the same nature in this regard. There¬
fore, when the crew are under an employer* s liability
75. Ibid, at p. 215.
75. Such liabilities are usually excluded by public
liability policies. See, e.g. 13 Halsbury's Forms
& Precedents (4th ed.) 272, Form 3:C:5.
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policy or a similar workmen's compensation scheme,
this very portion of liability should be excluded from
77
the P & I policy at a reduction in insurance cost.
P & I insurance is, without doubt, liability
insurance. But it differs from Comprehensive General
Liability insurance in that the former covers only
liabilities which are expressly specified in the P & I
policy. An illustrative example may be given of the
P & I conditions solely for drilling vessels offered
by two Norwegian Clubs, which may be viewed as a
73
remarkable breakthrough in offshore liability insurance.
In early 1970s, significant efforts were made in
Norway to work out Norwegian-style hull insurance
conditions for drilling vessels, as opposed to those
for conventional ships. The so-called General Condi¬
tions for Hull Insurance of Drilling Vessels, based
77. See below, Chapter 4.
78. The following summary is based upon a booklet,
Insurance Conditions for P & I Insurance of Drilling
Vessels (with commentary) , by Professor Sjur
Braekhus and Mr. Alex. Rein. The writer of this
work is indebted to Professor Braekhus for the
booklet. His advice is also gratefully acknowledged.
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upon the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan 1964, were
completed in 1974. Against this background, two
Norwegian P & I Clubs, Gard and Skuld, decided to
offer an equivalent P & I insurance for drilling
vessels in respect of liability coverage. The
conditions offered by the Clubs, known as the Terms
of Cover, were actually in typical Anglo-American
style, with the general P & I conditions of the
Clubs being supplementary to the Terms. Having
found the Terms not satisfactory mainly because
they failed to be complementary to the hull condi¬
tions based upon the 1964 Plan, the two Clubs in the
summer of 1975 asked Professor dr. juris Sjur Braekhus
and Mr. Alex. Rein to prepare a new draft for P & I
conditions, together with a commentary in Norwegian
and English. The new conditions, which have been
adopted by both Clubs, deserve a general analysis.
Under the new conditions, coverage is afforded for
the liabilities incurred by the assured fpr personal
injury, property damage, excess of loss through
measures to avert or minimise loss under the hull
insurance, obstructions and wreck removal, statutory
obligations in respect of master and crew, wages
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and effects. According to section of the conditions,
however, the coverage is conditional upon the fact
that the loss has occurred:
(a) in direct connection with the operation of the
drilling vessel entered.
(b) in connection with the activity at one or more
supply bases, provided that the activity is in direct
connection with the operation of the drilling vessel,
(c) in direct connection with transport between the
drilling vessel and a supply base or a port or
airport in the vicinity of the base.
Section 3 virtually embodies the fundamental
principle that P & I insurance only covers liabilities
expressly indicated in the policy, which is in contrast
to a Comprehensive General Liability policy where the
risks excluded are set out therein. An important
point to note is that the "operation of the drilling
vessel" referred to in subparagraph (a) includes
80
drilling and all activities in connection therewith.
79. See ss. 7-12 of the conditions.
80. Braekhus and Rein, op cit (supra note 78) p. 36.
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There is no specific mention of contractual
liabilities in the new Norwegian conditions. Therefore
it is left somewhat uncertain whether, or to what
extent if any, these liabilities are covered. In
this connection, reference should be made to the old
conditions. Clause III of the old conditions stipulates:
"Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the
contrary this policy does not cover any liability:
5) assumed by the Assured under contracts (or held
covered at a premium to be arranged, subject to
prior advice to Underwriters) but this exclusion
shall not apply to contracts which are normal to
offshore drilling operations and which were
submitted to the Underwriters hereon during the
negotiations for this insurance,
8) assumed by Contractor under contract or agreement
for any property in the Contractor's care, custody
or control unless the Contractor would have been
liable in the absence of such contract or agreement,
In addition to Clause III of the old conditions,
consideration should also be taken of another criterion,
i.e. whether the terms of the contract may be considered
customary in the trade concerned, as stipulated in the
1964 Plan. So far as offshore activities are concerned,
nevertheless, it would seem premature to distinguish
the developed customs from those being developed. It
117
is therefore submitted that in the absence of a clear
reference to those liabilities the Clubs should be
liable to the extent that the contract terms have
been submitted to the Clubs and approved, thus
corresponding to the general manner in which those
Clubs other than Gard and Skuld have been dealing
81
with contractual liabilities.
The new Norwegian P & I conditions for drilling
vessels are effected on the presumption that the
owner of the drilling vessel is the principal assured
82
and a member of the club. If the entered vessel is
not owned or even chartered by the drilling contractor
himself, as is sometimes the case, the drilling
contractor may still be protected under the owner's
83
P & I insurance by means of a special agreement. The
same protection applies, subject to exceptions, to the
84
lease operator and the charter, if any.
81. See above, pp. Ill, 112.
82. Braekhus and Rein, op cit (supra note 78) p. 36.
83. See s. 19 of the conditions.
84. Ibid.
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The entered drilling vessels under the new Norwegian
P & I conditions are meant to include different types of
85
drilling rigs other than stationary (fixed) platforms.
Therefore, ship-shaped drilling vessels, semi-submersibles,
and even jack-up rigs, are regarded as drilling vessels
in this context, notwithstanding the continuing argument
86
as to the legal categorisation of oil rigs. Although
it has been indicated that it is possible to insure
87
fixed platforms on equivalent conditions, it appears
reasonably clear that fixed platforms have been dominated
by the C.I.C.M. insurance in terms of liability, as well
as property (physical damage), coverage.
5. C.I.C.M. Insurance
Liability insurances needed for offshore activities
involving fixed production platforms can be roughly
divided into three parts, covering respectively the
construction period, the maintenance period, and the
production phase. What covers the construction period
85. Braekhus and Rein, op cit (supra note 78) p. 29.
36. See below, Chapter 4.
87. Braekhus and Rein, at p. 29.
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is termed builders' risk insurance, which is normally
effected by the operator of a joint venture. A special
coverage may be afforded by a builders' risk insurance
covering also the maintenance period. Once the actual
production operations have started, the joint venturers
usually carry their liability coverages individually,
which may vary considerably.
The builders' risk insurance currently used in
the North Sea, particular the British and Norwegian
sectors, is best known as the Construction, Installation,
Commissioning and Maintenance (C.I.C.M.) insurance. The
basic structure of the insurance framework comprises a
written policy and a number of standard marine insurance
89
conditions. A particularly noteworthy feature is that
the insurance covers both physical losses and third-
90
party liability'.
88. Builders' risk insurance is of wide application. In
the case of constructing a liquefied natural gas
(LNG) carrier, for example, this type of insurance
is essential. See Swan, Legal Aspects of the Ocean
Carriage and Receipt of Liquefied Natural Gas (1977)
pp. 95, 96.
89. The writer is indebted to Mr. Michael Howard for a
copy of the insurance contract.
90. The physical coverage aspects are discussed in
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The Principal Assureds and Other Assureds are
specified in Clause 1 of the written policy. All the
licensees (co-venturers), the project managers, and the
licensees' parent and/or subsidiary and/or affiliated
and/or inter-related companies, are under the category
of the Principal Assureds.
The Other Assureds, on the face of Clause 1,
include contractors and sub-contractors who are
contractually related to the licensees in connection
with the subject matters of the insurance. As there
Chapter 5. It has been suggested that the costs of
such an insurance "package" are cheaper than several
individual policies, and that the claim settlements
are more expeditious. See Daast^l, "Some Trends in
Norwegian North Sea Contracts," in Conference on
Contracts and Texation in the Norwegian North Sea,
Bryne, Norway (24, 25 October 1977) pp. 19-32, at
p. 28. The idea of framing insurance coverages on
a package basis is not a novel one. In the constru¬
ction industry, the Contractors' All Risks Insurance
has been widely used. Such a comprehensive insurance,
in which third party liability coverage can also be
provided, is normally effected by a contractor on a
construction project. A more expanded package, by
which employer's liability is also covered, can be
effected by obtaining a Contractors' Combined
Insurance Policy. The terms and conditions of such
a policy are set out in Eaglestone, Insurance for the
Construction Industry (1979) pp. 218-225.
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is no clear reference to the drilling contractor,
it has been suggested - with which the writer of
this wort is not in agreement - that the drilling
91
contractor is not included. This argument derives
mainly from the fact that drilling operations do
not usually start until the platform is completed
and installed on site. And, as has been pointed
out, the present insurance covers the period of
construction and may be extended to the maintenance
period only, thus seemingly justifying the exclusion
of drilling operations for the production hole.
However, the problem arises where there are
occasions upon which drilling operations, and
even actual production, may take place before the
completion of the platform. To this extent,
whether the drilling contractor is covered before
the expiry of the policy is of potential practical
importance.
Conceding that in the Period Clause (Clause 3)
the inclusion of drilling operations is stated,
some writers in favour of the exclusion of the
91. This view is expressed in Rein, Sogn, Krohn,
Kaasen and Lund, Norwegian Petroleum Law (1973)
p. 6.34.
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drilling contractor base their proposition upon,
inter alia, the wordings of the Interest Clause
(Clause 4) and the Waiver of Subrogation Clause
(Clause 9).
In Clause 4, exception (b), it is provided that
the property and equipment owned by drilling contractors
or other contractors/sub-contractors engaged for
drilling/production operations are excluded from
the property cover. Nevertheless, the inferences
the writers have drawn from exception (b) are-.of
little controlling importance in supporting the
exclusion of the drilling contractor from being
an Other Assured. It would seem that the writers
have failed to observe the remaining part of
exception (b), i.e. "...unless separately scheduled
hereunder or otherwise declared to Underwriters
hereon prior to loss at premium to be agreed." In
addition, a consideration of the very nature of an
exclusion clause may also suggest that the writers'
position is without sound basis. Assuming that the
drilling contractor is not meant to be an Other Assured,
then is there any point, or ground, for the policy
to stipulate specifically that its equipment is
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excluded from the property coverage in certain
circumstances? Finally, if the equipment has been
declared to the Underwriters, as the proviso provides,
the drilling contractor's equipment is thereby covered.
It would therefore be impossible in that case to resist
the conclusion that the drilling contractor is insured
under the policy.
The writers have also placed some reliance on the
Waiver of Subrogation Clause which provides that
subrogation rights "against any of the Assureds also
against all Drilling Contractors, Production Contractors
waived." It has therefore been suggested that
the fact that drilling and production contractors
are named specifically and in addition to the assureds
clearly seems to indicate that they are not intended
92
to belong to the class of Other Assureds. However,
this view does not appear to really assist in the
determination of the question at issue. As a matter
of fact, it is not uncommon to find that the insurer's
rights of subrogation against a particular assured
are to be waived in such a way by employing similar,
if not the same, wordings. This is especially true
92. Ibid.
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where an indemnitee is named as an additional assured
in a policy and the underwriters' rights of subrogation
93
against the indemnitee are waived. On the other hand,
it is submitted that the main reason why in the
present insurance the drilling and production contractors
are so named is probably because of the term of the
policy. As has been noted, the policy covers the
period of construction and maintenance, drilling which
drilling operations have not usually occurred, nor
has any cause for the underwriters to be subrogated
to the licensees' rights against the drilling and
production contractors. The way the present clause
is so worded seems reasonably to emphasise that even
though the cause for subrogation has occurred as a
result of any drilling operations prior to the
completion of the platform, the underwriters are
still barred from exercising their rights of subrogation.
If this interpretation is to be preferred, as has been
indicated by other inferences, it would appear enough
to refute the proposition that the drilling contractor
is not an Other Assured. It is also submitted that
93. See above, Chapter 2, pp. 53-59.
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in an accurate sense the present coverage is more of
an insurance policy covering a particular period of
time during which various risks are likely to emerge,
than a policy aimed at certain particular exposures.
The liability coverage under the present written
policy is regulated by Clauses 15-17. Clause 15,
which contains four sub-clauses, provides a very
comprehensive liability coverage. Cross Liabilities
Clause (Clause 15) deals with the situation in which
one assured incurs liability to any other of the co-
assureds, whereas Clause 17 is a Sue and Labour Clause.
Sub-clause (A) contained in Clause 15 refers to
94
a P & I clause, known as S 108, attached to the
present insurance. Clearly this is to ensure that
liabilities incurred during waterborne operations
are covered. Regrettably, the terms and conditions
of the P & I coverage attached are normally used for
insurance of conventional vessels. As mentioned
95
above, the new P & I conditions solely for drilling
94. The letter ' S* is the abbreviation of Sedgwick
Forbes, an insurance broking firm.
95. See above, p. 114.
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vessels (floating drilling rigs) have been made
available. It is not difficult to visualise that
in certain respects floating rigs are nearer to offshore
fixed platforms than conventional vessels. Even the
draftsmen of those P & I conditions for floating rigs
are too cautious to apply those conditions to fixed
platforms. How much more so should the promoters of
the present C.I.C.M. insurance have been in deciding
to attach the P & I conditions mainly for conventional
vessels to fixed rigs!
Certain unsatisfactory results are thus inevitable.
For example, the present P & I clause covers liabilities
arising out of loss or damage to personal property and
"cargo" on boax"d the insured "ship" (platform). Bearing
in mind that production platforms are not used to carry
cargo, one can hardly discern the true reason why
those terms should be attached to the present insurance
without any change. In addition, it gives rise to some
doubt as to the coverage of collision liability. It
should be noted that collision liability is not dealt
with in the written policy itself. This particular
liability seems to fall within the Running Down Clause
attached to the present insurance, and also within the
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present P & I coverage. The present P & I clause
expressly covers collision liability to the extent
that is not covered by the Running Down Clause
96
thereto attached. It has been indicated that the
present P & I clause covers .collision liability of
the same kind as is covered by the Running Down
Clause but which exceeds the limit specified therein
97
and therefore it is in this sense an "excess" coverage.
This interpretation should be given weight to some
extent. Nevertheless, the coverage under the Running
Down Clause is conditional upon the fact that the
subject matter insured has collided with any other
98
vessel. An important point to be decided is whether
a collision with another fixed platform should be
covered. If the Running Down Clause does not cover
it by sticking to the word "vessel", it would seem
96. Paragraph 2 of the P & I clause.
97. Swan, Ocean Oil and Gas Drilling and the Law (1979)
p. 172.
98. Running Down Clause (Clause 15) of the Institute
Clauses for Builders' Risks, as attached to the
present policy.
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that in this case the liability should be covered by
the present P & I clause. Given that presumption, it
is obvious that hte present P & I clause can no longer
be viewed as an "excess" coverage. Confusingly, the
present P & I clause only refers to the collision
liability incurred in respect of any other ship or
99
boat. In the light of the foregoing, it appears that
the actual effect deriving from this double-barrel
100
protection is not as all-embracing as intended.
Sub-clause (B) contained in Clause 15 of the
written policy relates to general third-party
liabilities, which have been covered in substance
by sub-clause (A) to a considerable extent. The
liabilities covered under sub-clause (B) are those
arising from or occasioned either directly or
indirectly by "the Assured's operations in connection
with the insured Platform(s)/Structure(s)/Pipeline(s),
or parts thereof..." As has been submitted, the
99. Paragraph 2 of the P & I clause.
100. The importance of this issue has been attested to
by Polpen Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Union
Assurance Co. Ltd. , [l943[] K.B. 161.
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drilling contractor is included as an Other ^ssured, the
drilling operations within the currency of the present
insurance and before the expiry of the construction
and maintenance period, should therefore be covered,
101
although others may think differently. As sub-clause
(B) also covers liabilities arising from loss of life,
personal injury or illness, it overlaps sub-clause (A).
Liability for wreck removal is dealt with in sub¬
clause (D), part of which reads as follows:
"It is hereby agreed to indemnify the Assured
hereunder for all costs and/or expenses of or
incidental to, the raising, removal or destruction
of the wreckage and/or debris (howsoever caused),
of the property of the Assured(s) hereon or of
others or the provisions and maintenance of lights,
marking, audible warnings etc., for such wreckage
and/or debris when the incurring of such costs and
/or expenses is compulsory by any law, ordinance
or regulation or when the Assured hereunder is
liable for such costs and/or expenses under Contract
or otherwise or when such wreckage and/or debris
interferes with the Assured's normal operations."
It should however be pointed out that such liabilities
are normally excluded in the case of policies covering
the production phase. This can be evidenced by clause
7(i) of the London Standard Platform Form, under which
101. Rein, Sogn, Krohn, Kaasen and Lund, op cit (supra
note 91) p. 6.96.
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the insurer accepts no liability in respect of -
"Claims in connection with the removal of property,
material, debris or obstruction, whether such
removal be required by law, ordinance, statute,
regulation or otherwise." (Emphasis added)
It should be observed that the exclusion refers not
only to the removal of debris, but also to that of
property and material. This is of particular practical
significance because the oil companies may well be
required to remove the production platform when the
102
oil field starts to run dry.
As drilling contracts normally require drilling
contractors to carry certain liability insurances
covering particularly the production phase, it is
likely that there will be overlapping of the
insurances covering the construction and production
102. The United Kingdom Offshore Operators' Association
has estimated the cost of removing a typical
northern North Sea steel platform at £50 million-
£150 million, with concrete platforms costing
around £70 million-£90 million. A helpful
discussion on problems of removing such redundant
installations can be found in Davis, "£10 Billion
Bill for Shifting the North Sea's Gigantic Junk,"
The Sunday Telegraph, March 23, 1980, p. 21.
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stages since drilling contractors may have been
covered twice as far as the drilling operations within
the construction period are concerned. Thus efforts
should be made to avoid double insurance and to ensure
that the insurances are co-ordinated with each other.
6. Excess Liability Insurance
A final matter which calls for note concerns
Excess Liability Insurance. It is generally
acknowledged that underwriters' capacity on offshore
coverages has improved and is improving. Nevertheless,
the satisfactory goal in terms of amounts is yet to
be achieved. As offshore insurance markets have lagged
behind offshore oil and gas ventures and underwriters
are thereby eager to impose limits in their policies,
many assureds have been unable to obtain adequate
protection. In the event of a catastrophic loss,
therefore, the implications are indeed far-reaching.
The aim of Excess Liability Insurance - also
known as Umbrella Insurance - is to fill to some
degrees the gaps which may not be covered under the
103
insurances maintained by the assureds. The fact that
103. A fuller description of Excess Liability Insurance
can be found in Hope-Ross, "Insurance and Indemnity
Problems in Offshore Drilling Operations," (1973)
11 Alberta Law Review 471, at pp. 475, 476.
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Excess Liability Insurance is by its nature liability
insurance is not meant to indicate that the risks it
covers are confined to those normally covered by
liability insurances, e.g. Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance or P & I Insurance. Rather,
Excess Liability Insurance also extends to the area
where property coverages like marine hull insurance
are exhaustive. With the steady increase in offshore
activities, Excess Liability Insurance is also in
growing demand.
However extensive Excess Liability Insurance may
be, it should be kept in mind that this unique
insurance is only a secondary coverage. In other
words, in order to effect an Excess Liability Insurance,
the pre-condition that there must be a primary insurance
should be fulfilled.
It is not uncommon that Excess Liability Insurance
may set its own limits and exclusions. From the assured's
point of view, he may also prefer to self-insure a
portion of the risks by accepting larger deductibles
if the cost for a broader coverage is prohibitive.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SOME THOUGHTS ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
AND EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY INSURANCE
Introduction
It should always be borne in mind that technology
exerts major influence and has a considerable effect
on offshore oil-related insurance. Difficulties which
may befall lawyers and underwriters stem from a number
of factors, principal among them which calls for an
urgent settlement remains the clarification of the
legal status of offshore oil installations. As is
shown below, the technological progress is bound to
create serious new problems.
Whether offshore drilling or production units should
be treated as ships or vessels for some, if not all,
1
purposes has been the cause of much discussion. This
1. See, e.g. Summerskill, Oil Rigs; Law and Insurance
(1979) pp. 12-85; Waltham, "Legal Problems Arising
from Offshore Operations in the North Sea and
Associated Insurances," Proceedings of the Petroleum
Law Seminar, Cambridge (8-13 January 1978) vol. 2,
pp. 22.2-22.5; Waltham, "Offshore Drilling Units -
Legal Problems," The Law Society's Gazette, January
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moot point is of vital importance in relation to topics
such as collision and salvage. As far as offshore
insurance coverages are concerned, legal distinctions
made between various oil rigs necessarily have a great
bearing on the nature and cost of the insurances. They
could be highly material in any consideration of the
rights and obligations of the parties concerned. Any
potential confusion would inevitably cast a shadow over
the workability of the insurances. The purpose of this
Chapter is to give coverage in some detail to this
vexed problem as it affects limitation of liability
and employer's liability insurance involved in offshore
activities. These two aspects do not, of course,
exhaust the legal and insurance problems associated
with the legal classification of oil installations.
A. Limitation of liability
1. The Merchant Shipping Acts and the international
conventions
Offshore oil installations can be broadly classified
11, 1978, p. 14; Himsworth, "The Legal Status of Marine
Devices Other Than Ships (United Kingdom)", a paper
presented to the 10th International Congress of
Comparative Law, Budapest (23-23 August 1978).
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2
into mobile units and fixed platforms. They may also
fall into two functional categories: units which are
used for exploratory drilling and those concerned with
production.
During the exploration phase, appraisal and
exploratory wells are drilled virtually from mobile
drilling units. Once drilling is completed, a mobile
drilling unit moves on to a new site either under its
own power or under tow. If the potential quantities
to be produced from the field justify commercially
the erection of a production platform - usually a
fixed structure which can be either concrete or
3
steel - the platform is then constructed. When the
production process begins, development drilling is
4
performed from the platform which permits the drilling
2. In the present context, however, associated structures
like pipelines and onshore terminals are not taken into
account.
3. Sometimes drilling starts before the completion of the
construction work. See above, Chapter 3, p. 121.
4. In exceptional cases like Argyll Field and Buchan
Field, the production platforms are converted drilling
rigs. See Department of Energy, Development of the Oil
and Gas Resources of the United Kingdom 1980, Appendix
7, p. 42.
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of a number of wells by using the technique of
5
directional drilling. During the production period,
the needs for mobile drilling units are still substan-
6
tial, especially when relief wells are drilled.
The above-mentioned installations are usually
referred to as offshore oil rigs. In the case of a
fixed production platform, the complete machinery and
the structure for development drilling is known as a
drilling rig. But the term "drilling rig" is also
commonly used to describe the mobile drilling units
referred to above.
While novel designs continue to develop at a fast
pace, the types of mobile drilling units which are by
far dominating exploratory drilling can be sub-divided
into four distinct categories: ship-shaped drilling
vessels, submersibles, semi-submersibles, and jack-up
7
rigs.
5. See below, Chapter 5.
6. Further discussed in Chapter 5.
7. For an account of the evolution of designing and
building offshore oil structures, see Cox, (et al.)
(eds), North Sea Oil and Gas 1975 (1975) pp. 49-67.
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A ship-shaped drilling vessel has been generally
8
accepted as being a ship. It appears reasonably certain
that the legal basis for treating a fixed platform as
a ship or vessel is not evident. With drilling units
like semi-submersibles being widely used, there is room
for debate as to whether they are ships or vessels. Are
owners of such floating rigs entitled to limitation of
9
liability? The exploration of this question requires
t
an analysis to be made of existing legal regimes at
both national and international levels.
It is far from clear whether offshore mobile rigs
like submersibles come within the purview of the
10
Merchant Shipping Acts 1854 to 1979 which entitle
8. Summerski11, op cit (supra note l) p. 67.
9. On which there appears to be no reported decisions.
10. Note however the provisions in Part IV of the
Merchant Shipping Act 1974, which deal with
"submersible apparatus". Section 16 of the Act
provides:
"(l) This Part of this Act applies to any
submersible or supporting apparatus -
(a) operated within waters which are in the
United Kingdom or which are adjacent thereto
and within the seaward limits of territorial
waters, or
(b) launched or operated from, or comprising, a
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shipowners to limit their liability in accordance with
the tonnage of their ships. By virtue of the 1854 Act,
ship registered in the United Kingdom or a British
ship of a specified description (being a British
ship which is not registered in the United Kingdom).
(2) In this section -
"apparatus" includes any vessel, vehicle or
hovercraft, any structure, any diving plant or
equipment and any other form or equipment,
"specified" means specified in regulations made
by the Secretary of State for the purposes of
this section,
"submersible apparatus" means any apparatus used,
or designed for use, in supporting human life on
or under the bed of any waters or elsewhere under
the surface of any waters, and
"supporting apparatus" means any apparatus used
or designed for use, inconnection with the
operation of any submersible apparatus." (Emphasis
added)
Section 17 of the Act provides that the Secretary of
State may make regulations for, inter alia, the
registration of submersible apparatus. The regulations
made thereunder are the Merchant Shipping (Registration
of Submersible Craft) Regulations 1976, S.I. 1976 No. 940.
Such a registration is by no means comparable to the
registration of offshore oil installations under the
Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971,
ss. 2, 7; Offshore Installation (Registration) Regulations
1972, S.I. 1972 No. 702. Further discussed in Chapter 5.
139
ships include "every description of vessel used in
11
navigation not propelled by oars." This definition
12
has been considered in a number of English decisions.
However wide the discretion of courts may be in
construing this definition, it is far from easy to
decuce from the consideration of these decisions whether
13
a complete definition of "ship" has been arrived at.
11. Section 2 of the Act.
The same definition reappears in section 742 of the
Merchant Shipping Act 1894. As far as limitation of
liability is concerned, this definition has been
extended on several occasions to apply to every
description of lighter, barge etc., see Temperley,
The Merchant Shipping Acts (7th ed. 1976) para. 682.
However, these subsequent enactments do not suffice
to show that offshore oil installations are
necessarily covered.
12. E.g. European & Australian Royal Mail Co. Ltd. v.
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., (1866)
L.R. 6 Q.B. 280; The Mac, (1882) 7 P.D. 126 (C.A.);
Southport v. Morriss, ^1893] 1 Q.B. 359.
13. In this connection, it must also be remembered that
"ship" is a concept variously defined in different
statutes. See, for example, Part II, Schedule 2 of
the Aircraft and Shipping Industries Act 1977, part
of which reads as follows:
"5 - (l) In this part of this Schedule "ship" means
a floating or submersible vessel with an integral
hull and, except in the case of a warship, of over
100 gross tons, but does not include a hovercraft
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For example, there is precedent to the effect that a
14
pontoon is a ship. Where a pontoon is converted into
a drilling rig - like the Sea Gem which collapsed and
or a mobile offshore installation,..." (Emphasis added)
Further, a careful reading of the Industry Act 1972
suggests that "ship" and "offshore installation" are
incompatible with each other. Section 10(1) of the Act
states:
"Subject to the provisions of this section, the
Secretary of State may, with the consent of the
Treasury, guarantee the payment by any person who
is an individual resident in, or a body corporate
incoporated under the law of any part of, the United
Kingdom, any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of
Man of any sum payable by that person in respect of
principal or interest under arrangements (whether
by way of loan or otherwise) entered into by that
person for the purpose of financing the construc¬
tion to the order of that person in the United
Kingdom of a ship or mobile offshore installation
of the qualifying size, and its equipment to his
order." (Emphasis added)
On the other hand, section 10(9) of the Industry Act
1972 provides:
"In this section 'construction' includes the
completion of a partially constructed ship or
installation."
The application of this sub-section has been extended
by section 2 of the Shipbuilding Act 1979 to include
the alteration of completed and partially constructed
ships and mobile offshore installations.
14. Marine Craft v. Blomqvist, [l953j 1 Lloyd's Rep. 514.
However, a pontoon crane was held not a "ship or
vessel" within the rules of the P & I Club: Merchants'
Marine Insurance Co Ltd. v. North of England Protection
and IndemniLy Association, (1926) 26 LI. L. Rep. 201.
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15
sank on 27th December 1965 - it is difficult to
conclude with any great accuracy whether a liberal
interpretation is justified.
The fact that there is a substantial difference
between conventional ships and offshore oil installa¬
tions in their registration may be of some significance
in approaching the present issue. However, it does not
necessarily follow that a vessel - once registered
irnder the Merchant Shipping Acts - can no longer be
registered as an offshore oil installation under the
16
Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971.
15. See Report of the Inguiry into the Causes of the
Accident to the Drilling Rig Sea Gem (1967) Cmnd
3409, pp. 3-6.
16. This is evidenced by the Offshore Installations
(Registration) Regulations 1972, S.I. 1972 No. 702.
Regulation 5 provides:
"(l) An application for the first registration
of an offshore installation shall include
the following particulars -
(a) the name and address of the person or
persons seeking to register it;
(b) where no address furnished pursuant to
head (a) is an address in the United
Kingdom, an address in the United Kingdom
to which communications for the owner may
be sent;
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While authorities may not be of much assistance
on this facet of the question, reference may be made
to the decisions in the United States courts where
floating rigs as distinguished from fixed platforms
17
have been held to be vessels.
The meaning of a ship or vessel was not given in
the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of the
Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels signed in
1924. Nor was it clearly defined in the International
Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability
(c) a name or other designation for the
installation;
(d) particulars of any other registration of
the installation (whether as a vessel or otherwise
and whether in the United Kingdom or otherwise);
(e) an indication of the nature and the function
or proposed function of the installation;
" (Emphasis added)
17. Recent decisions include Marine Drilling Co. v.
Autin, 363 F.2d 579; Neil v. Diamond M. Drilling
Co., 426 F.2d 487; Guilbeau v. Falcon Seaboard
Drilling Co., 215 F. Supp. 909; Ferdinandstsen v.
Delta Marine Drilling Co., 235 So. 2d 641.
This point is further treated below.
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of Owners of Sea-going Ships concluded in 1957. The
latter "was replaced by the 1976 International Conven-
18
tion on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims,
which calls for special note. Although the word "ship"
was not defined, Article 15.5 of the Convention states:
"This Convention shall not apply to : (a) air-
chshion vehicles; (b) floating platforms constructed
for the purpose of exploring or exploiting the
natural resources of the sea-bed or the subsoil
thereof."
At first glance, it would appear that offshore oil rigs
are expressly excluded. Nevertheless, it could be
argued that jack-up rig, although constructed for
such purposes, would not be "floating" when performing
its operations. It has been seemingly suggested that
a ship-shaped drilling vessel, if constructed for such
19
purposes, should also be excluded. It is doubtful,
however, as to whether such drilling vessels which
are usually constructed not solely for such purposes
could be viewed as "floating platforms".
18. The text of it is in (1977) 16 ILM 616.
19. Summerskill, op cit (supra note l) p. 38.
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2. A proposed solution
Any approach to the question of limitation of
liability associated with offshore oil rigs, whereby
the stress is laid in the definition of a ship or
vessel, might not necessarily provide the best solution
to the problem at issue. It is submitted that a qualified
application of existing rules governing the limitation
of liability of those "conventional" shipowners to
rig owners, by simply avoiding the vexed question of
the legal classification, may probably prove to be
more advisable. In other words, if it is generally
thought that rig owners should be entitled to limited
liability for whatever reason, it is not necessary
that in order to achieve that effect the rigs must
20
be classified as ships or vessels. This presumption
20. This is close to, but different from, the approach
invoked by the Merchant Shipping Act 1979. Section
41 of the Act provides:
"(l) The Secretary of State may by order provide
that a thing designed or adapted for use at sea
and described in the order is or is not to be
treated as a ship for the purposes of any provision
specified in the order of the Merchant Shipping Acts
or the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971 or any
instrument made by virtue of any of those Acts; and
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may be likened to the present factual situation that
owners of floating drilling rigs are generally
eligible for P & I memberships without being nece-
21
ssarily recognised as "shipowners".
There are, of course, instances where the ideas
of limitation of liability and the legal classification
of offshore oil rigs are inter-related. To separate
these two factors from each other, nevertheless, is
such an order may -
(a) make different provision in relation to
different occasions;
(b) if it provides that a thing is to be treated
as a ship for the purposes of a provision
specified in the order, provide that the
provision shall have effect in relation
to the thing with such modifications as
are so specified.
(2) Whether the Secretary of State proposes to
make an order in pursuance of the preceding
subsection it shall be his duty, before he makes
the order, to consult such persons about the
proposal as appear to him to represent the persons
in the United Kingdom who he considers are likely
to be effected by the order."
At the time of writing, no order has been made under
section 41 (1).
21. See above, p. 110.
146
sometimes of considerable significance in terms of
offshore insurance conditions. It is evident that rig
owners - and probably their underwriters as well - can
benefit from the limitation of liability. However, a
careful consideration of other parameters would suggest
that to place oil rigs under the category of ships or
vessels is not necessarily favoured by the underwriters
and assureds. This unigue point again reguires reference
to the United States examples whereby certain loopholes
have indeed been tightened by classifying floating rigs
as vessels. By doing so, however, they have in effect
subjected the owners and underwriters to established
maritime rules which could expose them to additional
claims under the doctrines of seaworthiness, etc. In
estimating the potential risks and rating the insurance
cost, the underwriters' ability to adjust their coverages
would also be confronted with the resulting problem of
22
seaman status, which is described in the later discussion.
3. The draft International Convention on Off-shore
Mobile Craft
Leaving aside the guestion as to whether floating
rigs are ships or not, it is recommended that in order
22. See below, p. 158.
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to encourage offshore ventures in view of the growing
global energy crisis rig owners should be entitled to
23
limited liability. As a matter of fact, efforts of an
international nature have been made in the draft
24
International Convention on Off-Shore Mobile Craft
t
adopted by the Comite Maritime International in 1977
with a view towards, but not confined to, applying
the provisions of the existing international conven¬
tions on limitation of liability to offshore floating
rigs.
As defined in Article 1 of the draft Convention,
"craft" means:
"... any marine structure of whatever nature not
permanently fixed into the sea-bed which:
(a) is capable of moving or being moved whilst
floating in or on water, whether or not
attached to the sea-bed during operations,
and
23. Cf. Dupont, "The Insurance of North Sea Oil and Gas
Exploration and Production Operations," Proceedings
of the Petroleum Law Seminar, Cambridge (3-13
January 1978) Vol. 2, at p. 21.4.
24. For the text of the draft Convention and the pre¬
paratory work on it, see "CMI Conference - Rio de
Janeiro 1977. Report of Proceedings," Lloyd's Maritime
& Commercial Law Quarterly (February 1978) pp. 14-30.
148
(b) is used or intended for use in the explora¬
tion, processing, transport or storage of the
mineral resources of the sea-bed or its
subsoil or in ancillary activities."
Article 5, entitled "Limitation of Liability", Provides:
"A State Party which is also a party to
- the International Convention for the unification
of certain rules relating to the limitation of
liability of owners of sea-going vessels and
Protocol of signature dated August 25, 1924,
or to
- the International Convention relating to the
limitation of liability of owners of sea-going
ships and Protocol of signature dated October
10, 1957, or to
- the Convention on limitation of liability for
maritime claims dated November 19, 1976,
shall, subject to Article 19 below, apply the rules
of any such convention to craft to which they would
not otherwise apply. In the case of the 1976
Convention, a State Party shall do so notwithstanding
the provisions of Article 15, para. 5 of that
Convention."
It seems clear from the provisions that floating sub-
mersibles and semi-submersibles have been included. So
are jack-up rigs as is evidenced by the wording "....
whether or not attached to the sea-bed during operations."
Offshore rigs intended for use in "ancillary activities",
as stipulated in Article 1, appear to include those like
the semi-submersible multi-purpose service rig ordered
149
in 1979 by Shellexpro Oil Company owned jointly by
Shell and Exxon, The rig was by then the biggest of
its type to be built in the world. It would operate
in maintenance, rescue and emergency capacity in the
East Shetlands basin in the North Sea, and was described
25
as representing the world's highest technology. The rig
was dynamically positioned. Although it remained
stationary by means of an automatic system without
anchors, it would still come within the purview of
Article 1 of the draft Convention since it was "capable
of moving."
It must however be pointed out that the definition
of "craft" as used in Article 1 may prove to be inade¬
quate in meeting the challenges from the ever changing
technology. Early indications of trouble to come might
have been seen in certain novel structures. For example,
difficult questions are bound to be raised in the case
of the Tethered Buoyant Platform (TBP) system which
has been considered as a breakthrough in offshore oil
platforms. This system can be installed and maintained
without divers. It can also withstand gales and heavy
25. Journal of Commerce, July 26, 1979, p. 2.
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seas by allowing the platform to move horizontally at
the end of steel tubes or wire tethers anchored to the
26
sea bed. It is doubtful whether the platform should
be regarded as "permanently fixed into the sea-bed" or
not.
What is more open to question is the exclusion of
fixed structures. A few years ago, companies had
little alternative but to produce oil through permantly-
fixed platforms. In January 1980, the US-based Conti¬
nental Oil (Conoco) group and its North Sea partners
announced that they would use the world's fist tension
27
leg platform (TLP) to develop the Hutton gield in 1984.
The TLP is a floating structure, anchored to the sea-bed
by vertical mooring lines, and can be easily unhooked
28
and towed away once the field is depleted. And the
platform can be used again in another field once re¬
furbished .
26. As reported in The Guardian, September 6, 1979, p. 5.
27. Ray Dafter, "North Sea Oil: Revolutionary Concepts
Open Up New Vistas," Financial Times, January 22,
1980, p. 14.
28. A similar report with a photo of the new structure can
be found in "New Products & Processes," Newsweek,
February 4, 1980, p. 3.
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Even greater flexibility can be incorporated in a
production system labelled SWOPS (Single Well Offshore
Production System) currently being developed by British
Petroleum. If successful, it -would do away with the
need for a platform - fixed or otherwise. A drilled
well would be fitted with a special type or seabed
wellhead structure. Apart from a sonar transmitter
and a marker buoy, the remainder of the production
29
facilities would be built into a tanker. A flexible
riser pipe would be designed to lock on to the the
wellhead, with reservoir pressure helping to push the
30
crude oil up the riser and into the tanker.
By analogy with the rule in the draft Convention,
it would appear that both the TLP and SWOPS should be
included since they are "not permanently fixed into
the sea-bed" as opposed to conventional concrete or
steel fixed platforms, notwithstanding the fact that
both the novel structures and conventional platforms
share the same function - recovering oil reserves. In
29. Dafer, op cit (supra note 27) at p. 14.
30. Ibid.
152
this connection, it seems also relevant to note that
the use of tanker as a means of storage of oil - known
as floating storage - is sometimes more feasible than
31
onshore storage. As the tanker owner is entitled to
limitation of liability either under the draft convention
or the previous three Conventions, or both, it is
pertinent to inquire whether onshore or fixed storage
should be given the equivalent protection.
Further, it is not unusual to see that fishing
trawler fleets move into the 500-metre safety zone
close to offshore fixed installations ignoring the
32
warnings to leave, which is very likely to cause serious
risks of damage to the fixed structures. Whatever damage
they may cause, the trawler orners are entitled to limit
their liability. It should also be kept in mind that
31. See May, "Tankers; Building Contracts, Charters,
Operations," Proceedings of the Petroleum Law
Seminar, Cambridge (8-13 January 1978) Vol. 2,
at p. 27.7.
32. Note the Continental Shelf (Protection of Installa¬
tions) Order 1981, S.I. 1981 No. 29, made under the
Continental Shelf Act 1964, s. 2(1)(3). The Order
specifies as safety zones certain areas and prohibits
ships from entering such zones without permission.
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the trawlers' underwriters can easily disclaim the
liability as the violation of statutory rules is
normally excluded by the policy. It has therefore
been indicated that in working out the insurance
programme for the fixed facilities oil companies
33
should take these factors into consideration. In the
meantime, however, it is possible that liability may
be incurred by the fixed facilities. Unfortunately, the
doctrine of limitation of liability is not available to
them, for which the legal distinction of fixed and
non-fixed structures is to blame.
In the face of the increasingly obvious injustice
and the potential controversy as a result of novel
technological designs as intimated above, it is
recommended that offshore fixed installations should
not be treated differently as far as limitation of
liability is concerned.
While it is outwith the ambit of this discussion
33. Dakin, "Insurance of Offshore Exploration and
Production Risks," Proceedings of the Energy Law
Seminar, Cambridge (29 September-4 October 1979)
Vol. 1, at p. A2.5.
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to delve in detail into the basis upon "which the
limitation of liability should be effected, it is
sufficient that other means than tonnage would appear
34
to be more feasible as applied to offshore oil rigs.
4. Underwriters' entitlement to limitation of liability
Another important point which calls for consideration
concerns an assured's entitlement to limitation of
liability as it affects the assured's underwriter.
Assuming that owners of offshore oil rigs are
entitled to limited liability, as the writer has been
advocating, does it necessarily lead to the conclusion
that their underwriters' liabilities are correspondingly
limited on equal footings? In other words, can the
underwriters on all occasions take the advantage of
the assureds' right to limit their liabilities?
It appears that there is little, if any, authority
on this point as far as the decisions in British courts
are concerned. Nevertheless, it is submitted that this
question is more than academic and may offer an approach
to the maritime bar in the absence of any clear-cut
statutory rules or judicial rulings. This impression
34. Cf. Summerskill, op cit (supra note l) at p. 38.
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may also be strengthened by the implications of Olympic
35
To-winq Corporation v. Nebel Twoing Company, a United
States federal court decision.
In Olympic, the limitation of liability was held
to be a personal defence. The court stated that under
36
the Louisiana's direct action statute the limitation
of liability available to a vessel owner was not
available to the owner's insurer in a direct action
suit.
The court in Olympic cited a Circuit Court's
37
holding in Cushing v. Maryland Cas. Co. in supporting
its position. Surprisingly, the fact that Cushing
had been reversed by the United States Supreme Court
failed to change the attitude of the Olympic judges.
The Supreme Court in Cushing pointed out the
possibility that higher premiums would result if the
35. 419 F.2d 230 (1969).
36. The Louisiana's direct action statute is further
noted in Chapter 6, see below, p. 307.
37. 193 F2d 536 (1952); 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
This case is further noted in Chapter 6, see
below, p. 309.
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insurer was held liable beyond the amount of the
limitation fund, which would in turn deny the shipowner
full benefit of the federal Limitation Act. However,
the judges in Olympic were of the opinion that the
possibility of higher premiums was an insufficient
basis for permitting an insurer to limit its liability,
denying that the Limitation Act was intended to limit
the amount of premiums paid by vessel owners on
insurance. ihe insurer (appellant) in Olympic
38
contended, among others, that the right to limit
liability was not a personal defence under Louisiana
law. The court however took the position that the
Limitation Act was designed to assist the maritime
industry and that it was in no way intended to benefit
the insurance industry. As the status of insurer was
not covered by the public policy underlying the
Limitation Act, the limitation of liability under the
federal statute was a personal defence which could not
38. The appellant also contended that the insurance
policy involved - a P & I policy - did not permit
a direct action. The no-action clause contained
in the policy was however held ineffective by the
Circuit Court.
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be availed of by any insurer under Louisiana lav.
This discussion does not propose to make any
comment on the question of personal defence or the
underlying rationale for the relevant Louisiana
legislation involved in the Olympic case. Nevertheless,
it is felt that if the judicial conclusion in Olympic
were to apply to oil-related insurance, which seems
not contested yet, it is bound to create more problems
than it solved, if any.
It is necessary to bear in mind that liability
insurances are heavily involved in offshore oil
activities. Despite a number of problems described
throughout this work, a considerable portion of risks
are virtually assumed by offshore liability underwriters.
If the limitation of liability were not available to
the underwriters but personal to the assureds who are
substantially in a less vulnerable position, it would
be of little practical significance. Furthermore, and
perhaps most plausibly, oil-related insurance is very
much market-oriented. This is the pivotal factor on
which any analysis of the insurance implications of
maritime judicial rulings must turn. To respond
sensibly to expectations about potentially catastrophic
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losses in the future, the underwriters would be left
with little alternative but to increase the premiums
and to enlarge the extent to which the assureds self-
insure their risks. It is the consumers of oil products
who would as a result of the chain reaction suffer the
most.
B. Problems of employer's liability insurance and
workmen's compensation in the US.
1. The seaman status
As the legal clarification made between offshore
installations is important in any approach to the
problem of limitation of liability, so is the legal
status of offshore oil workers to the employer's
liability insurance and workmen's compensation.
In common parlance, it might be reasonably presumed
that offshore oil-field workers on board an oil rig
classified as a ship or vessel must then be treated
as seamen, and vice versa. As is demonstrated below,
nevertheless, this presumption is far from correct. It
is proposed to explore this question by examining some




In summary, an offshore oil worker classified as
a seaman can,proceed against his employer for mainte¬
nance and cure under the Jones Act and the unseaworthi¬
ness doctrine. A distinctive feature of the Jones Act
is that there is no statutory limitation of the amount
recoverable. If a seaman is found guilty of contribu¬
tory negligence, the amount recoverable may be reduced,
but this does not constitute a complete bar to his
action.
Early cases established that fixed structures were
not vessels, which denied typical fix-platform workers
39
seamen's remedies. This conclusion raised the question
of the applicability of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. Nevertheless, there were
cases where fixed-platform workers were held to be
neither seamen nor under the coverage of the Longshore¬
men' s Act, and accordingly state workmen' compensation
became their primary injury remedy.
39. For works examining this area of the law, see Comment,
"When Is An Offshore Oilfield Worker A Seaman?" (1967)
27 Louisiana Law Review 757; Robertson, "Injuries to
Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplifi¬
cation," (1977) 55 Texas Law Review 973.
160
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 1953 changed
urx
the situation, making Longshoremen's Act benefits
available to workers on fixed platforms located beyond
three miles from shore, whereas workers on fixed rigs
within three miles from shore continued to resort to
state workmen's compensation law for their rights for
40
compensation against their employers.
3. Tenders alongside fixed rigs
The general rule that oil workers on fixed platforms
were not seamen was - and is now still being - challenged
with success in cases involving tenders or auxiliary
vessels alongside fixed platforms.
Tenders or auxiliary vessels associated with fixed
platforms are usually used for supporting operations.
They can also serve as living quarters if the fixed
rigs are not self-contained. In a typical platform-
tender situation, it is common to find that an employee
40. Generally, greater benefits are available under the
Longshoremen's Act than under state workmen's compen¬
sation law. Therefore, the argument that a distance
of three miles should not deprive stateside oilfield
workers, performing identical tasks as their offshore
counterparts, of the improved benefits available under
the federal act, is not without force.
161
may live aboard the tender and even perform part of
his duties aboard the tender, such as loading supplies
and cleaning up. Not surprisingly, he then may well be
held to be a member of the crew of the tender. To claim
seaman status in that case, it is immaterial whether he
41
is injured on board the tender or on the fixed platform.
Nevertheless, the characterisation of the worker's
employment on the tender is of vital importance in
securing seaman benefits. To this extent, the worker's
exact duties on board the tender and the amount of time
he spends working on the tender as opposed to working
42
on the fixed rig are generally considered as key factors.
In view of the foregoing, there is no ground for
asserting that workers on board offshore fixed rifs
not regarded as ships or vessels must be non-seamen.
4. Floating-rig workers and the Robison test
As previously noted, floating oil rigs have been
41. E.g. Noble Drilling Corp. v. Smith, 412 F.2d 952,
cert, denied. 396 U.S. 906 (1969).
42. There has been a great deal of significant litigation
in the US federal courts, e.g. Texas Co. v. Savoie,
240 F.2d 674; Keener v. Transworld Drilling Co.,
468 F.2d 729; Callahan v. Flour Ocean Servs. Inc.,
482 F.2d 1350.
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held in the United States to be vessels, although they
function only to a minimum extent as a means of trans¬
portation. However, this does not lead to the inference
that workers on board floating oil rigs are necessarily
entitled to attain seaman status.
43
In Texas Co. v. Gianfala, the first case classifying
offshore oil workers on board floating rigs as seamen,
the decedent was killed while unloading tubing with
a hydraulic lift on board a submersible drilling rig.
The jury determined that the worker was a seaman and
awarded damages under the Jones Act. On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the decedent was
not working in aid of navigation nor was he a member of
the crew of the vessel, but was a member of the drilling
crew. But the United States Supreme Court reversed on
certiorari without discussion.
Among cases subseguent to Gianfala, Offshore Co. v.
44
Robison which involved a submersible drilling rig was
a leading one in that the legal requirements for an oil-
43. 350 U.S. 879, rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 960 (1956).
44. 266 F. 2d 769.
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field worker to be a seaman were established to some
degree. As to whether there was a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to submit a Jones Act claim for
seaman status to a jury, Judge Wisdom of the Fifth
Cirduit delineated the definitive test, which is worth
quoting in full:
"(l) if there is evidence that the injured workman
was assigned permanently to a vessel (including
special purpose structures not usually employed as
a means of transport by water but designed to float
on water) or performed a substantial part of his
work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in which
he was employed or the duties which he performed
contributed to the function of the vessel or to the
accomplishment of its mission, or to the operation
or welfare of the vessel in terms of its maintenance
during its movement or during anchorage for its
future trips."
The Robison test has been applied in a number of cases
involving floating rigs and, significantly, to situations
where tenders or auxiliary vessels as described above
were present. While the Robison rule is by no means
extensive enough in the context of offshore oil operations,
one important conclusion which can be drawn thus far
would be that workers aboard floating rigs legally
classified as vessels are not always able to recover
under the Jones Act and maritime law as seamen. In
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this connection, it should also be noted that once a
worker has been classified as a seaman because of the
nature of his employment on a floating rig, the
temporaty assignment to a fixed platform does not
45
divest him of his status as a seaman.
5. 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's Act
The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's Act have
substantially expanded the coverage of the Act and in
turn affected the status of offshore oil workers.
As far as this discussion is concerned, a few
fixed-rig workers continue to achieve seaman status
because of their relationship with the tenders or
auxiliary vessels used in connection with the fixed
rigs. Those fixed-rig workers who are not entitled
to seaman benefits and who suffer injury beyond three
miles from shore are covered by the Act for compensa¬
tion purposes. Some of the fixed-rig workers injured
within three miles, who were not covered by the Act
before 1972 and who had to resort to state workmen's
compensation statutes, have now been brought into the
45. Hiqginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422.
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46
coverage of the Act by the 1972 Amendments.
In cases of floating-rig workers, the Robison test
is of continuing importance, notwithstanding the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoremen's Act. In brief, those
floating-rig workers lacking seaman status because
their connection with the floating rigs fails to satisfy
the Robison requirements are now covered by the amended
47
Act, irrespective of the three-mile limit.
With these statutory guidelines in mind, one may
still find it difficult to ascertain with great certainty
46. The determining factors include the new geographic
and employment status limits imposedl by the 1972
Amendments. In general, the geographic limit which
refers mainly to navigable waters presents no
difficulty. Whether work on fixed rigs meets the
new employment status criterion depends on the
interpretation of the "maritime employment" under
the amended Act. There have been Administrative
Law Judge decisions suggesting that ordinary oilfield
work on fixed rigs is not "maritime employment" in
this context. Therefore, it may be concluded that
the amended Longshoremen's Act does not cover all
fixed-rig injuries occurring within three miles from
shore. It should also be added that the decision
against coverage have invited criticism. See Robertson,
op cit (supra note 39) at pp. 994-996.
47. E.g. St. Julien v. Diamond M. Drilling, 403 F. Supp.
1256.
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as to what benefits are actually available to a
particular offshore oil worker, in view of the court'
wide discretion in construing the worker's connection
with the rigs and vessels involved therein. It follows
that viable employer's liability insurances, which
are essential to offshore oil activities, can hardly
be expected under these circumstances. Offshore
employers would be in such a dilemma unable to predict
or foresee the extent to which they may be liable to
their employees whose legal positions are yet to be
decided, which could vary from case to case. Thus,
employer's liability policies expressly covering the
employer's liability under, say, the Longshoremen's
Act, would obviously not suffice. And the greatest
protection possibly available can only be achieved by
means of broad terms employed in the policies referring
to all relevant compensation statutes including, of
course, the Longshoremen's Act and the Jones Act.
Given such a coverage at the expense of higher premiums
which might otherwise be reduced, the benefits available
to the employees may ironically be found to be no more
than what the Longshoremen's Act provides, or even less.
Such insurances, workable as they may be, can hardly fit
167
in with the employers' actual need. Nor can the
potential risks be precisely reflected by the rates.
C. Effects of UK legislation on offshore injuries and
compensation
1. The evolution and development of the law
So far as offshore employer's liability in respect
of personal injuries sustained by their employees is
concerned, the legal distinctions among offshore
installations are not evident under the existing
United Kingdom legislation. This noteworthy feature,
which is in contrast to the US jurisdiction, is shown
by the following discussion.
Before approaching the workmen's compensation and
employer's liability insurance involved in offshore
operations, it is necessary to outline briefly the
evolution and development of the law in respect thereof.
The year 1897 saw the introduction of the first
Workmen's Compensation Act, which was then extended
from time to time and was consolidated in 1925. In
essence, the Workmen's Compensation Acts were for half
a century the chief statutory remedy for a workman
who sustained personal injury arising out of and in
the course of his employment. Under those Acts,
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negligence was irrelevant and the amount of compensation
was limited. In other words, the rights given to a
workman the Acts were based upon principles entirely
different from those controlling a workman's right to
sue his employer at common law. As the liability to
provide compensation was the personal liability of
the employer, the employer in a sense became the
insurer of his employees. Nevertheless, he was free
to make insurance arrangements covering his liability
under the Acts.
The defects of the compensation scheme under the
Workmen's Compensation Acts led to a demand for reform.
From 5th July, 1948, the system of workmen's compensa¬
tion was replaced by a scheme of National Insurance,
with the inception of the National Insurance (Industrial
Injuries) Act 1946, which was also amended thereafter
on several occasions. This in turn led to the intro¬
duction of the consolidating National Insurance
(Industrial Injuries) Act 1965.
Briefly, the compensation scheme under the 1965
Act was essentially one of compulsory insurance.
Benefits were paid to injured workmen out of a fund
to which the workmen and their employers contributed,
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with the State adding sums to the contributions. In
general, benefits were not payable in respect of
accidents happening while the insured persons were
48
outside Great Britain, subject however to provisions
49
dealing with, among others, offshore oil-field workers.
Because the benefits were specific in terms of money ,
the effect of the legal classification of offshore
oil workers in this context was far less significant
than the US experience had shown.
The present law governing this area is to be
found in Chapter IV of Part II of the Social Security
Act 1975, as amended by the Social Security Act 1980.
Nevertheless, the idea of the national insurance fund
continues to be maintained. Three basic benefits, i.e.
industrial injury benefit, industrial disablement
benefit and industrial death benefit, are provided
50
thereunder. The benefit rates are subject to increase.
As they do not involve the classification issue which
48. Section 5(4) of the 1965 Act.
49. Section 76 of the 1965 Act.
50. Section 50(2) of the 1975 Act.
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has been previously observed, there is no need to set
out in detail the rating scheme in the present discussion.
51
With a number of modifications, the 1975 Act has been
extended to employment in connection with continental
shelf operations. Thus,
"Employment in any designated area which is employ¬
ment in connection with the exploitation of the
resources mentioned in section l(l) (exploitation
and exploration of Continental Shelf) of the
Continental Shelf Act 1964 or with the exploration
of the sea bed and subsoil in any designated area
and which,were every such area in Great Britain,
would be employed earner's employment under Chapter
IV of Part II of the Act of 1975"
has now been added to be treated as employed earner's
52
employment for industrial injuries purposes.
2. Employer's liability
The present National Insurance scheme under the
1975 Act does not relieve an employer of his liability
51. For which the power is given to the Secretary of
State. See section 132 of the 1975 Act.
52. The ^ Social Security (Employed Earners' Employments
for Industrial Injuries Purposes) Regulations 1975,
S.I. 1975 No. 467, Regulation 2 and Schedule 1,
Part 1, para. 7. However, it was not until Clark v.
Ocean Contractors Inc., [l98l] 1 W.L.R. 59, that the
application of some provisions of the Income and




at common law or that under statute law. Among those
statutes relating to offshore employees, the Mineral
Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 is of vital
importance. The Act, largely generated by the Sea Gem
54
accident, is applied to offshore installations for
53. Subject to section 2(1) of the Law Reform (Personal
Injuries) Act 1948 and section 3(1) of the Law
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Norther
Ireland) 1948, which provide that a court when
awarding damage shall take into account one-half
of the value of certain social security benefits
for five years.
It must be added that there have been proposals to
simplify and rationalise the sources of compensation
in respect of injuries in the course of employment,
and injuries through the use of motor vehicles or
other road transport. See in particular The Report
of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Com¬
pensation for Personal Injury (The Pearson Report),
Cmnd 7054. For appraisal of the recommendations
contained in the report, see Allen, (et al.)(eds.)
Accident Compensation After Pearson (1979); Kewley,
"The Pearson Report: An Appraisal," (1978) 128 New
Law Journal 551; Marsh, "The Pearson Report on Civil
Liability and Compensation for Death or Personal
Injury," (1979) 95 The Law Quarterly Review 513;
Fleming, "The Pearson Report: Its Strategy," (1979)
42 Modern Law Review 249.
54. See above, pp. 140, 141.
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underwater exploitation or exploration of mineral
resources. It is aimed primarily at controlling
safety on offshore rigs and establishing standards
for the construction of such installations. In so
far as personal injuries are concerned, breaches of
the Act or of regulations made under the Act are
55
actionable. Nevertheless, it makes no reference to
remedies for such injuries, as the US Longshoremen's
Act does.
Also of relevance is the Health and Safety at
Work etc. Act 1974, designed to prevent or reduce
accidents by laying down safe working conditions.
This Act, which has been made applicable to the areas
56
designated under the Continental Shelf Act 1964, confers
55. Section 11 of the Act.
The regulations made under the Act include the Off¬
shore Installations (Operational Safety, Health and
Welfare) Regulations 1976, S.I. 1976 No. 1019; the
Offshore Installations (Emergency Procedures) Regula¬
tions 1976, S.I. 1976 No. 1542; the Offshore Installa¬
tions (Life-saving Appliances) Regulations 1977, S.I.
1977 No. 486, as amended by the Offshore Installations
(Life-saving Appliances and Fire-fighting Equipment)
(Amendment) Regulations 1980, S.I. 1980 No. 322.
56. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Applica¬
tion outside Great Britain) Order 1977, S.I. 1977
No. 1232, Order 4.
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no civil right of action for failure to comply with
57
the general duties imposed upon the employers. Nor does
it provide remedies for personal injuries suffered by
the employees.
The broad definition of offshore installations
referred to in the Mineral Workings (Offshore Insta¬
llations) Act 1971 has been further extended by the
Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act 1975 to cover
other manned installations, both fixed and floating,
58
used in connection with submarine pipe-lines. This
Act makes provision for regulations to be promulgated
in relation to safety of workers engaged on pipe-lines
59
works. Similar provisions for civil actionability
60
are contained therein.
It remains to be decided whether oil workers on
board offshore installations are also entitled to
57. Section 47(1) of the Act. However, breach of a duty
imposed by health and safety regulations shall, so
far as it causes damage, be actionable except in so
far as the regulations provide otherwise. See s. 47(2).





seaman benefits under the present law. As defined in
the Merchant Shipping Acts, "seaman" includes every
person employed or engaged in any capacity on board
62
any ship. As it is left uncertain whether offshore
oil installations are ships for the purposes of the
Acts, the statutory basis for treating those workers
as seamen is by no means clear. It should also be
63
added that the judicial decisions interpreting the
above-mentioned definition do not really assist in
the determination of the question.
61. Seaman benefits are largely regulated in the
Merchant Shipping Acts.
62. Section 742 of the 1894 Act. The definition has
been extended to cover apprentices to the sea
service, see section 49 of the 1906 Act. These
provisions should be read in conjunction with
section 67 of the 1970 Act.
63. E.g. Lascars serving on a British ship were held
to be seamen, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Naviga¬
tion Co. v. The King, [l90lj 2 K.B. 686; so was a
steward in charge of a bar on board a ship, Thompson
v.H. & W. Nelson, [l9l3] 2 K.B. 523.
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3. Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969
Employer's liability both at common law and under
the statute law, which is different from and independent
of their legal duty to pay contributions under the
present National Insurance scheme, has led to the
introduction of the Employers' Liability (Compulsory
64
Insurance) Act 1969. This Act requires an employer
carrying on business in Great Britain to maintain
compulsory insurance against liability for bodily
injury or disease suffered by his employees arising
from and in the course of their employment in Great
65
Britain. The amount for which the employer is obligated
to insure under the Act shall be two million pounds
in respect of claims relating to any one or more of
66
his employees arising out of any one occurrence. On
benefits available to an injured worker, the National
64. This Act came into force on January 1, 1972.
65. Section l(l) of the Act.
66. The Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance)
General Regulations 1971, S.I. 1971 No. 1117,
Regulation 3, as amended by the Employers' Liabi¬
lity (Compulsory Insurance)(Amendment) Regulations
1974, S.I. 1974 No. 208.
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Insurance scheme under the 1975 Act and the compulsory
insurance by virtue of the 1969 Act are far apart and
not mutually contradictory. Therefore, the fact that
both insurance schemes are of a compulsory nature and
designed for industrial compensation, confusing as it
may be, does not invalidate the rights of an injured
67
worker under either scheme in an appropriate case.
Adding to the complexity is the fact that the worker
killed or injured may have taken out a first party
insurance policy providing for benefits in the event
68
of his death or personal injury. The insurance
benefits to which the worker is entitled must be
distinguished from the two sources of compensation
referred to above.
Regulations made under the 1969 Act prohibit for
the purposes of the Act certain conditions in policies
of insurance which would entitle insurers to deny
67. See however supra note 53.
68. First party insurance is personal and voluntary,
the three main types of policy being life assurance,




liability under the policy. Of those conditions
prohibited by the regulations, two are of particular
70
sugnificance.
By virtue of further regulations in 1975, the
69. The Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance)
General Regulations 1971, S.I. 1971 No. 1117,
regulation 2, as amended by S.I. 1974 No. 208.
70. "Any condition in a policy of insurance issued or
renewed in accordance with the reguirements of the
Act after the coming into operation of this Regula¬
tion which provides (in whatever terms) that no
liability (either generally or in respect of a
particular claim) shall arise under the policy,
or that any such liability so arising shall cease -
(b) unless the policy holder takes reasonable care
to protect his employees against the risk of
bodily injury or disease in the course of their
employment;
(c) unless the policy holder complies with the
reguirements of any enactment for the protection
of employees against the risk of bodily injury
or disease in the course of their employment; and
is hereby prohibited for the purposes of the Act."
Before the passing of the 1969 Act, those conditions -
now prohibited by regulation 2 of the Employers' Lia¬
bility (Compulsory Insurance) General Regulations
1971 - could be found in many employer's liability
policies. See, e.g. London Crystal Window Cleaning
Co. Ltd. v. National Mutual Indemnity Insurance
Co. Ltd. , [jl952j 2 Lloyd's Rep. 360.
178
1969 Act has been extended to waters to which the
Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971
71
applies. Those offshore employees and installations,
now covered by the 1969 Act, are specified in Regula¬
tion 2 of the 1975 Regulations, which provides:
"The Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance)
Act 1969 (hereinafter in these Regulations referred
to as "the 1969 Act") shall apply to employers of
relevant employees employed for work on or from
relevant installations, or on or from associated
structures in the course of operations undertaken
on or in connection with relevant installations,
subject to such modifications and extensions as
are hereafter in these Regulations prescribed."
(Emphase s added)
72
"Revelant employee" in this context means an employee -
"(a) who is ordinarily resident in the United
Kingdom, or
(b) who is not ordinarily resident in the United
Kingdom but who has been present in the United
Kingdom and waters to which the 1971 Act applies
outside the United Kingdom other than territorial
waters admacent to Northern Ireland in the course
of employment there for a continuous period of
not less than 7 days."
71. The Offshore Installation (Application of the
Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act




"Relevant installation" denotes "an offshore
installation in waters to which the 1971 Act applies
outside the United Kingdom other than territorial
waters adjacent to Northern Ireland not being an
installation registered as a vessel (whether in the
United Kingdom or elsewhere) which is a dredging
73
installation or is in transit to or from a station."
An "associted structure" is meant to cover any
vessel, aircraft or hovercraft which, in relation to
an offshore installation, is attendant on the insta¬
llation or any floating structure used in connection
74
with the installation. It seems clear that a tender
or auxiliary vessel moored alongside a fixed platform,
which is important in determining the benefits available
to fixed-rig workers in the United States jurisdiction,
is under the category of the "associated structure".
It should be observed that "relevant installations"
and "associated structures" as used in the 1975 Regula¬
tions are defined in a broader sense than "offshore





(Offshore Installations) Act 1971. However, no distinc¬
tion between fixed and floating installations is made
76
in either context.
For the purposes of the Employers' Liability
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969, an "Associate struc¬
ture" is not to be treated differently from a "rele¬
vant installation" so far as "relevant employees" are
concerned. In the absence of any statutory rule or
significant judicial decision specifically classifying
77
these "relevant employees" into different groups, e.g.
seamen or non-seamen, there is no solid legal ground
75. Offshore installation is defined in s. 1(3) of the
1971 Act as "any installation which is maintained,
or is to be established, for underwater exploitation
or exploration to which this Act applies." This
definition-does not cover aircraft or hovercraft.
76. Nevertheless, for the purposes of registration under
the Offshore Installation (Registration) Regulations
1972, S.I. 1972 No. 702, a distinction is drawn
between "mobile installations" and "fixed installa¬
tions". See the definitions specified in r. 2(1).
77. This is certainly not meant to indicate that off¬
shore employees cannot be subdivided into functional
categories which match the various divisions of the
operations, e.g. diving crew, production staff,
catering staff, etc.
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for assessing how much different the insurance
benefits available under the 1969 Act will be among
different injured employees.
4. Insurance coverages and the Sayers case
Regulation 3 of the Employers' Liability (Compulsory
78
Insurance) Exemption Regulations 1971, which is of
particular relevance to offshore employers' liability
insurances, stipulates:
"The following employers are hereby exempted from
the requirement of the Act to insure and maintain
insurance: -
(a)
(x) any employer who is a member of a mutual
insurance association of shipowners or of
shipowners and others, in respect of any
liability to an employee of the kind mentioned
in section 1(1) of the Act against which the
employer is insured for the time being with
that association for an amount not less than
that required by the Act and regulations
thereunder, being an employer who holds a
certificate issued by that association to
the effect that he is so insured in relation
to that employee;
The enactment of regulation 3(x) is obviously motivated
by the realisation that ships - as well as a substantial
78. S.I. 1971 No. 1933.
182
number of offshore oil rigs - are insured for such
79
risks in P & I Clubs. As long as the P & I coverages
are not less than what is required in terms of amount,
therefore, the exemption thereof is practically advisable.
As has been explained, the entitlement of oil-rig
owners to P & I memberships does not lead to the
inference that offshore oil rigs so insured are regarded
as ships or vessels. Nor does it encourage the belief
that workers on board those rigs are seamen.
It is important to remember that offshore employers
who are under P & I coverages in respect of their oil
rigs are not necessarily protected against the employers'
liability. There are situations where offshore emplo¬
yers, being P & I policyholders, opt to insure against
their employers' liability separately under employers'
liability insurances other than P & I coverages. This
portion of risks in that case should then be excluded
from the P & I policies at reduced premiums. In this
connection, it is relevant to note that the I.A.D.C.
contract, requiring the drilling contractor to maintain
insurance covering persons employed by the contractor or
79. See above, pp. 109, 110.
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its sub-contractors, does not specify P & I coverage
as the only insurance open to the contractor against
80
such risks. Rather, it provides:
"Any insurance covering personnel in accordance
with the governing law of the jurisdiction where
the work is performed or in accordance with appli¬
cable laws of other countries, covering those
persons employed by Contractor or its subcontractors
for work to be performed hereunder whose employment
may be subject to such laws, during the period such
persons are so engaged."
It is evident from the above-quoted contract terms that
the insurance the drilling contractor maintains must be
in accordance with either (a) the law which governs the
jurisdiction where the work is performed, or (b) the
applicable laws of other countries "coverings persons
employed... whose employment may be subject to such laws
..." These various laws, which may come into play,
should be given adequate consideration by the drilling
contractor who is under the obligation to carry the
81
insurance.
80. In Appendix B, cl. A.
81. See Summerskill, op cit (supra note l) at p. 279.
Cf. McClendon, "Some Legal Aspects of Offshore Oil
Operations in South America," (1959) 1 Inter-American
Law Review at p. 181.
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The rationale underlying the I.A.D.C. contract as
regards "the governing law of the jurisdiction where
the work is performed" is clearly based upon the fact
that that governing law has a great bearing on the
legality or even necessity of an employers' liability
insurance programme covering such risks occassion in
that jurisdiction, as the UK Employers' Liability
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 has demonstrated.
Logically, the law governing the employers' liability
insurance - be it compulsory or not - must also be
parallel in substance to the law regulating the
liability which may be incurred by employers within
that jurisdiction, thus rendering the insurance viable
and feasible. That is probably why the originators of
the I.A.D.C. contract used; the words "in accordance
with the law..." At any rate, the present standard
contract, while reflecting the true picture of offshore
practices, has virtually confirmed the proposition that
the law governing the jurisdiction where the work is
performed is of fundamental importance in determining
the benefits available to oil workers injured within
that jurisdiction, so far as offshore operations are
concerned. Conceivably, where the employers' liability
185
in such a case gives rise to conflict of laws problem,
as is frequently the case, it would appear relatively
difficult to rule out that governing law as the applicable
law. Bearing in mind this presumption, it seems appro¬
priate to consider the decision reached by the Court of
82
Appeal in Sayers v. International Drilling Co. N.V., a
decision which is perhaps disappointing to some extent.
The plaintiff, an Englishman, entered into a contract
with a Dutch subsidiary of an American oil drilling
company to work on oil rigs overseas. The standard
form of contract, intended to cover employees of different
nationalities working outside their own countries,
contained no express choice-of-law provision. Clearly
purporting to exclude the plaintiff's rights at law in
the event of injury by substituting a company "Compensa¬
tion Program", the contract provided in clause 8:
"As the company is a Netherlands corporation, and
as my employment contract hereby applied for will
be wholly performable overseas and outside the
United Kingdom, the company does not subscribe to
or carry workmen's compensation insurance under the
laws of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, I realise
that I shall not be covered by virtue of my proposed
82. [l97l] 1 W.L.R. 1176 (C.A.).
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employment with the company by workmen's compensa¬
tion insurance or benefits under the law of the
United Kingdom...I am satisfied with the provisions
and benefits of the said Compensation Program."
The contract further stated:
"In consideration of having this Program maintained
for me, I hereby agree that, in the event I am
accidentally injured or sustain disability of any
kind during my employment with the company, I will
accept those benefits to which I may be entitled
under the Compensation Program as my exclusive
remedy in lieu of any other claims, rights, demands,
or actions whether at common law or under the
statutes of United Kingdom or any other nation,
which may accrue to me by virtue of such accidental
injury."
While working on an oil rig off the coast of Nigeria,
the plaintiff was injured as a result of the alleged
negligence of fellow employees. He was then returned
to England and payments were made to him under the
terms of the Program.
The plaintiff however sued the defendant company,
seeking to override the exempting clause by relying on
s. 1(3) of the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948,
under which any term in a contract of employment having
the effect of excluding employers' liability for the
negligence of persons in common employment would be
187
rendered void. The Court of Appeal decided that the
proper law to be applied was Dutch law which permitted
such a clause, and that s. 1(3) of the 1948 Act could
not be invoked by the plaintiff.
On the said choice-of-law issue, their Lordships
in Sayers concurred generally, though with differing
reasons. One ground of criticism is that Nigerian
law - the law governing the jurisdiction where the
work had been performed - was decided unanimously to
have the least substantial conncetion. While the
reasons for ruling out Nigerian law were far from
convincing, the emphasis was virtually on the choice
between Dutch and English law. Adding to the criticism
is the fact that no evidence whatsoever of Nigerian law
83
was given. In view of the presumption as described in
the preceding paragraphs and rightly reflected by the
I.A.D.C. approach, the irrelevancy of Nigerian law in
Sayers - a typical situation involving an offshore
accident - could hardly be justified. At this point
83. For criticisms of the decision, see Smith,"Interna¬
tional Employment Contracts - Contracting Out," (1972)
21 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 164.
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it should be observed that a similar issue was raised
in a later Scottish case, where a differing ruling was
84
rendered by Lord Kissen.
85
Apart from the controversial choice-of-law aspect,
it is not difficult to extract from the decision in
Sayers support for the view that offshore employers
can successfully avoid employer's liability insurance
84. Brodin v. A/R Seijan, 1973 S.L.T. 198.
85. Certain uniform rules concerning the choice of law
have now been established within the European
Community. Article 4.1 of the Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations provides:
"To the extent that the law applicable to the
contract has not been chosen in accordance with
Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the
law of the country which it is most closely
connected. Nevertheless, a severable part of
the contract which has a closer connection with
another country may by way of exception be governed
by the law of that other country."
The rules of this Convention do not apply to contracts
of insurance which covers risks situated in the
territories of the Member States of the Community.
(Article 1.3)
The text of the Convention is to be found in 19 ILM
1492 (1980).
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in a case like Sayers, thus resulting in the effect
of the law requiring compulsory liability insurance,
if any, being literally vitiated. As a matter of fact,
even if an employer is within the reach of the law
respecting such insurances, he may still opt to ignore
the law. Because the employer may prefer following
the example of the "Compensation Program" in Sayers
to abiding by the compulsory-insurance law, so long
as the punishment for infringement thereof is not
86
prohibitive, as the 1969 Act has shown.
5. Insurance policy considerations
As has been pointed out, offshore employers may
insure against their employers' liability under P & I
policies. And by virtue of regulation 3(x) of the
Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Exemption
87
Regulations 1971, those employers are legally exempted
86. If on any day an employer is not insured in accor¬
dance with the 1969 Act the licensees and owners of
the installation are both guilty of an offence
punishable by a fine of up to £200. See the Offshore
Installations (Application of the Employers' (Compul¬
sory Insurance Act 1969) Regulations 1975, S.I. 1975
No. 1289, regulation 6.
87. Supra note 78.
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to that extent from the compulsory-insurance require¬
ments, thus avoiding double insurance. Nevertheless,
it is necessary to bear in mind that in practice the
operator and the drilling contractor in an offshore
venture is each to maintain employer's liability
insurance separately and respectively, if any, covering
their own employees, which may be evidenced by the
I.A.D.C. contract under which the drilling contractor
is only obligated to carry insurance for its own
personnel as far as employer's liability is concerned.
Since operators are normally not entitled to P & I
88
memberships, as previously noted, regulation 3(x) is
only applicable in substance to drilling contractors
in the context of offshore operations. However, were
all the oil workers involved in an offshore project
directly employed by the operator, as demanded by
2,000 Norwegian offshore workers involved in an indus¬
trial action in 1980 - a demand which was then turned
89
down by the National Arbitration Board, it is not
88. See above, p. 106.
89. Financial Times, October 10, 1980, p. 2.
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immediately clear whether the operator in that case
may obtain P & I coverage for such risks. The answer
to this hypothetical question would seem to be negative.
I seeking the employer's liability insurance, two
options are open to an offshore drilling contractor
whose drilling unit is insured with a P & I Club
prividing such coverages. He may solely rely upon
the protection under the P & I policy; or turn to a
separate employer's liability policy, with that portion
of risks being excluded by agreement from the P & I
coverage. To this complexity, however, has been added
the fact that there are situations where employer's
liability coverages may be automatically excluded
from P & I policies, as described in the following
section of the Chapter.
D. The Norwegian conditions and the C.I.C.M. cover
1. Problems of the exclusion
In contrast to the cover afforded by the P & I
Clubs generally, two Norwegian Clubs have offered
P & I conditions specially designed for mobile drilling
90
units. As far as offshore employers' liability is
90. See above, p. 114.
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concerned, the distinction between the P & I Clubs
generally and the two Norwegian Clubs is of central
importance in that the former normally provide cover
for such risks whereas the latter have adopted a
different approach.
Under the old conditions - generally known as the
91
Terms of Cover - offered by the two Norwegian Clubs,
liability "for any claim arising directly or indirectly
under Workmen' Compensation or Employers' Liability Acts
and any such Statutory Law in respect of. accidents to
92
or illness of any employee of the Assured" was excluded.
Section 13 of the present conditions, as opposed to
the old conditions, provides:
"The Association shall not cover:(a)
(b) loss which is covered under the Norwegian
Folketrygd or which is or should have been
covered under equivalent obligatory insurance
system in a country to which the operation of
the entered drilling vessel has a natural
connection,
»»
In brief, the Norwegian Folketrygd referred to in
91. See above, p. 114.
92. CI. 3(1) of the Terms of Cover.
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section 13 is virtually a social security insurance
scheme, under which persons residing in the Kingdom
and Norwegian subjects employed on Norwegian ships
93
are automatically insured. Foreign subjects serving
on Norwegian ships are also covered with respect to
compensation for death and grants in case of injury
suffered in the service. While it is not proposed to
discuss in detail the Norwegian scheme, the "equivalent
obligatory insurance system in a country to which the
operation of the entered drilling vessel has a natural
connection" merits some analysis. In this context,
94
the following foreign countries are meant to be covered:
(a) the country where the drilling vessel is
registered, or the "home country" if it is
not registered; and
(b) the countries on the territory or continental
shelf of which the drilling vessel is operating.
There is some doubt as to whether in this context
93. Braekhus and Rein, Insurance Conditions for P & I
Insurance of Drilling Vessels (1976) p. 72.
94. Ibid, at p. 73.
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"obligatory insurance system" of those relevant countries
refers to social security scheme or compulsory employers'
liability insurances, or both. Since these two notions
do not share the same nature, a clarification would seem
to be needed. Nevertheless, as exclusions contained in
the present conditions are aimed primarily at the
avoidance of double insurance, it may be presumed that
exclusion (b) of section 13 purports to cover those
areas where the assured's liability towards its
employees has been actually covered by means of other
obligatory insurances. Accordingly, when the drilling
rig while operating in the British sector of the North
Sea is also subject to the UK Employers' Liability
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969, as extended by the
Offshore Installation (Application of the Employers'
Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969) Regulations
1975, such risks may not be automatically excluded from
the present Norwegian P & I conditions. Since the
entered drilling unit has been covered under a P & I
policy, it is thus exempted from the compulsory insurance
by virtue of regulation 3(x) of the Employers' Liability
95
(Compulsory Insurance) Exemption Regulations 1971. In
95. See above, 181.
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such a unique situation, the present Norwegian P & I
coverage cannot exclude such risks which should have
been, but actually not, covered in accordance with
the UK 1969 Act.
2. C.I.C.M. observations
It is manifest from the foregoing account that
P & I conditions, whether those offered by the two
Norwegian Clubs or otherwise, are of major importance
in assessing employer's liability coverages relating
to floating rigs. In considering the corresponding
coverages as regards fixed platforms during the
construction and maintenance period, one might
naturally turn one's attention to the P & I clause
96
contained in the C.I.C.M. insurance. Nevertheless,
a careful distinction must be drawn at the outset
between the P & I clause referred to above and a P & I
insurance. It should be stressed that this clause,
as used in the C.I.C.M. insurance, is by means a P & I
policy. Rather, it is intended to cover P & I risks
where appropriate within the framework of the C.I.C.M.
coverage.
96. See above, p. 125.
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If observed in isolation, it appears that no adequat
description of employer's liability coverage is specifi¬
cally contained in the P & I clause under consideration.
In fact, an inquiry as to whether the present clause
extends to employer's liability would seem to be of
little practical significance, since such risks have
in the main been expressly excluded from the C.I.C.M.
insurance. This exclusion, as incorporated into cl. 15
of the written policy, provides:
"Excluding Workmen's Compensation Acts and Employers
Liability but including liabilities resulting from
legal recourses in respect of the rights of subroga¬
tion legally permitted under Workmen's Compensation
Acts or other common law liability but the foregoing
shall not be deemed as being substituted to Employer
legal or statutory obligations as to Workmen's
Compensation Acts or Employers' Liability Acts to
their own personnel."
The thought behind this exclusion seems partially
attributable to the fact that in practice offshore
employers usually maintain their employer's liability
97
insurances or compensation schemes separately. It is
thus practically essential that such coverages be
obliterated from the present C.I.C.M. insurance which
97. Cf. p. 190.
197
is designed to cover a number of potential assureds
jointly.
However, it is worth bearing in mind that by virtue
of the proviso contained in the exclusion the present
insurance does not excluded subrogated claims by the
compensation insurer of other parties against an assured
of the C.I.C.M. coverage. For example, where party A's
employee has suffered injury in the course of his
employment, for which party B, a named assured of the
C.I.C.M. insurance, was wholly or partly responsible;
party A*s compensation insurer, after settling the
claim, could turn to party B for recovery, as long as
it is not prohibited by law. To that extent, party B
is covered under the C.I.C.M. insurance.
While the present C.I.C.M. insurance covers a
fixed rig in the Norwegian sector, the reference to
Workmen's Compensation Acts and Employers' Liability
should be replaced by the "Folketrygdloven", the
equivalent Norwegian Welfare Insurance legislation,
under which an insurer has a right of subrogation in
98
certain cases. Presumably, these are the situations
98. Rein, Sogn, Krohn, Kaasen, Lund, Norwegian Petroleum
Law (1978) p. 3-113, note 34.
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to which the proviso is meant to apply.
E. Employer's liability coverage on a global basis
It should be further noted that many oil-associated
companies carry on world-wide activities, which require
additional consideration in framing their insurance
programmes. Against this background, it may be realistic
in appropriate cases to form their employers' liability
coverages on a global basis. Such coverages vary so
from case to case that few generalisations can be
made about their structures, which depend mainly upon
the intention of the employers and the professional
ability of the insurance brokers. As is shown below,
underwriters' liability could as a result become
unpredictable by its nature in terms of amounts. And
novel questions of law have also been created by this
very observable phenomenon, of which a recent English
decision is a graphic illustration.
99
In Castanho v. Brown & Root (U.K.) Ltd. and another,
the controversy before the court was factually complex.
On February 11, 1977, an American supply vessel engaged
in carrying supplies to oil rigs in the North Sea was
99. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 833.
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lying at Great Yarmouth in Norfolk. The plaintiff,
a Portuguese subject, was one of the crew of the vessel.
While transferring oil from a drum to a tank on board
the vessel, the plaintiff sustained a serious accident
which left him a guadriplegic.
The injured worker was employed by the second
defendant, a Panamanian company. Brown and Root (U.K.)
Ltd., an English company providing shore services for
100
the vessel, was the first defendant. Significantly,
both Brown and Root (U.K.) Ltd. and the Panamanian
company were associates of a vast comples based in
Texas known as Jackson Marine Inc. All the corpora¬
tions comprised in the Texas-based group were insured
with the same insurers. Clyde & Co. of London, the
solicitors of Brown and Root (U.K.) Ltd., acted in
England for those insurers who had a clear interest
in the accident.
In September 1977, a writ was issued in England
100. A helpful survey of offshore supply vessels can be
found in "Special Reports: Servicing and Supply in
the North Sea," Noroil Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 1974)
pp. 27, 28.
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rather than in Texas where substantially higher damages
101
could be obtained. By amendment of the writ, the
plaintiff also claimed against Jackson Marine damages
for injuries suffered and losses as a result of the
accident arising out of the negligence and/or breach
of statutory duty of the defendants, their servants
or agents. From the insurers' point of view, no
better policy could be pursued than to encourage the
issue of the proceedings in England and to confine
the proceedings there.
On March 22, 1978, a consent order was made under
102
R.S.C., Ord. 29, r. 9 for an interim payment of £7,250
to the plaintiff and a further order for...an interim
payment of £20,000 was made in December 1978.
101. In the United States the scale of damages for
injuries of the magnitude sustained by the plaintiff
is something in the region of ten times what is
regarded as appropriate by the conventional standards
of the courts of England. Per Shaw L.J., at p. 859.
102. "...'interim payment,' in relation to a defendant,
means a payment on account of any damages in respect
of personal injuries to the plaintiff..."
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During 1978 a firm of Texan attorneys contacted
the plaintiff, persuading him to bring proceedings in
Texas. In February 1979, the plaintiff executed a
power of attorney, conferring on the Texan firm
exclusive rights to represent him judicially in the
United States. In return, the plaintiff agreed to
pay them one-third of the sum recovered in an out of
court settlement and 40 per cent, if the petition
were filed in the court.
Proceedings on the plaintiff's behalf were then
commenced in a Texas State court. In May 1979, the
plaintiff's English solicitors served notice to dis-
103
continue the English proceedings under R.S.C., Ord.
104
21, r. 2(l). In july 1979 the Texan lawyers filed
a notice of non-suit in their action and started a
103. The Texan attorneys promised to pay the English
solicitors proper costs for the work they had
done.
104. "The plaintiff in an action begun by writ may,
without the leave of the court, discontinue the
action... as against any or all of the defendants
at any time not later than 14 days after service
of the defence on him..."
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fresh action in the United States District Court for
105 106
Texas, claiming compensatory and punitive damages.
Parker J. struck out the notice of discontinuance
as being an abuse of the process of the court. The
judge also granted an injunction to restrain the
plaintiff from proceeding further with his action in
the United States. The plaintiff appealed. Shaw and
Brandon L.JJ. concurred in allowing the appeal, with
Lord Denning M.R. dissenting.
In a superficial sense, the primary issue was
directed at the validity of the notice of discontinuance
105. The reason for starting afresh in the federal
court was stated to be that the Texan attorneys
considered such courts were more liberal in
accepting jurisdiction over foreigners and that
an earlier hearing date was likely.
106. The Texan attorneys claimed $5 million compensatory
damages and $10 million punitive damages and
requested trial by jury.
In the United States jurisdiction, plaintiffs
and/or their attorneys usually sue for punitive
damages in addition to compensatory damages if
they consider that they can establish a high degree
of negligence on the part of the defendants. This
point is considered in Payne, "The USA Jurisdiction
Problems As It Affects Liability Underwriting in
the UK," (1977-78) 66 Journal of the Insurance
Institute of London 24, at p. 27.
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under English law. It may however be possible to
extract from the judgments rendered by their Lordships
support for the view that the debate was virtually
dominated by moral or ethical considerations - though
with differing interpretations.
It is indeed difficult to disagree with the
proposition made by Lord Denning that the present
case was a good example of the evils to which
107
champerty could give rise. There is also some
force in his argument that the conduct of the Texan
attorneys was champertous. Nevertheless, that
reasoning seems to have been regarded as tenuous
by Lord Justice Shaw.
Admitting that champerty had ugly connotations
in English law, Shaw L.J. pointed out that the
emotive use of the expression did not "confer upon
an English court a universal moral supervision of
108
legal institutions in other countries." To that
extent, another passage contained in his judgment
107. At p. 857.
108. Per Shaw L.J. , at pi 866.
204
109
deserves to be read in full:
"Whatever moral or ethical considerations may
inspire (or cloud) the judgment of an English
court, it must not seek to meddle officiously
with the jurisdiction of foreign tribunals in
regard to matters which they consider to be within
the province of that jurisdiction."
It is fairly clear that greater stress was laid in
Lord Justice Shaw's holding on the suffering of the
plaintiff. His Lordship took the view that to deny
to the plaintiff the opportunity to pursue his claim
for compensation where it would evoke the most
110
generous response was "less than humane." Has this
also assumed a moral or ethical significance?
Brandon L.J. resolved the dilemma by holding
that the great advantage to the plaintiff in suing
in Texas where much higher damages were obtainable
111
outweighed other considerations.
No adequate description of the insurance coverage
109. At p. 865.
110. Per Shaw L.J., at p. 358.
111. At pp. 872, 873.
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was specifically contained in the judgments. It would
seem probable that both Lord Denning and Brandon L.J.
found little merit in the insurers' contention that
inconvenience and potentially extra expenses could be
incurred. Be that as it may, it does not however
justify making no mention of the point.
Noting that the insurance factor was dispositive
of the issue, Shaw L.J. rightly stated that American
corporations, like their insurers, were aware of the
scale of damages in the United States, and they
112
arranged their policies and the premiums accordingly.
The holding in Castanho has raised several questions
with regard to the liability of insurers. Conceivably,
the broad effect of the decision has been that the
underwriters' liability in monetary terms may differ
substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as
the claimants are allowed to lodge their complaints
therein. At any rate, the underwriters in those
situations are the parties that actually bear the
risk. Therefore, what is material in approaching
112. At p. 866.
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such cases should include the insurance factor. The
underwriters' capacity on the risk should in no event
be disqualified as a basis for determining the damages.
Such a conclusion would be consistent with the position
already adopted by the writer in discussing the
insurance problems associated with indemnity provisions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
OFFSHORE PROPERTY COVERAGES - SOME PROBLEMS
A. The nature and coverages of the insurance
1. The nature of the insurance
Apart from liability insurance aspects, offshore
oil and gas operations cannot afford to be without
property damage insurance covering potential physical
losses. As the facilities and eguipment involved
therein are too many and varied to be dealt with
comprehensively, the scope of this Chapter is limited
to certain selected major items. In the present
context, pipe-lines and other ancillary facilities
can only be briefly mentioned but not further analysed.
It is unquestionable that physical damage and
liability exposures are by no means comparable in
their nature. However, in order to be complementary
to the preceding Chapters in which fixed and non-fixed
offshore units are in most cases considered separately,
the present discussion attempts to pinpoint offshore
property coverages on a roughly similar basis where
appropriate for purposes of contrast. As may be
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ascertained in the following observations, nevertheless,
the placing of the demarcation line between fixed and
non-fixed oil rigs is of less importance to offshore
property insurers than to liability underwriters in
so far as indemnification is concerned. Be that as
it may, it must be added that the distinction between -
as well as classification of - offshore installations
cannot be discounted as a factor in determining the
types of policies to be used and the rating of premium.
2. Hazards
It has been generally acknowledged that the risk
of collapse at varying stages is one of the main hazards
1
of offshore units, of which the loss of Sea Gem has
2
given some indication. The Alexander Kielland disaster
in 1980, in which 123 oil workers were killed, can no
1. For an official report on the Sea Gem accident, see
Report of the Inguiry into the Accident to the
Drilling Rig Sea Gem (1967) Cmnd 3409.
2. The Alexander Kielland was a semi-submersible oil rig
accomodating offshore oilmen working on the Edda Field
platform, which forms part of the Ekofisk production
complex in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. The
disaster occurred on March 27, 1980 when one of the
rig's five legs collapsed. The 10,108-ton rig
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doubt be viewed as another tragic example which preceded
3
the recent Bohai Gulf accident off the Mainland China's
east coast.
4
The losses resulting from blowout, explosion, fire,
overturned within minutes, trapping many of the oilmen.
In terms of fatalities, the accident is by far the
worst in the North Sea. As to the physical damage
aspects, the total insured value of the hull of the
rig was 251.25 million. A significant part of the
risk was insured in the Norwegian market, whereas
Lloyd's of London and London insurance companies were
also involved through the acceptance of 62.5 per cent,
of the risk in reinsurance.
The final report by a three-man commission of inguiry
into the disaster has been published in early April,
1981.
3. The accident, which claimed 70 lives, involved a jack-
up drilling rig which collapsed while operating in the
shallow gulf north of the Shandong peninsula. See The
Times, July 8, 1980, p. 1; International Herald Tribune,
July 8, 1980, p. 4.
4. Fire protection systems for offshore oil installations
are examined in "Fighting Oil Offshore," Insurance
Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 1975) p. 34. Such systems have
been brought under statutory control. See the Offshore
Installations (Fire-fighting Eguipment) Regulations
1978, S.I. 1978 No. 611, as amended by the Offshore
Installations (Life-saving Appliances and Fire-
fighting Equipment)(Amendment) Regulations 1980, S.I.
1980 No. 322. For a general guidance in relation to
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5
etc. have been typified by the stricken Bravo platform
6
and further illustrated by the Ixtoc I blowout in 1979
where the drilling rig was blown to pieces. On the
other hand, the damage caused by Hurricane Allen in
August 1980 merely highlights the threat of hurricanes
7
and windstorms to offshore activities, which is also a
the provisions of the Offshore Installations (Fire-
fighting Equipment) Regulations 1978, see Department
of Energy, Offshore Installations: Guidance on Fire
Fighting Eguipment (H.M.S.0.1980).
5. Ekofisk Bravo 2/4-B-14 production well blew out on
April 22, 1977, causing the first major oil spill in
the North Sea. The Bravo platform sustained consi¬
derable physical damage. Discussed more fully by
Fleischer, "The Lessons of the Ekofisk Bravo Blow¬
out," in Cusine and Grant (eds.), The Impact of
Marine Pollution (1980) pp. 135-154.
6. The blowout at Ixtoc I exploration well in the Bay
of Campeche in early June, 1979, has become one of
the world's largest oil slicks. Controlling the oil
spill posed serious problems for Pemes, the Mexican
State-owned oil corporation.
7. At least one person was killed and 12 were missing
in the crash of a helicopter which had been removing
oil workers from offshore rigs in the Gulf of Mexico.
See International Herald Tribune, August 8, 1980, p.3.




Among different types of offshore units, ship-
shaped drilling vessels are generally considered more
stable and a better risk, thus justifying comparatively
9
low rating. And the trend has been such that underwriters
into the Gulf of Mexico in September 1979, causing
Pemex temporarily to abandon efforts to control the
Ixtoc I oil spill, as reported in Financial Times,
September 19, 1979, p. 4. One recent event in the
Northe Sea involved the storm-hit SEDCO 703 drilling
rig. For a detailed report, see The Scotsman, February
6, 1981, p. 1.
8. Other celebrated examples of offshore accidents
include the Adma Enterprise (a large four-legged
jack-up rig), Endeavour (a three-legged self-elevating
rig), Ocean Prince (a large semi-submersible),
Constellation (a jack-up rig), Cia Barca (a jack-up
workover barge), Bluewater I (a semi-submersible),
Hubinsel (a small jack-up barge), Mr Cap (a three-
legged jack-up rig). For a comprehensive account,
see Cooper and Gaskell, The Adventure of North Sea
Oil (1976) pp. 127-135.
9. Norris-Jones, "The Problems of Insuring the Oil
Industry," (1968-69) 57 Journal of the Insurance
Institute of London 84, at p. 85.
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tend to assess the risk on the basis of an oil rig's
mobility in view of the increasing hazards of offshore
10
towing. It is easy to understand that the insurance




For the sake of completness it should be mentioned
that the present UK certification scheme does not
cover the safety of a fixed installation during
transit from building site to permanent location as
it is not then considered to be an established insta¬
llation. See Department of Energy, Guidance on the
Design and Construction of Offshore Installation (1974)
p. 12. It is relevant to note that towing an offshore
oil rig on a barge or pontoon - also known as "dry"
tow - is safer than on the rig's own hull. Insurance
rates for "dry" tow are significantly lower than for
conventional tows. A fuller treatment of this issue
can be found in Watson, "The Use of Barges and Pon¬
toons for the Carriage of Dredgers, Rigs and Floating
Equipment," (1977-78) 66 Journal of Insurance Insti¬
tute of London 86. Cf. Garrod, "Rig Towing - The Need
for High Horsepower Tugs and the Specialist Operator,"
in Financial Times Ltd., Offshore Development (1975)
Vol. 1, pp. 74, 75. As has been reported, one jack-
up type drilling rig built by Hitachi Zosen in Japan
for a drilling company of Abu Dhabi was so designed
that the legs could be completely contained in the
platform, allowing it to be carried on the deck of
a barge. See Financial Times, October 3, 1979, p. 12.
11. Lloyd's Register has recommended that stability
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3. Insurance arrangements
At the exploration stage, seismic surveys are
usually carried out by survey contractors, whereas
exploratory drillings are undertaken by independent
drilling contractors. As surve and drilling contrac¬
tors normally perform the operations by using their
own equipment, the physical damage insurances covering
calculations should be required in the interests of
underwriters and safety. See Smedley, "The Inspection
and Certification of Offshore Structures," in Insti¬
tute of Petroleum, Offshore Oil Needs Onshore Fabri¬
cation (papers presented at a conference held in
Glasgow on February 19, 20, 1975) p. 4. On the ques¬
tion of stability of offshore floating rigs, see
Chevallier, "The Offshore Drilling Problem from
Floating Units," in Financial Times Ltd., Offshore
Development (1975) Vol. 2, pp. 140-147. See also
Department of Energy, Offshore Research Focus, No. 1
(March 1977) p. 2. Despite the statutory require¬
ments contained in Schedule 2, Part IV of the Off¬
shore Installations (Construction and Survey) Regu¬
lations 1974, S.I. 1974 No. 289, there is still
scope for improvement in the stability of floating
rigs when subjected to wind and sea. That is why
the Department of Energy recently signed an agree¬
ment with a Scottish engineering consultancy for a
12-month study into a system of stabilising such
rigs. See The Scotsman, March 12, 1981, p. 3.
Significantly, the commission of inquiry into the
Alexander Kielland disaster pointed out in its final
report that stability calculations at the design
stage failed to consider that the rig might lose one
of its five legs.
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their facilities are, in practice, obtained and main¬
tained by themselves.
After the completion of the exploration phase,
production facilities consisting of fixed platform
and pipelines etc. are installed in position during
the so-called construction and maintenance period.
As far as the North Sea practice is concerned, such
facilities - usually owned by the operator and its
co-venturers in the case of a joint venture - can be
insured under a builders' risk policy. The duty to
obtain such a coverage is almost invariably imposed
upon the operator, as the joint operating agreement
would so require. In this connection, it must be
reiterated that such an insurance - generally known
as the C.I.C.M. insurance - offers liability coverage
12
as well, which has been discussed above.
Once the production period begins and the C.I.C.M.
policy has ceased to be in force, drilling operations
are resumed - but they are no longer of an exploratory
nature. Rather, they include the drilling of deviated
13
holes and even water injection wells. Joint venturers
12. See above, Chapter 3.
13. On deviation drilling systems, see Brumley, "Deviation
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now manage to arrange their own liability coverages
in one way or another, with the same applying in the
14
Norwegian sector. As to the physical coverage during
the production period, a single policy may again be
organised. Alternatively, each licensee can resort
to separate policies covering the value of his share
of the production equipment.
4. Insurance policies
Articles of earlier years have indicated that
there are two basic types of property insurance forms
covering non-fixed drilling rigs, i.e. the "all-risks"
15
policy and the "stated-peril" form. Briefly, the former
covers - subject to specific exclusions - risks of
direct physical loss or damage to the rig insured;
whereas the latter details a list of occasions on which
Drilling System - Methods and Results," in Financial
Times Ltd., Offshore Development (1975) Vol. 1, pp.
204-207.
14. Interview with Mr. Johnassen of Statoil, Stavanger,
on May 20, 1980.
15. Mead, "Insurance Coverage of Offshore Drilling and
Production Operations," (1957-58) 32 Tulane Law Re¬
view 207, at pp. 212-213; Hill, "The Insurance of Oil-
Drilling Rigs," (1960) 57 Journal of the Chartered
Insurance Institute 65, at pp. 74-77.
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underwriters will accept liability. Opinions vary
as to which of these two standard forms should be
prevailing. On the whole, nevertheless, the all-
risks form provides a broader cover. One of the
principal advantages of the stated-perils form is
the fact that the form employs traditional marine
language which is believed to be better suited to
16
offshore units. Understandably, this assertion
raises the continuing argument as to whether off¬
shore rigs are ships or vessels.
With the advent of standard forms which are espe¬
cially designed for offshore rigs and which have been
gradually dominating the offshore insurance market,
the emphasis upon the afore-mentioned approach dividing
offshore property coverages into all-risks and stated-
perils appears to be waning. It is therefore submitted
that the following tentative classification may be of
more practical assistance in examining offshore property
coverages now on the scene:
16. Mead, op cit (supra note 15) at p. 213.
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(1) Non-fixed units; their physical damage coverages
may still be generally termed Marine Hull Insurance
17
so as to echo the I.A.D.C. contract phraseology,
notwithstanding the argument as to whether they
are vessels.
i. (a) ship-shaped: usually covered by the Institute
18
Time Clauses (Hulls) or similar hull forms;
(b) other than ship-shaped: the London Standard
Drilling Barge Form is representative of such
coverages;
(2) Fixed units: the C.I.C.M. insurance affords major
19
protection.
In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind
that the coverage offered by the Norwegian hull con¬
ditions aimed at mobile rigs, known also as DV-kasko,
extends to both (a) and (b) above.
17. However, this does not lead to the inference that
oil-rig insurance is within the purview of conven¬
tional marine insurance. Further discussed below.
18. E.g. the American Institute Hull Clauses.
19. During the operational period, however, a separate
policy like London Standard Platform Form is usua¬
lly needed.
218
While it is not proposed to examine the Institute
Time Clauses (Hulls) in greater detail, the following
discussion is intended to describe the London Standard
Drilling Barge Form, the Norwegian DV-kasko, and the
C.I.C.M. insurance (property aspects) separately.
B. The London Standard Drilling Barge Form 1972
1. Introductory remarks
20
In Summerskill's Oil Rigs: Law and Insurance, the
London Standard Drilling Barge Form is described and
analysed on a clause by clause basis. To avoid
repetition, the present section ventures to give some
coverage of some matters which Summerskill's discussion
seems to have omitted, and also of certain points which
merit further emphasis or observations than his work
has displayed.
2. The cover
Clause 5 of the London Standard Drilling Barge
Form (hereinafter the L.S.D.B. Form) provides:
"COVERAGE:
Subject to its terms, conditions and exclusions
this insurance is against all risks of direct
physical loss of or damage to the property insured,
20. Sub-titled Some Aspects of the Law and Insurance
Relating to Offshore Mobile Drilling Units.
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provided such loss or damage has not resulted from
want of due diligence by the Assured, the Owners or
Managers of the property insured, or any of them."
The wording of cl. 5 seems to have contributed to the
belief that the present insurance is of an all-risks
nature. With the exclusions being so many and substan¬
tial, nevertheless, this general assumption may have to
be qualified.
It is necessary to bear in mind that the L.S.D.B.
Form also deals with collision liability and sue and
21
labour expenses, which form a separate and additional
coverage. Therefore any suggestion that the policy
covers only the physical damage in respect of a drilling
unit should be repudiated. The collision liability of
the owner of the drilling barge is covered in full
under the present insurance. This is in contrast but
not necessarily in contradiction to the established
English practice of marine insurance whereby three-
quarters of collision liability is covered by a marine
hull policy, with the remaining one-fourth being insured
against under a liability -usually a P & I - policy.
21. Clauses 6 and 13.
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It is evident from cl. 5 that there can only be
recovery in respect of direct physical loss of or
damage to the drilling unit. Such a qualified
commitment which necessarily involves the question
of causation is of particular importance in relation
to offshore accidents like the Alexander Kielland
tragedy, a disaster of considerable insurance signifi-
22
cance. Among many indirect losses occasioned by the
tragedic event has been the immense cost for righting
23
the capsized rig, which runs as high as £4.5 million.
The accident involved in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty.
Ltd. v. The Dredge 'Willemstad', (1975) 136 C.L.R. 529
is also illustrative of the importance of such a direct-
24
loss clause.
22. Little is known of the type of the insurance policy
under which the rig was insured. It has however been
reported that the Norwegian insurers - the Norwegian
Oil Insurance Pool - have declared the rig a total
loss and its owner Stavanger Drilling accepted £24.8m
in compensation. See The Times, January 9, 1981, p. 13;
Financial Times, January 28, 1981, p. 2. The nature
of the Norwegian Oil Insurance Pool (Norsk Oljeforsi-
kringspool) are noted in Braekhus and Rein, Insurance
Conditions for P & I Insurance of Drilling Vessels
(1976) pp. 30-32.
23. For details, see Financial Times, Oct. 22, 1980, p.31.
24. In Caltex a dredge fractured an oil pipeline which
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If the loss or damage has resulted from want of
due diligence by the assured, the owners or managers
of the rig, then the insurer is exempted from liability.
It should however be remembered that want of due dili¬
gence does not disentitle the assured from recovery
in the case of an offshore employer's liability
25
insurance. There may therefore by unique situation
in which the employer's liability insurer is barred
from disclaiming his liability for the above reason
whereas the hull underwriter is not, of which the
present L.S.D.B. Form is one manifestation.
The proviso referring to want of due diligence
is also where the difficulty lies. In Coast Ferries
26
Ltd. v. Century Insurance Co. of Canada and Others, the
"want of due diligence" exclusion was directly at issue.
It was undisputed that in Coast Ferries the partial
connected an oil refinery with an oil terminal. The
court held that the economic loss incurred in provi¬
ding alternative means of transporting the oil was
recoverable. The Caltex case is discussed in Hayes,
"The Duty of Care and Liability for Purely Economic
Loss," (1979) 12 Melbournes University Law Review 79;
Comment, "Economic Loss and the Tort of Negligence,"
(1980) 12 Melbourne University Law Review 408.
25. See above, p. 177, note 70.
26. [l973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 232.
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loss in respect of a vessel was caused by the improper
loading. The trial judge held that the improper
loading was due to want of due diligence by the
owner who had employed a competent and fully qualified
master and had left the entire operation of loading
to him. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
the owner of the vessel, while leaving full responsi¬
bility for the loading to the master, was under a duty
to furnish him with sufficient information about
minimum freeboard and trim for the vessel to enable
the master to exercise sound judgment in loading.
Thus the failure of the owner to do so constituted
its want of due diligence, whibh exempted the insurer
from liability under the policy.
Bearing in mind the ruling in Coast Ferries, it
has to be asked immediately whether non-compliance
with statutory safety regulations in respect of an
oil rig is within the purview of the present prosiso
under consideration.
By virtue of the Mineral Workings (Offshore
Installations) Act 1971, the Secretary of State is
empowered to make regulations for, among others,
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27
the safety of offshore installations. The principal
regulations made thereunder are the Offshore Installa¬
tions (Operational Safety, Health and Welfare) Regula-
28
tions 1976 in which stringent operational rules are
laid down. In addition, the provisions of section 11
of the 1971 Act which makes provision for civil liabi¬
lity for breach of statutory duty apply to the duties
29
imposed on any person by the 1976 Regulations.
It must be admitted that want of due diligence
is clearly distinguishable from the notion of non¬
compliance with statutory duties. It may be unsound
and unjust if the courts' judicial discretion in
construing the proviso were dominated by such statu¬
tory instruments. Nevertheless, it would be equally
difficult in practice to disassociate them from each
other, especially in view of the fact that duties of
the major parties in respect of their offshore
27. Section 6 of the Act.
28. S.I. 1976 No. 1019.
29. Section 11(l) of the Act.
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operations have been legally standardised to a very
considerable extent. Putting all this together, the
suggestion would be that the more statutory safety
regulations there are, the more likely the insured
will lose its claim against the insurer; although
it is the safety of offshore installations, rather
than offshore hull underwriters, that concerns the
draftsmen of such regulations.
3. Inherent vice exclusion
Among many exclusions, there is no liability under
the present L.S.D.B. Form in respect of wear and tear,
gradual deterioration, metal fatigue and so on. These
are matters which may be covered by the term "inherent
30
vice". As far as the Marine Insurance Act 1906 applies,
the exclusion of inherent vice is an implied one unless
31
the policy provides otherwise. However, an analytical
reading of the present exclusions would suggest that
the insurer is still liable for direct physical loss
of or damage to the rig resulting from or caused by
30. Subject to the discussion at pp. 230-242 below.
31. Section 55(2)(c) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.
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such inherent vice. This clarification should prove
vital in oil rig insurance. Because there is every
evidence which demonstrates that there is much chance
of this happening, to which the Alexander Kielland
31a
disaster bears testimony. It has been suggested
that metal fatigue was the most likely explanation
for the collapse of the rig.
4. Removal of debris
Exclusion (i) of cl. 8 refers to claims "in
connection with the removal of property, material,
debris or obstruction, whether such removal be required
by law, ordinance, statute, regulation or otherwise."
Significantly, similar exclusion can be found in other
property coverages. Nevertheless, costs or expenses
incidental to the removal of wreckage or debris are
usually recoverable under a coverage attached to a
P & I insurance, but normally only to the extent that
the removal is compulsory by law. Coverages which
do not distinguish between removals made compulsory
31a. By, among others, Mr. Odd Osland, chief engineer
of the Alexander Kielland rig. His view has been
endorsed by the final report on the catastrophe.
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by law and others are also obtainable, subject of
course to appropriate premiums.
One of the examples where the removal is compulsory
by law may be given of the US Corp of Engineers which
can compel the operator to remove any wreck or debris
at his own expense once the licence or drilling permit
31b
is granted. In that case, the drilling contractor -
who is normally the insured under the P & I policy -
actually effects the insurance on behalf of the operator.
Notwithstanding the law requiring compulsory
removals, it is not unusual to find that the respon¬
sibility for such costs is also specified in drilling
contracts. Under the I.A.D.C. contract, for example,
this responsibility is placed upon the operator. Clause
1006 of the contract provides:
"Operator shall be liable for the cost of regaining
control of any wild well, as well as the cost of
removal of debris, and shall indemnify Contractor
for any such cost regardless of the cause thereof,
including, but not limited to the negligence of Con¬
tractor, its agents, employees and subcontractors."
Therefore, when the indemnification is made by the
underwriters in respect of the cost, the underwriters
3lb. Under the US Rivers and Harbors Act 1970.
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become subrogated against the operator for recourse
unless waiver of subrogation has been procured.
At the time of writing, there is not equivalent
legal requirement for compulsory removals in the
32
British sectors of the North Sea. In practice, however,
32. The statutory provisions regulating wreck removal
include ss. 510-536 of the Merchant Shipping Act
1394, and s. 56 of the Harbours, Docks, and Piers
Clauses Act 1847. For the purposes of the Merchant
Shipping Act, wreck includes "jetsam, flotsam, lagan,
and derelict found in or on the shores of the sea or
any tidal water." (s. 510(1)) It is important to note
that the property must be a ship, her cargo or a
portion thereof. See 35 Halsbury's Laws of England
(3rd ed.) 721. In this context, a gas buoy which has
become adrift is not a wreck: Wells v. Gas Float
Whittan No. 2 (Owners), Ql897j A.C. 337, H.L.; 8 Asp.
M.L.C. 272. For application of the law of wreck
removal to aircraft, see the Aircraft (Wreck and
Salvage) Order 1938, S.R.& 0. 1938 No. 136 and the
Civil Aviation Act 1949, s. 51.
S. 56 of the Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act
1847 provides:
"The harbour master may remove any wreck or other
obstruction to the harbour, dock, or pier, or the
approaches to the same, and also any floating timber
which impedes the navigation thereof, and the
expence of removing any such wreck, obstruction or
floating timber shall be repaid by the owner of the
same, and the harbour master may detain such wreck
or floating timber for securing the expences, and
on nonpayment of such expences, on demanded, may
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there may be operational eventualities where the
removal could be necessary or advisable, and thus
the insurance coverage. It is therefore important
to ensure that the proper insurance - covering the
cost of removals whether compulsory by law or not -
is obtained. This leads to the conclusion that the
silence of law in respect of the removal of wreck
necessitates the purchase of broader coverages. While
it is right to feel sceptical about whether this is
justified, the issue under consideration is persuasive
evidence that the necessary co-ordination of the law
and oil rig insurance is yet to be achieved.
5. Blowout preventer warranty
So far as oil rig insurance is concerned, loss
prevention has been increasingly regarded as one of the
33
important risk evaluation factors. A clue to this may
sell such wreck or floating timber, and out of the
proceeds of such sale pay such expences, rendering
the overplus, if any, to the owner on demand."
(Emphasis added)
A literal reading of s. 56 would suggest that
wrecked offshore installations may fall within
the purview of the section. Apart from that, there
is no statutory basis for compulsory removals.
33. Jackson, "Petroelum Industry Catastrophe Parameters:
The American Viewpoint," International Business Law¬
yer Vol. 5(iv)(October 1977) 486, at p. 490.
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lie in the Blowout Preventer Warranty Clause contained
in the L.S.D.B. Form, which provides:
"The Assured warrants and agrees that blowout
preventers of standard make will be used, same
to be installed and tested in accordance with the
usual practice."
Notwithstanding the definition of the term "blowout"
set out in the present Form, there is virtually no
single explanation for its happening. When a blowout
occurs, considerable physical damage to the rig would
normally follow. In practical terms, too much would
be at stake for a blowout to be allowed to happen and
it is extremely difficult to quantify the damaging
results. As is treated in the following Chapter,
blowout is also a major cause of offshore oil pollution.
From an insurance standpoint, therefore, the potential
losses arising therefrom are never to be counted only
in physical damage context.
However preventive they may be, the functionability
of blowout preventers should be treated with suspicion
in view of the recent Ixtoc I blowout in the Gulf of




preventers is sometimes a contributing element.
There are reasons to suppose that the wording of
the present warranty clause may arouse controversy.
Firstly, it is open to question what the "standard
make" implies, when the standard, if any, has not
been translated into any binding rule with mandatory
effect. Secondly, there are considerable doubts as
to the meaning of "the usual practice". Recommending
the safe practice for oil drilling, the Institute of
Petroleum concludes that even such equipment may
"vary from well to well to suit anticipated or known
36
pressure conditions..."
6. Applicability of the Marine Insurance Act 1906
The fact that the L.S.D.B. Form does not contain
a choice-of-law clause necessitates a consideration
of the potential applicability of the Marine Insurance
35. See Brask, "Blow-out in the North Sea," Lloyd's
Maritime & Commercial Law Quarterly, (August 1975)
271, at p. 273. See also "Blow-out," Noroil, Vol. 5,
No. 5 (May 1977) pp. 43, 44.
36. Institute of Petroleum, Code of Safe Practice for
Drilling and Production in Marine Areas (2nd ed.
1972, 1980) p. 34.
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Act 1906. Logically, raising queries about that issue
also raises the question as to whether oil rig insurance
37
is marine insurance. A brief article by Summerskill
featuring some aspects of the latter point has proved
to be a significant attempt. Summerskill's approach,
of which the emphasis was largely on the interpretation
of the relevant statutes, is heavily associated with
the definition of ships or vessels for purposes of
such statutes. This is very similar to the attitude
taken by some other writers. As has been noted
elsewhere in this work, there are longstanding differences
of view on the issue of definition. In approaching
this point, Summerskill, with remarkable academic
caution, proceeds throughout on the stated assumption
that the 1906 Act applies.
A contract of marine insurance is defined by the
Marine Insurance Act 1906 as a contract whereby "the
insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in manner
and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine losses,
38
that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure."
37. Summerskill, op cit (supra note 20) Appendix C.
38. Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 1.
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This definition covers insurances on ship or goods,
freight or profits. Nevertheless, every lawful marine
adventure may also be the subject of a contract of
39
marine insurance. In particular, there is a marine
adventure where "any ship goods or other moveables are
40
exposed to maritime perils." (Emphasis added)
It may be argued that the term "other moveables"
is wide enough to include offshore oil installations.
However, a literal reading of section 90 may suggest
otherwise. By that section, "moveables" means "any
moveable tangible property, other than the ship, and
includes money, valuable securities, and other documents."
(Emphasis added)
The definition contained in section 90 strongly
suggests that "moveables" refer to movable objects
41
connected with the ship insured. It is therefore
difficult to resist the conclusion that the legal basis
39. Section 3(1).
40. Section 3(2)(a). In this context, "maritime perils"
means perils consequent on, or incidental to, the
navigation of the sea.
41. Cf. Summerskill, at p. 457.
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for treating oil rig insurance as marine insurance for
the purposes of the 1906 Act is not evident. It is
equally difficult to maintain that oil rigs come within
42
the definition of "ship" for the purposes of the Act.
If non-fixed oil rigs were classified as ships for
the purposes of the 1906 Act as a result of a legislative
43
effort, some of the problems would be simplified. Rela¬
tively speaking, however, such an approach towards that
direction only makes a marginal contribution to the real
problem. In other words, the problem which should be
urgently examined cannot be resolved in the long term
simply by classifying oil rigs as ships. Is the classi¬
fication significant enough to warrant a full applica¬
tion of the Act? It is perfectly appropriate to subject
42. Rule 15 of the Rules for Construction of Policy
attached to the Act states:
"The term 'ship' includes the hull, materials and
outfit, stores and provisions for the officers and
crew, and, in the case of vessels engaged in a
special trade, the ordinary fittings requisite
for the trade, and also, in the case of a steam¬
ship, the machinery, boilers, and coals and engine
stores, if owned by the assured."
It would seem that the Rule does not purport to define
a ship.
43. For example, the Marine Insurance Act 1906 has been
made applicable to the insurance of hovercraft: the
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oil rig insurance to statutory regulation. However,
is it equally appropriate to subject the insurance to
the 1906 Act in a realistic sense? If the insurance
of non-fixed rigs were governed by the Act, should
the same apply to fixed rigs? Questions like this
may shed light on whether oil rig insurance should be
brought under control of statutory regulation other
than the 1906 Act.
It is undeniable that the 1906 Act, which was
drafted with the intention of regulating the insurance
associated with maritime shipping, is by far the nearest
in nature to oil rig insurance. The introduction of
marine perils, particularly those related to self-
propelled rigs, is probably the major valid defence
for its applicability to oil rig insurance. Indeed
oil rig insurance and conventional marine insurance
have some significant features in common, yet the
fact remains that the traditional marine insurance
concepts which may be applicable to oil rig insurance
without any change are virtually confined to insurable
Hovercraft (Application of Enactments) Order 1972,
S.I. 1972 No. 971, art. 4, Sch. I, Part A.
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interest, disclosure and representations, assignment
of policy, and the premium.
Common sense decrees that there are important
differences between conventional marine ventures and
offshore oil activities. One point among many is the
fact that offshore oil and gas operations are deeply
associated with the seabed, both above and below it.
Certain risks of particular relevance to offshore ventures
like blowouts and leaks in offshore pipelines are
virtually unknown to conventional marine insurance
44
concepts. In addition, offshore installations - whether
ship-shaped or otherwise, or those between them - have
been and are being developed. Even if the 1906 Act
is applicable - which is very much in doubt - there
are bound to be more doubts as to whether it should
45
continue to apply in the near future.
44. On other safety and health hazards incidental to
offshore operations, which may exert considerable
influence in oil-related insurance, see Farmer,
"Health and Safety Hazards in North Sea Oil," (1976-
77) 65 Journal of the Insurance Institute of London
46; see also the International Labour Office, Safety
Problems in the Offshore Petroleum Industry (1978) 19.
45. Obviously, such doubts would not apply to hovercraft.
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The purpose of the preceding analysis is to
demonstrate that the distinctive novelty of oil rig
insurance deserves more acknowledgment, which should
also be reflected and crystallized into an actual
legal regime. There is much evidence that a signifi¬
cant distinction between conventional ships and oil
rigs has been admitted, whether with reluctance or
not. Principal indications are the regulations made
under the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations)
Act 1971, which have impliedly recognised the unique
features of offshore installations as opposed to
46
conventional ships or vessels. This must also help
to discern the spirit behind the draft International
46. Examples include the registration of offshore
installations, the appointment of installation
managers, the holding of public inquiries into
accidents. The statutory instruments governing
those areas are the Offshore Installations (Regis¬
tration) Regulations 1972, S.I. 1972 No. 702; the
Offshore Installations (Managers) Regulations 1972,
S.I. 1972 No. 703; the Offshore Installations
(Public Inquiries) Regulations 1974, S.I. 1974,
No. 338. It is important to note that these regu¬
lations do not have effect in relation to conven¬
tional ships or vessels. For an approach to certain
statutory instruments made under the 1971 Act, see
Cadwallader, "Legal Aspects of Safety of Offshore
Installations," Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial Law
Quarterly (February 1977) pp. 53-63.
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Convention on Off-Shore Mobile Craft. The 1977 draft
Convention, although it purports to apply certain
maritime law principles to non-fixed oil rigs, has
in essence increased rather than weakened support for
the proposition that offshore non-fixed rigs, were
it not for the draft Convention, should be treated
differently from conventional ships or vessels in
many important aspects.
Evidence from the insurance sector is also
evident. So widespread now is the impression that
policies specially designed for oil rigs have been
in great demand. It is difficult not to see this
as a sign that so far as oil rigs are concerned
conventional marine insurance policies are deficient
or impractical, or both. The same applies to offshore
liability insurances, although in some areas coverages
48
based upon conventional policies have been working
with a moderate degree of success. With the scale of
47. See above, p. 146.
48. E.g. P & I policies. However, the demand for liabi¬
lity coverages specially designed for offshore oil
rigs is egually evident from the appearance of the
Norwegian P & I conditions for drilling vessels.
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oil and gas activity expanding, it is much clearer
than it was that oil rig insurance should be based
on a more distinctive legal ground. And lessons
drawn from offshore new technology have added to
the need for a significant transformation.
As conventional marine insurance is essential
to maritime shipping activities, so is oil rig
insurance to offshore ventures. While the distinc¬
tion between these two insurances widens, the 1906
Act is all the more unlikely to be able to sustain-
if ever - oil rig insurance. So far as the Act itself
is concerned, some - if not many - sections are of
little significance in relation to offshore oil and
gas activities, such as those dealing with the voyage
and loss of freight. In fact, the present L.S.D.B.
Form has also tended to sound a warning note. Examples
include the different approaches between the L.S.D.B.
49
Form and the 1906 Act towards constructive total loss.
49. Clause 12 of the L.S.D.B. Form provides:
"CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS:
There shall be no recovery for a Constructive
Total Loss hereunder unless the expense of
recovering and repairing the insured property
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50
The same is true of the discovery of records.
All this means a strengthening of the assertion
that the time is ripe for legislative measures to be
shall exceed the actual insured value.
In no case shall Underwriters be liable for
unrepaired damage in addition to a subsequent
Total Loss sustained during the period covered
by this insurance."
By contrast, section 60(2) of the 1906 Act states:
"In particular, there is a constructive total
loss:
(i) Where the assured is deprived of the possession
of his ship or goods by a peril insured against,
and (a) it is unlikely that he can recover the
ship or goods as the case may be, or (b) the cost
of recovering the ship or goods, as the case may
be, would exceed their value when recovered; or
(ii) In the case of damage to a ship, where she
is so damaged by a peril insured against, that
the cost of repairing the damage would exceed the
value of the ship when repaired. In estimating
the cost of repairs, no deduction is to be made
in respect of general average contribution to
these repairs payable by other interests, but
account is to be taken of the expense of future
salvage operations and of any future general
average contributions to which the ship would
be liable if repaired.
50. Clause 16 of the L.S.D.B. Form states:
"DISCOVERY OF RECORDS:
During the currency of this insurance or any time
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initiated, which should bring under effective mandatory
control the insurances of both fixed and non-fixed rigs.
The transformed situation, nonetheless, should not
necessarily reflect a complete departure from the
1906 Act. Nor should it preclude the possible applica¬
bility of the Act to oil rig insurance where appropriate.
It is hoped that such an effort should be one of the
keys to a successful legal framework in which viable
oil rig insurance can be further developed as it deserves
to be.
51
In Edinburgh Assurance Company v. R.L. Burns Corp.,
an insurance policy covering a salvage operation on a
floating drilling rig was in dispute. During the
thereafter within the period of the time provided
for in Clause 17 for bringing suit against these
Underwriters, these Underwriters shall have the
right of inspecting the Assured's records pertain¬
ing to all matters of cost, repairs, income and
expenditures of whatsoever nature relating to the
properties insured hereunder, such records to be
open to a representative of these Underwriters at
all reasonable times."
In brief, the rights in respect of discovery of
records given to the L.S.D.B. underwriters by cl.
16 are greater than those given to insurers under
the 1906 Act.
51. 479 F. Supp. 138 (1979).
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operation, the rig collapsed in a storm and sank into
the sea. The underwriters disclaimed their liability
by asserting that the rig was not an actual total
loss for the purposes of the policy. Having concluded
that English law applied to the definition of the term
"actual total loss", the court proceeded to analyse
section 57(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 without
regard to the applicability of the Act. To that extent,
the approach invoked by the court appears to be without
52
sound logical basis.
Another indication that the applicability of marine
insurance law is important in determining offshore
underwriters' liability concerns the proposed changes
in the rule of non-disclosure in insurance law. In
brief, the present law imposes a duty on the insured
to disclose to the insurer all material information
relating to the proposed contract of insurance.
52. A general discussion of the decision can be found
in a recent legal article. See Margo, "The Anglo-
American Scene," Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial Law
Quarterly, (February 1981) pp. 83-92. The writer of
that article seems to have paid no adequate attention
to the point under consideration.
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Following a Working Paper published in 1979, the Lord
Chancellor in October 1980 presented to Parliament the
54
Report of the Law Commission on Insurance Law. The Law
Commission suggests in the Draft Bill attached to the
Report that the duty of the insured to disclose should
55
be reduced to a considerable extent. Significantly,
the Bill exempts marine, aviation and transport
56
insurance. Nothing in the Bill serves to clarify
the confusion as to whether oil rig insurance should
be classified as marine insurance.
C. The Norwegian hull conditions
1. Introduction
Workable as traditional marine policies may be,
the demand for coverages specially designed for offshore
53. Working Paper No. 73. A description of the central
theme of the Paper can be found in Financial Times,
May 22, 1979, p. 10.
54. Cmnd 8064.
55. For a brief comment on the subject, see "The Reform
of Insurance Law," The Journal of Business Law,
(January 1981) pp. 1-3.
56. Insurance in these fields is also known as MAT
insurance.
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oil rigs has been increasingly evident. The appearance
57
of the Norwegian hull conditions, also known as DV-kasko,
marks another move towards the development of such
coverages.
The origin of the Norwegian form has been briefly
58
described in Chapter 3. While a commentary on the
conditions has been published, no attempt is to be
made in the present section to discuss the coverage
in detail. As the Norwegian form provides a contrast
to the L.S.D.B. Form, it has acquired additional
significance which may serve useful purposes.
2. Property insured
The first point to be made about the Norwegian
conditions concerns the items insured thereunder. In
addition to the drilling rig scheduled in the policy
with all its machinery and equipment on board, the
Norwegian conditions extend to such machinery and
equipment while on board other vessels moored alongside
57. See above, p. 113.
58. By Dr. jur. Sjur Braekhus, Professor at the Universi¬
ty of Oslo. A copy of the commentary was made
available to the writer through the courtesy of the
Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law, Oslo.
244
or in the vicinity of the insured rig and used in
59
connection with that rig. A similar coverage can be
found in the L.S.D.B. Form, with such other vessels
60
themselves being expressly excluded. Although no
clear exclusion of such other vessels themselves
is referred to in the Norwegian conditions, it could
hardly be construed as covering such vessels.
It should be observed that the possibilities
of covering more than one drilling rig by one policy
61
are very real under the L.S.D.B. Form. By contrast,
59. Clause 4 of the Norwegian conditions.
60. Clause 3 of the L.S.D.B. Form.
61. This is discernible from the wording of cl. 3 of
the L.S.D.B. Form, which provides:
"PROPERTY INSURED HEREUNDER
This insurance covers the hull and machinery of
the drilling barge(s), as scheduled herein,
including all their equipment, tools, machinery,
caissons, lifting jacks, materials, supplies,
appurtenances, drilling rigs and equipment,
derricks, drill stem, casing and tubing while
aboard the said drilling barqe(s) and/or on
barges and/or vessels moored alongside or in the
vicinity thereof and used in connection therewith
(but not such barges and/or vessels themselves),
and including drill stem in the well being drilled,
and all such property as scheduled herein, owned
by or in the care custody or control of the Assured,
except as hereinafter excluded." (Emphases added)
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a literal reading of cl. 4 of the Norwegian form
suggests that the Norwegian policy is not intended
to cover more than one drilling rig.
It has been reckoned that the coverage given by
the Norwegian conditions with regard to the drilling
rig's equipment is not as wide as that under the
62
L.S.D.B. Form. Among the equipment excluded under
the Norwegian conditions are the helicopters stationed
63
on board the insured drilling rig. It is easy to
understand that such items are usually covered by
aviation insurance. The L.S.D.B. Form makes no
specific mention of such exclusions. There is some
doubt as to whether they are meant to be excluded.
3. Exemption of liability
A further complexity is the question of the
insurer's liability. The Norwegian conditions are
based upon the Norwegian Insurance Plan of 1964, which
exempts the insurer partly or wholly from liability
in the case where there has been blameworthy conduct
62. See the commentary (supra note 58) at p. 77.
63. Clause 4(4)(c) of the Norwegian form.
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on the part of the insured. And it is by virtue of
section 20 of the Norwegian Insurance Contracts Act
that the insurer may disclaim its liability when the
negligence of the insured is deemed gross negligence.
Nevertheless, this must in turn be qualified by section
56 of the 1964 Plan which provides that the liability
of the insurer, in the event of gross negligence on
the part of the insured, shall be decided according
to the degree of blame and other circumstances of the
case. A comparison between the Norwegian conditions
and the L.S.D.B. Form, in which the determining factor
64
lies solely in "want of due diligence", still shows
some resemblance in their nature. While each case
must be dealt with on its merits, it is hard to lay
down any set rule.
4. Drilling of relief wells
Clause 5(3) is primarily directed at the exclusion
of perils in respect of the drilling of a relief well
performed by the insured rig for the purpose of con¬
trolling or attempting to control a fire, blowout or
64. See above, pp. 218, 219.
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cratering associated with another drilling rig. Under
the L.S.D.B. Form such perils are also excluded "unless
immediate notice be given to Underwriters of said use
65
and additional premium paid if required."
From a practical standpoint, the drilling of relief
wells is a usual but not necessarily the only method
to be used to control blowouts. Its principal function
is to reduce the pressure and eventually stop the oil
flow. An illustrative example may be given of the
Ixotic I blowout. The well off Mexico's Yucatan
Peninsula blew out on June 3, 1979 when a hot drill
66
hit a pocket of gas and oil. With enormous manpower
and resources, it took two months to complete the
two relief wells.
It must be emphasised that the insurer is not
liable if the drilling of relief wells is performed
by the insured rig to control a blowout associated
with another drilling rig. One practical explanation
must be that the drilling rig associated with the
65. Clause 8(c) of the L.S.D.B. Form.
66. See above, p. 210.
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blowout may have sustained considerable damage .or even
totally destroyed. In the case of the L.S.D.B. Form
where it is possible to insure two drilling rigs under
a single policy, it is worth inquiring whether the
insurer is liable if the relief drilling has been
performed by one of the insured rigs to control a
67
blowout associated with the other drilling rig.
Some consideration should also be given to the
drilling of water injection wells. The present
exclusion does not include a reference to the
drilling of such wells, which is one way of main¬
taining the pressure needed for the production of
oil and is regarded by some oil companies as a means
68
of significantly increasing the oil recovery. Even
if such perils are coverable under the present Norwegian
67. Clause 8(c) of the L.S.D.B. Form excludes liability
in respect of -
"Loss, damage or expense caused whilst or resulting
from drilling a relief well for the purpose of con¬
trolling or attempting to control fire blowout or
cratering associated with another drilling barge,
platform or unit unless immediate notice be given
to Underwriters of said use and additional premium
paid if required." (Emphasis added)
68. Phillips Petroleum has been given Norwegian Government
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conditions, it would seem that the risks are relatively
slight.
5. The special safety regulations
As has been remarked, the L.S.D.B. Form contains
69
a blowout preventer warranty. It has therefore been
suggested that under section 33(3) of the Marine
Insurance Act 1906 breach of that warranty should
free the insurer from liability whether or not the
70
breach brought about the casualty. Nonetheless, this
belief should be discredited when the applicability
71
of the Act is still in doubt.
In the context of the Norwegian conditions, the
requirement for installing blowout preventers does
not take the form of a warranty. Rather, it is
considered a special safety regulation in relation
approval to operate such a water injection scheme at
its North Sea Ekofisk Field, as reported in Financial
Times, September 27, 1979, p. 3.
69. See above, p. 228.
70. Summerskill, op cit (supra note 20) at p. 196.
71. See above, pp. 230-242.
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72
to section 49 of the 1964 Plan. Practically speaking,
the insured has a clear interest in installing blowout
preventers, as no drilling rig short of blowout pre¬
venters is likely to be safe. In that sense, it
seems unrealistic to insist that such a reguirement
should be in the form of a warranty, especially when
the clause is so worded that interpretive controversy
73
is very likely to arise.
6. Waiver of subrogation
The present Norwegian policy further provides in
clause 15 that the insurer agrees to waive its right
of subrogation against the owners, charterers, drilling
contractors and operators of the insured drilling rig.
This waiver of subrogation is automatic and uncondi¬
tional .
Under the L.S.D.B. Form the underwriters also
agree to waive their rights of subrogation against
72. Clause 6 of the Norwegian conditions.
73. This view has virtually been shared by the
commentator who takes the position that the
underwriters' interests are sufficiently protected
by the blowout preventer rules being regarded as
safety regulations.
251
any person firm or corporation which has been
released by the insured from liability with respect
to loss of or damage to property insured thereunder.
The waiver is however subject to two conditions: (a)
the said release is granted prior to the commencement
of the operations; and (b) the loss or damage subject
to said release arises out of or in connection with
74
such operations.
Two points do deserve to be made. First, it would
appear that the L.S.D.B. approach reflects more pre¬
cisely the offshore operational practice. Clearly,
those who may be released by the insured would include
any contractor and sub-contractor carrying supply and
maintenance works on board the insured rig. Such
protection is however not available under the Norwegian
conditions. Second, it can be assumed that the waiver
of subrogation is postulated on the idea of contractual
75
allocation of liability through indemnity agreements.
Although it is required in many drilling contracts that
the drilling contractor (usually the owner of the drilling
74. Clause 15 of the L.S.D.B. Form.
75. See above, Chapter 2.
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rig) should hold the operator harmless and that a
waiver of subrogation by the contractor's insurer
be procured, it seems the Norwegian conditions have
missed the point that the opposite can happen, i.e.
the drilling contractor to be indemnified by the
operator, which will result in the automatic waiver
being unjust and impractical.
7. Problems of the 1964 Plan
The present Norwegian conditions are governed
76
by the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan of 1964.
This coupled with the fact that the provisions of
the Plan concerning ships apply correspondingly to
the insured drilling rig, means a disengagement
from the problems of interpretation confronting
the L.S.D.B. situation. In a legal sense, therefore,
the prolonged controversy associated with the clari¬
fication of oil rigs ceases to exist. Most signifi¬
cantly of all, insurance of floating oil rigs must
now be considered marine insurance in the context of
Norwegian legislation, although it does not follow
that all rules in the Norwegian legislation applicable
76. Clause 1 of the Norwegian conditions.
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77
to ships are automatically applicable to such rigs.
To a considerable extent, the broad effect of the
Norwegian approach has been to reduce by legislative
artifice the distinctive characteristics of oil rig
insurance. Such an approach may promote diversity
instead of uniformity of the law. First of all,
insurance of fixed rigs is still subject to the rules
which apply to other insurances. There is a necessary
implication here that insurance of fixed rigs -
although not dissimilar from that of floating rigs -
is nor marine insurance in the context of Norwegian
78
legislation. Ironically, it has been suggested that
it is possible to insure fixed rigs on equivalent
79
conditions. Taking into account these factors, there
is no good cause for such divisions, other than the
argument that floating rigs are ships whereas fixed
rigs are not. This of course can hardly endorse the
view that insurance of floating rigs must be marine
77. Braekhus and Rein, Insurance Conditions for P & I
Insurance of Drilling Vessels (1976) at p. 29.
78. Rein, (et al.), Norwegian Petroleum Law (1978) p. 6-28.
79. Supra note 77.
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insurance in real terms.
It must be added that the problem is bound to be
magnified by the development of offshore technology
which has been rapid and is continuing at a fast
pace. This foreshadows the likelihood that the simple
classification of oil rigs into ships and non-ships,
or floating and fixed, could become simplistic in
the foreseeable future. This lends support to the
view already expressed that some amelioration of a
legislative nature should be effected in favour of
a fresh legal basis independent of marine insurance
concepts.
On the face of it the applicability of the 1964
Plan to the present conditions seems to have presented
no considerable difficulties. Yet there have been
significant derogations in respect of constructive
80
total loss and deductibles. These and other factors
have combined to confirm the warning that oil rig
80. Clause 7 dealing with constructive total loss is
more strict than the corresponding paragraph in
the 1964 Plan. As to deductibles, the departures
can be ascertained by contrasting cl 11 of the
conditions and ss. 189, 197 of the 1964 Plan.
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insurance is without parallel in its essentials. In
other words, there is no reason for automatically
presuming that oil rig insurance and marine insurance
can be lightly compared with each other.
D. Fixed-rig coverages
1. Schedules A and B of the C.I.C.M. insurance
Insurances of fixed production rigs during the
construction and maintenance period, such as the
C.I.C.M. insurance which is being used in the British
and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea, are some of
the most complicated insurances ever developed. As
previously noted, a particular feature of the insurance
is that it covers both physical losses and liability
exposures. The liability aspects having been already
81
dealt with, the present section is designed to give
coverage to its property phases.
The insurable values under the present insurance
are subject to two schedules. Schedule A states the
insurer's overall liability in terms of money as
regards physical damage. In other words, the figure
81. See above, Chapter 3.
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specified therein represents the maximum limit of
recovery, which is also the total value of the insured
production rig when it is completed.
Individual but large components and entire
segments of the rig are itemized in Schedule B which
clearly reflects the separate value of each component
for a defined stage. Properly computed new values are
also designated in Schedule B in a cumulative manner
as the components are assembled from time to time
82
and constitute augmented new units, with increased
values being established. In the event of loss of
or damage to an item, the recovery is based upon the
applicable value shown on Schedule B. The recovery
varies in terms of compensation depending upon whether
it is total or partial loss. Other factors taken into
account include whether the damaged item is to be
repaired or replaced. These are all regulated in
cl. 7 of the written policy.
82. For a full account of the construction of offshore
fixed production platforms, see Baldwin and Baldwin,
Onshore Planning for Offshore Oil: Lessons from
Scotland (1975) pp. 67-94.
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2. Problems of the equipment exclusion
The objects to be covered under the insurance are
83
also subject to the Interest Clause, according to
which property and equipment owned or used by
contractors are in principle excluded. Also excluded
are vessels or craft except as provided under the
Collision Clause. This exclusion is of particular
relevance to offshore diving operations, which are
essential to inspection and maintenance. It is
important to note that as far as diving techniques
are concerned the idea now is to get rid of human
divers altogether and to use a type of craft called
84
an unmanned submersible. The insurability of such
craft under the present insurance is likely to become
a prominent issue. The same applies to remote-controlled
85
robots which are another alternative to human divers.
83. Clause 4 of the written policy.
84. "North Sea: Divers' Suits," The Economist, March
15-21, 1980, pp. 84, 85. Some technical aspects of
manned and unmanned submersibles used in offshore
diving operations are dealt with in the International
Labour Office, op cit (supra note 44) pp. 37, 38.
85. It has been suggested that robots are likely to
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Pipelines also call for special remarks. As
separate policies for pipelines bringing oil and gas
ashore are available in the market, only pipelines
between installations are covered in the present
C.I.C.M. context.
Problems caused by additional equipment associated
with fixed production rigs may also cause concern.
During the production period, some equipment may not
even be considered until the government so requires.
Illustrative examples may be given of the equipment
86
for restricting gas flaring, and reinjection equipment.
Underwriters as well as oil companies should be fully
conversant with such new technological developments.
Only by doing so can a realistic insight be gained into
the potential hazards.
replace divers in offshore oil operations. See Lloyd's
List, July 16, 1979, p. 3. This is however not the
generally accepted view, see in particular "Remote
Controls Cannot Replace Human Divers," The Oil Re¬
gister, p. iii, in The Scotsman, February 24, 1981.
86. A government decision to restrict gas flaring on the
Brent Field, the biggest oil and gas field in the UK
sector of the North Sea, was announced on October 29,
1979. The aim of the move was to conserve Britain's
North Sea gas reserves, because 340m cu ft of gas
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3. Miscellaneous coverages
The cover also extends to any components, pieces
of equipment, or modules which have not yet been
attached to the platform and which are stored, loaded,
unloaded or in transit across land or water. As they
are largely delivered by barges, it has been suggested
that this is essentially a marine transport risk in
87
which the insured property is treated like cargo. In
that sense, the attached Institute Cargo Clause should
from Brent was flared daily to enable the field to
produce its rate of 185,000 barrels a day. Delays in
installing equipment to restrict the flaring forced
the Department of Energy to intervene. The government
told Shell, operator of the field, that it should cut
production to 100,000 barrels a day, which meant that
only 170m cu ft of gas a day would have to be flared.
There were plans to reinject the gas into the field
until it could be piped ashore. However, Shell also
had considerable technical difficulties with its
reinjection equipment. Two months later, the Depart¬
ment agreed to changes after representations from
the company. The limits would be on the amount of
gas flared rather than the oil produced. See Financial
Times, October 30, 1979, p. lj The Daily Telegraph,
December 22, 1979, p. 15.




Site preparatory work is also covered under cl. 9,
A(i). The wording of the clause seems to imply that
the preparation of the ocean floor, and cementing of
88
the foundation or collar for the platform are included.
89
It is also apposite to consider cl. 14 which provides:
"All tows and towing arrangements to be approved by
Noble Denton & Associates. Design & Project feasi¬
bility study to be approved by Det Norske Veritas."
As is further noted below, the power of the Norske
Veritas, the Norwegian ship and rig classification
society, has been highlighted by the inspection of 25
rigs in the Norwegian sector in the wake of the Alexander
90
Kielland disaster.
Loss, damage, or expense resulting from or attri¬
butable to faulty design, materials or workmanship is
covered by the present policy. This is another unigue
feature of builders' risk insurance, to which the rig
91
construction industry owes much of its development.
88. Rein, (et al.), op cit (supra note 78) at p. 6-50.
89. Not applicable to the rigs in the British sector.
90. See below, p. 265.
91. One writer seems to have taken the view that such
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This is also one of the perils coverable during the
92
maintenance period within which the perils insured
against are more limited than those during the construc¬
tion period. As indicated above, the policy ceases to
be in effect at the completion of the maintenance
period. It should not be thought that the new policy
covering the production period gives coverage to such
perils as well. This is evidenced by cl. 7(f) of the
London Standard Platform. The principle that such
perils are normally not covered when the oil rig is
in operation also applies to floating rigs. This is
clear from the L.S.D.B. Form and the Norwegian hull
risks are uninsurable. See Vock, "The North Sea
Lawyer: A Profile," (1978) 6 International Business
Lawyer 67, at p. 69. The fact that such risks are
covered in the present C.I.C.M. insurance is indeed
a significant departure from the insurance practice
in the construction industry. For example, it is
provided in the Specimen Contractors' Combined Insurance
Policy and Conditions that:
"The Company shall not be liable to indemnify the
Insured in respect of:
1. (a) the cost of repairing, replacing or rectify¬
ing property which is defective in material or
workmanship;
(b) loss or damage due to fault, defect, error
or omission in design plan or specification;
2 "
92. See cl. lO(i) of the written policy.
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93
conditions referred to above.
Pollution hazards are not insured against under
the C.I.C.M. insurance. Nevertheless, the Institute
Pollution Hazard Clause attached to the present
insurance has the effect that loss of or damage to
the insured rig caused by actions of the Norwegian state
or any foreign governmental authority taken for the
purpose of preventing or reducing pollution is
94
recoverable. This special coverage should be distin¬
guished from those afforded by the insurance of
95
seepage, pollution or contamination.
4. Earthquake and terrorist actions
Loss or damage caused by earthquake or volcanic
eruption which is under the category of excepted perils
in the case of the L.S.D.B. Form or the Norwegian hull
96
conditions, is covered under the C.I.C.M. insurance.
93. See cl. 8(f) of the L.S.D.B. Form and section 175
of the 1964 Plan as applied to the Norwegian hull
conditions.
94. Only applicable to the rigs in the Norwegian sector.
95. See below, Chapter 6.
96. Cl. 8(a) of the L.S.D.B. Form and cl. 5(1) of the
Norwegian hull conditions.
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Such perils are in fact regarded in a negative light,
97
as far as the Institute Clauses for Builders' Risks
are concerned. But the exclusion contained in the
Institute Clauses has been deleted when applying to
98
the present insurance. It has been suggested that
one of the reasons for the deletion is that the
likelihood of earthquake or volcanic eruption in
99
the North Sea is extremely small. This being the
case, it does not suffice to explain why such perils
are excluded under the insurance of floating rigs,
which are reasonably less vulnerable to earthquake
or volcanic eruption.
The cover against terrorist actions is afforded
100
under the present insurance. It should be pointed
out that the threat of any act for terrorist purposes
97. The Institute Clauses for Builders' Risks are
standard clauses widely used as amendments to the
insurance policies covering the construction of
offshore structures. See Insurance Institute of
London, Construction and Erection Insurance (1978) at 60.
98. Clause 9(A)(i) of the written policy.
99. Rein, (et al.), op cit (supra note 78) at p. 6-53.
100.Clause 9 of the written policy.
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is a very substantial one, although it is not widely
publicized. To guard against this, a proposal was
made to set up a military force with the aim of coping
with terrorist groups, foreign intervention as well as
101
peaceful dangers facing oil rigs in the North Sea. As
far as the C.I.C.M. insurance is concerned, some relief
has been provided by the fact that the proposal has led
to the forming of a 300-strong independent "reaction
102
force" on May 1, 1980.
5. Other exclusions
Of all the excepted perils, those resulting from
government ordinances and loss of use merit more
attention than most.
The present policy excludes loss, damage, liability
or expense arising from restraint, detainment etc. by
the government in the form of administrative orders
103
and so on. The adverse effects of such orders can
101. As reported in The Scotsman, January 24, 1980, p. 4.
102. See Hetherington, "Why It Takes Comacchio to Ensure
the Safety of the Rigs," The Guardian, June 11, 1980,
p. 13.
103. Clause 5(1) of the Institute War Clauses Builders'
Risks attached to the present C.I.C.M. insurance.
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include enormous economic loss. Recent events are
already indicating that never has the need to insure
against such risks been so real. Particular example
was the drastic step taken in April 1980 following
the catastrophe of the Alexander Kielland and the
104
event of its sister rig Henrik Ibsen, as a result of
which 25 rigs in the Norwegian sector of the North
Sea were ordered to be inspected for defects. It was
reported that the inspection was planned to take eight
weeks and would cost the operators a considerable
105
amount of money. In the meantime, rigs in production
could be taken out of service and production could also
106
be halted. Another graphic illustration relates to an
oil rig which was barred from operating in September
107
1980 because of its weight limitation. It can be
104. The Henrik Ibsen, which was to have replaced the
Alexander Kielland, was banned by the Norwegian
authorities from operating because of defects.
105. The Guardian, April 9, 1980, p. 24.
106. It was the Norske Veritas, the Norwegian ship and
rig classification society, that decided on the
inspection.
107. As reported in Financial Times, September 20,
1980, p. 2.
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reasonably presumed that such decisions were in
substance - if not in form - made by the Norwegian
108
government.
Loss caused by wear and tear is also excluded.
Nevertheless, the exclusion has no necessary connota¬
tion that corrosion also comes within the provisions
thereof. In this connection, the suggestion has been
made that corrosion is a serious problem confronting
fixed oil rigs. In 1976, BP discovered that a 20-in
diameter hot oil riser on the Forties Alpha Platform
had suffered very severe corrosion over a length of
50-60 feet. A large number of investigations were
carried out to determine the cause of the corrosion.
However, no real satisfactory explanation for the
109
corrosion was found after three years' investigation.
108. Immediately after the final report on the Alexander
Kielland disaster was published, three oil rigs
operating in the British sector of the North Sea
(the Pentagone 84, Dixylyn 96 and Dixylyn 97)
similar in design to the Alexander Kielland rig
were reguired by the Lloyd's Register of Shipping
to undergo modifications in the summer of 1981.
See Financial Times, April 7, 1981, p. 2.
109. Potter, "North Sea Oil Industry Still Has A Lot
to Learn," Scotland'79, p. iv, in The Scotsman,
May 24, 1979. In fact, it has already been
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The event shows that in the offshore area there is
still scope for technical improvement, in which oil
rig insurance has a very clear interest.
6. Costs of re-siting the rig
Wrong location of the platform also comes within
the category of undertakings to which the excepted
perils apply. In practical terms, the costs of re-
siting the rig can be tremendous. By virtue of the
110
Exclusions Clause, the underwriters are not liable
for any claim by reason of the insured platform or
structure being placed in the wrong location unless
the mislocation is caused by an insured peril.
It may be relevant to note that towing out an
oil production platform to a correct position in the
recognised that corrosion is the biggest single
cause of deterioration in ocean engineering. See
Davies, "Protection of Offshore Units - A major
Technology," in Financial Times Ltd., Off shore
Development (1975) Vol. 2, pp. 152-164, at p. 152.
The organisers of the Offshore Inspection, Repair
and Maintenance Conference (Ingliston, Edinburgh,
10-12 February 1981) have pointed out that clearing,
painting and corrosion control in the North Sea is




North Sea has been likened to landing a spacecraft on
111
the moon. A new navigational aid applying satellites
and sensors is now being developed whereby rigs can
112
be anchored over the ocean bed with precision. In
times ahead insurance of such navigational aid would
113
surely bring about new problems and challenges.
7. Conventional marine insurance?
It is agreed in the present C.I.C.M. insurance for
Condeep Statfjord A Platform that the contract of the
insurance shall be governed by English law, though
any dispute should be brought before Norwegian courts.
For reasons already discussed, this contractual
arrangement would inevitably create a potential source
of dispute in respect of the applicable law, which
111. Williams, "Satellites and Sensors Aid Search for
Oil," Financial Times, October 20, 1980, p. 18.
112. Ibid.
For a recent survey, see Banel, "Satellites and
Sensors Play Critical Role," The Oil Register,
p. iv, in The Scotsman, February 24, 1981.
113. Insurance of satellites falls within the scope
of aviation insurance. On problems of insuring




With little alternative available, some Norwegian
writers have reached a strained assumption, not without
suspicion and reluctance, that the contractual commit¬
ment refers virtually to the English marine insurance
114
law, at the heart of which lies, of course, the 1906
Marine Insurance Act. This is hardly surprising
because the 1906 Act is by far the only piece of
legislation that would appear to have possible appli¬
cation. Superficially, the analogy with the 1906 Act
has solved some immediate problems. However, there
is little to suggest that such an approach has real
bearing on solving the genuine issue. Nor does it
obviate the necessity of working out an ultimate
resolution thereon. Needless to say, it is also of
little weight against the fact that there are areas
in which discrepancies persist.
As previously indicated, the applicability of the
1906 Act to the insurance of floating rigs has already
promoted scepticism, let alone its applicability to
114. Rein, (et al.) op cit (supra note 78) at p. 6-29.
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115
the construction of fixed platforms. Although the
present C.I.C.M. policy retains some features of
marine insurance, the essential basis for full appli¬
cability is largely absent. In consequence, contro¬
versy is expected to be forthcoming.
The magnitude of the problem does provide
justification for an immediate review of the present
legal framework as regards oil rig insurance, on which
the interest of both the British government and the
London market converges. With the effects of oil rig
insurance already pervading offshore production and
developments, there is scarcely any margin for delay
in beginning to introduce a programme of law reform.
From the foregoing account, it may be concluded that
oil rig insurance is not incompatible with marine
insurance, but it transcends marine insurance concepts.
That is the direction in which the reform should move.
115. Section 2 of the Marine Insurance Act 1905 has the
effect that a contract of marine insurance may also
cover a ship in the course of building. In James
Yachts Ltd. v. Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance
Co. Ltd. , []l977j 1 Lloyd's Rep. 205, the plaintiff
(insured) argued that a policy covering the con¬
struction of a boat was not a marine insurance policy.
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CHAPTER SIX
AN INSURANCE APPROACH TO OFFSHORE OIL POLLUTION
A. Offshore pollution insurance; an introduction
1. Pollution hazards
On January 28, 1969, a blowout took place at
tract 402 in the Santa Barbara Channel off California,
resulting in a slick that grew to 800 square miles.
The estimated damage from the oil spill ran into
1
tens of millions of dollars. Among the representative
examples of offshore pollution hazards following San-
2
ta Barbara, the blowouts of Bravo and Ixtoc I also
1. For legal approaches to the incident, see Baldwin,
"The Santa Barbara Oil Spill," (1970) 42 University
of Colorado Law Review 33; Nanda and Stiles, "Off¬
shore oil Spills: An Evaluation of Recent United
States Responses," (1970) 7 San Diego Law Review
519, at pp. 526-534; Salmsley, "Oil Pollution Problems
Arising Out of the Continental Shelf : the Santa
Barbara Disaster," (1972) 9 San Diego Law Review 514.
In a case growing out of the Santa Barbara oil spill,
the court held that oil companies were under a duty
to fishermen to conduct their offshore drilling and
production in a reasonably prudent manner so as to
avoid negligent diminution of aquatic life, thus
allowing fishermen to recover damages for economic
loss: Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (1974).
2. See above, p. 210.
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caused much legal interest and press comment throughout
the world. The blowout off the coast of Nigeria in
3
1980 marked a recent indication of the devastating
pollution damage resulting from offshore oil activities,
which usually involves huge amount of damages and
cleanup costs.
In general, there are four major sources from which
oil pollution can occur: seabed exploration and exploi¬
tation, land-based pollution, vessel-source pollution,
and ocean dumping. The present study, which chiefly
concerns the first sources, is an insurance approach
to the subject with a review of some relevant inter¬
national conventions and agreements. The insurance
coverages currently in use as against the risk are also
to be observed.
It should be realised that blowouts like Santa
Barbara are not the only source of oil pollution
arising from offshore operations. Accidental spills
3. The blowout occurred at a well one mile off the port
of Sangana, in the Rivers State about 400 miles east
of Lagos, as reported by The Times, March 3, 1980,
p. 7.
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from oil wells, drilling and production facilities
4
can also generate enormous claims and compensations.
All this underlines the importance of framing appro¬
priate insurance programmes, which merit thorough
legal consideration.
2. Operators' liability
It should be pointed out at the outset that off¬
shore pollution liability falls within the category
of third party liability, which may be imposed under
5
statutory law or common law, or both. The nature of
4. There are seven main types of accidents which have
been recognised as possible sources of offshore oil
pollution. For details see North Sea Oil and the
Environment - Pollution: An Assessment of the Risks
and Action to Deal with Incidents, a paper published
by the Scottish Office at the request of the Oil
Development Council for Scotland, at pp. 3-5.
5. One writer takes the position that there will be
no grounds for an action based on negligence, nor
will the strict liability of Rylands v. Fletcher
apply. See McLoughlin, The Law and Practice Relating
to Pollution Control in the United Kingdom (1976)
at p. 176. Note however Henderson (et al.), Oil and
Gas Law: The North Sea Exploitation (1979) at
p. 1.1033. As to the applicability of Rylands v.
Fletcher to vessel-source pollution, see Ingram,
"Oil Pollution - Rylands v. Fletcher," (1971) 121
New Law Journal 183.
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6
such liability, to which some articles have devoted,
is not discussed in this Chapter. It is also beyond
the ambit of this work to generalise about the
occasions on which compensation is likely to be claimed.
Of paramount importance in establishing the legal
relationship between operators and drilling contractors
for purposes of pollution liability are drilling
contracts, in which responsibility for costs or
expenses in respect thereof should be clearly defined.
In practice the view prevails that the major portion
of the responsibility is imposed upon the operator.
One of the most revealing pieces of evidence lies
7
in clause 1005(b) of the I.A.D.C. contract. Although
6. See, e.g. Dubais, "Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation
of Hydrocarbons in the Seabed," (1975) 6 Journal of
Maritime Law & Commerce 549. For the Norwegian
jurisdiction, see Levandowski, "Civil Liability for
Oil-Pollution Damage on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf," (1978) 5 Ocean Development and International
Law Journal 397.
7. Clause 1005(b) of the I.A.D.C. contract provides:
"Operator shall assume all responsibility for
(including control and removal of the pollutant
involved) and shall protect, defend and save the
Contractor harmless from and against all claims,
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the drilling contractor under the contract should
still assume responsibility for cleaning up and
containing pollution or contamination which originates
above the surface of the water from spills of fuels,
8
lubricants and so on, such responsibility is rela¬
tively insignificant.
The dominant approach whereby the operator should
assume substantial responsibility for oil pollution
has been echoed by the Offshore Pollution Liability
9
Agreement (OPOL), under which the operating oil
companies agree to accept strict liability for such
hazards. This has been further strengthened following
the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
demands, and causes of action of every kind and
character arising from all pollution or contamina¬
tion, other than that described in subclause (a)
above, which may occur from the negligence of
Contractor or otherwise during the term of this
Contract or as a result of operations hereunder,
including but not limited to, that which may result
from fire, blowout, cratering, seepage or any other
uncontrolled flow of oil, gas , water or other
substance, as well as the use or "
8. Clause 1005(a) of the contract.
9. See below, p. 29 3.
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Damage Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of
10
Seabed Mineral Resources 1976, according to which the
liability falls - subject to certain exceptions - on
the operator. As is noted below, the operator should
also maintain pollution insurance or produce other evi¬
dence of its financial ability to cover the risk.
Despite the foregoint, it remains true that parties
other than the operator are not exempted from being
sued. One example may be given of the claims as a
result of the Ixtoc I blowout. Instead of seeking
financial compensation for damages from the two
Mexican companies involved in the oil field, the US
Justice Department decided to restrict its litigation
for a modest £ million damages to Sedoc, an American
drilling firm which leased Mexico the oil rig used at
11
the site of the blowout. It is fairly clear that
political reasons were taken into consideration in
12
reaching the decision.
10. See below, p. 299.
11. The Guardian, October 24, 1979, p. 7; The Times,
November 16, 1979, p. 8.
12. It has been reported that in the midst of the furore
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3. A separate coverage
It should be observed that offshore pollution
liability is not covered under the liability or
13
property policies previously discussed, with the
14
very limited exceptions of the C.I.C.M. insurance.
Therefore, it is virtually through a separate coverage
that the risk can be insured against. This would
inevitably leave the parties with less flexibility
over the implementation of their insurance schemes.
over compensation for damages caused by the blowout,
the two governments reached a new agreement on the
sale of Mexican natural gas to the United States.
As reported by The Times, November 16, 1979,
p. 8.
13. This can be evidenced by, among others, section
17(a) of the new Norwegian P & I conditions
specially designed for floating drilling rigs;
see also clause 8(h) of the London Standard
Drilling Barge Form.
14. It is however confined to damage to a production
platform in order to prevent or reduce a pollution
hazard. The loss or damage must have been caused
by actions of a sovereign power. See clause 9 of
the written policy.
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It must also be added that increasing public and
government concern is being focused on oil pollution,
which is a strong pointer to the compulsory nature of'
the insurance.
Another salient feature of offshore pollution
insurance is the fact that pollution hazards always
involve potentially sizable losses, which necessitates
joint efforts to effect internal insurance arrangements
among oil companies. In this domain, the role the Oil
15
Insurance Limited (O.I.L.) plays is a practical illus¬
tration. On the other hand, progressive steps have been
taken at the international level towards an equitable
solution of the pollution problem. The influence
exerted by such measures upon pollution insurance is
of considerable significance.
B. A conceptual classification of oil pollution
coverages
1. Effecting the insurance: some introductory
remarks
As has been pointed out, the basic concern in this
work is with the risk of oil pollution caused by off¬
shore exploration and exploitation, which must not be
15. See below, p. 296.
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confused by that of vessel-source pollution, e.g. an
accidental spill from an oil tanker. It should be
f
indicated that the legal regime of the latter case
has been largely established , and a considerable
16
amount of literature exists on the topic. It may
probably be asserted that the devastating pollution
effects originating from the two different sources
are identical. On legal reparation, however, they
are far apart. And it is exactly this distinction
that has proved to be of vital importance in effecting
pollution. In considering this facet of the problem,
reference to the following international conventions
and agreements is required.
16. E.g. Keeton, "The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon:
English Law Aspects," (1968) 21 Current Legal
Problems 94; Lowry, "Shipowner and Oil Pollution
Liability," (1972) 18 McGill Law Journal 577;
Dinstein, "Oil Pollution by Ships and Freedom of
the High Seas," (1972) 3 Journal of Maritime Law
363; Forster, "Civil Liability of Shipowners for
Oil Pollution," (1973) Journal of Business Law
23; Sandbrook and Yurchyshyn, "Marine Pollution
from Vessels," in Stein, (ed.), Critical Environ¬
mental Issues on the Law of the Sea, a Report of
the International Institute for Environment and
Development, London (1975) pp. 19-30.
280
17
2. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958
Article 24 of the Convention states:
"Every state shall draw up regulations to prevent
pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from
ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploita¬
tion and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil,
taking account of existing treaty provisions on
the subject."
It is reasonably clear that the "regulations" referred
to above are potentially of very wide application.
Specifically, they are meant to cover both vessel-
source pollution and pollution arising from offshore
oil activities.
In this connection, mention must also be made of
18
the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, which
seems to have paid no specific attention to oil pollu-
19
tion.
17. 52 AJIL 842.
18. 52 AJIL 858.
19. However, Article 5.1 provides:
"The exploration of the continental shelf and the
exploitation of its natural resources must not
result in any unjustifiable interference with
navigation, fishing or the conservation of the
living resources of the sea, nor result in any
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3. The International Convention Relating to Inter¬
vention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties 1969
20
The Convention, also known as the Intervention
21
Convention, provides:
"Parties to the present Convention may take such
measures on the high seas as may be necessary to
prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent
danger to their coastline or related interests
from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea
by oil, following upon a maritime casualty or acts
related to such a casualty, which may reasonably
be expected to result in major harmful consequences."
(Emphasis added)
As used in the Convention, "maritime casualty" means
"a collision of ships, stranding or other accident of
navigation, or other occurrence on board a ship or
external to it resulting in material damage to imminent
22
threat of material damage to a ship or cargo."
interference with fundamental oceanographic or
other scientific research carried out with the
intention of open publication."




The definition of "ship" is to be found in Article
2.2, which stipulates:
"'Ship' means:
(a) any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever,
and
(b) any floating craft, with the exception of an
installation or device engaged in the explora¬
tion and exploitation of the resources of the
sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof."
It is manifest that oil pollution resulting from off¬
shore ventures does not come within the category of
undertakings to which the Convention applies.
4. The International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships 1973
23
The Convention includes a reference to the word
"discharge", which means "any release howsoever caused
from a ship and includes any escape, disposal, spilling,
24
leaking, pumping, emitting or emptying."
In this context, "ship" denotes "a vessel of any
type whatsoever operating in the marine environment
and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles,
submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating
platforms." However, this should be read in
23.
24.
12 ILM 1319 (1973).
Article 2(3)(a).
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conjunction with Article 2(3)(b)(ii), whereby
"discharge" does not include release of harmful
substances "directly arising from the exploration,
exploitation and associated off-shore processing of
sea-bed mineral resources."
In the light of the foregoing, the Convention
only applies to offshore floating rigs in respect
of discharges not resulting directly from the explora¬
tion or exploitation of seabed mineral resources.
5. The Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
25
tion by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 1972
According to Article 19.1, "dumping" refers to
any deliberate disposal of substances and materials
into the sea by or from ships or aircraft. Article
19.2 provides:
"'Ship and aircraft' means sea-going vessels and
air-borne craft of any type whatsoever. This
expression includes air-cushion aircraft, floating
craft whether self-propelled or not, and fixed or
floating platforms."
Thers is a necessary implication that offshore oil
rigs of whatever type should fall within the provisions
of this Article.
25. 11 ILM 252 (1972).
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6. The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
26
tion by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter 1972
By virtue of Article III(l)(a) of the Convention,
"dumping" means:
"(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms, or
other man-made structures at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels,
aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea."
Article 111(2) has the effect that vessels and aircraft
includes "air-cushion craft and floating craft, whether
self-propelled or not."
That offshore oil rigs fall within the scope of
the Convention is clear from the consideration of
these provisions. The definitions present no
difficulties.
7. The Agreement Concerning Pollution of the North
27
Sea by Oil 1969
28
The Agreement applies "whenever the presence or
26. 11 ILM 1294 (1972).
27. 9 ILM 359 (1970).
28. This Agreement is a regional scheme of co-operation
among the following North Sea States: Belgium,
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the prospective presence of oil polluting the sea
within the North Sea area... presents a grave and
imminent danger to the coast or related interests
29
of one or more Contracting Parties."
Article 5.1, which calls for particular consi¬
deration, states:
"Whenever a Contracting Party is aware of a
casualty or the presence of oil slicks in the
North Sea area likely to constitute a serious
threat to the coast or related interests of any
other Contracting Party, it shall inform that
other Party without delay through its competent
authority." (Emphasis added)
In the absence of a plain definition of "oil slicks",
there may be argument as to whether such slicks
30
necessarily cover oil spills of whatever source.
It is submitted that the ambiguity - whether deli¬
berately engineered or not - may be attributable to
the following factors.
First, there are instances in which sources of
Denmark, France, federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the U.K.
29. Article 1.
30. Cf. Fitzmaurice, "A Critical Assessment of Pollution
Control Laws Regulating the Development of Petroleum
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oil spills are unknown or difficult to identify. One
recent example involved the oil pollution along the
Swedish west coast and in part of the Oslofjord in
Norway in early January, 1981. Neither the Norwegian
nor Swedish authorities were able to locate the source
31
of the pollution. On January 6, 1981, Swesiah coast¬
guards abandoned the search for the oil slick, which
32
had killed hundreds of thousands of seabirds.
Second, the principal purpose of the Agreement is
to achieve active co-operation between the Contracting
States in minimising pollution damage. To that extent,
it is of little practical significance in treating with
difference oil slicks which are of different sources,
even if they are identifiable.
Resources in the United Kingdom and Norwegian Sectors
of the Northr Sea," PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh,
1977, at p. 218.
31. The Guardian, January 5, 1981, p. 6.
32. The Times, January 6, 1981, p. 4. It was reported on
BBC radio news on January 15, 1981, that the slick
had been from a Greek tanker. This was not confirmed
by newspapers reports.
In this connection, it should be further indicated
that the difficulty in identifying the sources of
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From the foregoing observations it may therefore
be concluded that oil pollution, being of different
sources, is considered a single subject or category
by some, but not all, international conventions or
33
agreements. The thought behind the 1969 Agreement
may help to explain why these conventions or agree¬
ments have adopted such an approach. It can be
inferred that the nature of these conventions or
agreements does not necessitate the distinction
between oil pollution of different sources; or that
the distinction would be inadvisable in implementing
the conventions or agreements, as the 1969 Agreement
34
has shown. At any rate, this lack of uniformity seems
oil spills also applies to the case of an oil fire.
For a recent decision illustrative of this point,
see The "Arzew", [l98lj 1 Lloyd's Rep. 142.
33. As far as this proposition is concerned, it would
seem unnecessary to extend the present discussion
to many other international conventions and agree¬
ments relating to oil pollution.
34. The approach bringing vessel-source and seabed-
source pollution within one legal machinery can
also be found in municipal law. See in particular
the Prevention of Pollution Act 1971. In summary,
if oil is discharged from a ship, the owner or
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to have left the distinction with less significance
than it should ordinarily have. It is natural that
come confusion may have been created. It should be
reiterated, however, that the fact that some inter¬
national conventions or agreements do not distinguish
the sources of oil pollution does not lead to the
assumption that there should be a single legal frame¬
work within which oil pollution is regulated as far
35
as compensation and remedial measures are concerned.
As will be further demonstrated, the implications of
master of the ship shall, subject to the provisions
of the Act, be guilty of an offence. See section
1(b). If the discharge results from the exploration
or exploitation of seabed resources, the person
carrying on the operations shall be guilty of an
offence. See section 3(1) of the Act. However,
it should be observed that the Act makes no re¬
ference to civil liability.
35. It should however be pointed out that there are
differing views on this point. See, for example,
Dubais, op cit (supra note 5) at pi 553. Never¬
theless, it is not proposed to discuss in the
present work the feasibility and advisability
of such a possible single framework.
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this distinction upon pollution insurance are
extremely far-reaching, on which the international
conventions and agreements to be noted below may
shed some light.
8. The International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage 1969
36
The Convention was concluded with the aim of
adopting limits of liability for discharges of oil
from ships, which represent an increase in the limits
of the 1957 Brussels Convention on the Limitation of
Shipowners' Liability.
What constitutes "pollution damage" is set out in
Article 1.6, which provides:
"'Pollution damage' means loss or damage caused
outside the ship carrying oil by contamination
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from
the ship, whenever such escape or discharge may
occur, and includes the costs of preventive measures
and further loss or damage caused by preventive
measures."
Article 1.1 defines "ship" as "any sea-going vessel
and any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually
carrying oil in bulk as cargo."
This is a conclusive intimation that oil pollution
36. 9 ILM 45 (1970).
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arising from exploration and exploitation of mineral
resources in the offshore area is meant to be excluded.
However, difficulty may be encountered in this context
as regards the SWOPS, BP'S proposed new production
37
system, which raises the immediate guestion as to
whether such tankers fall within the purview of the
provisions. It would seem that the decisive test lies
in whether they are carrying oil in bulk as cargo.
The limitation of liability contained in the
Convention does not remove the overwhelming disirability
of pollution insurance, to which some consideration
38
should be given. The Convention further provides:
"The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting
State and carrying more than 2,000 tons of oil in
bulk as cargo shall be required to maintain
insurance or other financial security, such as
the guarantee of a bank or a certificate delivered
by an international compensation fund, in the sums
fixed by applying the limits of liability prescribed
in Article V, paragraph 1 to cover his liability
for pollution damage under this Convention."
In addition, part of Article VII.2 reads as follows:
"A certificate attesting that insurance or other
financial security is in force in accordance with
37. See above, p. 151.
38. Article VII.1.
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the provisions of this Convention shall be issued
to each ship..."
There are other provisions to which the structures
of the insurance or other financial security are
39
subject.
Account must also be taken of the International
Convention on the Establishment of an International
40
Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, of which the primary
purpose is to complement the Civil Liability Convention.
9. Tanker Owners' Voluntary Agreement Concerning Lia¬
bility for Oil Pollution (T0VAL0P) and its
insurance affiliate
39. See Article VII.5.
The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 gives
effect to the 1969 Brussels Convention. The provi¬
sions dealing with compulsory insurance are contained
in sections 10-12.
The Oil Pollution (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations
1977, S.I. 1977 No. 85, made under ss. 10(1),(4) and
11(3) of the 1971 Act, consolidate and amend the Oil
Pollution (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1975,
S.I. 1975 No. 869, and the amending S.I. 1975, Nos.
1234, 1759 and 2002 and S.I. 1976 Nos. 154, 857, 1177
and 1440. These regulations were amended as from 12
April 1977 by S.I. 1977 No. 497 and as from 2 January
1980 by S.I. 1979 No. 1593.
40. 11 ILM 284 (1972).
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41
The core of the Agreement is to provide a source
of recoiTery for national governments having expended
money in removing oil caused by the negligent dis¬
charge of a participating tanker. However, the reim¬
bursement is directed at a government's cleanup
expense only.
It is important to note that pollution insurance
has been heavily involved in the implementation of
TOVALOP. In this connection, account must be taken
of the International Tanker Indemnity Association,
Ltd. (I.T.I.A.), TOVALOP's insurance affiliate with
which the participating tanker owners carry oil
pollution insurance. When a claim arises from a
negligent discharge, liability is channelled to the
participating tanker owner and I.T.I.A. The tanker
owner is able to recover from I.T.I.A. for the
expenses in removing any discharged oil.
It should be indicated that insurance coverages
against tanker pollution are in general not looked
42
upon favourably by the insurance industry. However,
41. 8 ILM 497 (1969) .
42. Comment, "Compensation for Oil Pollution at Sea: An
Insurance Approach," (1975) 12 San Diego Law Review
729-731.
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it is still possible to obtain marine liability
policies to cover the risk, one vehicle being an oil
pollution endorsement to a P & I policy. When, as is
frequently the case, the tanker owner is under double
insurance of both the P & I coverage and I.T.I.A.,
the latter should be the primary insurer.
TOVALOP, together with the Contract Regarding an
Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
43
(CRISTAL), has marked a joint effort on the part of
tanker owners and oil companies to deal with the
problem of tanker pollution, about which much has
been written. As is observed below, the insurance
coverages involved therein are by no means comparable
to those in respect of pollution liability arising
from offshore oil operations.




As tanker owners are in principle responsible for
43. 10 ILM 137 (1971).
44. 13 ILM 1409 (1974). This Agreement has been amended
on several occasions.
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tanker pollution, so are operators for pollution damage
resulting from offshore oil operations. In 1974, an
initiative was taken by the oil industry to ensure
that possible pollution claims arising therefrom were
met. This led to OPOL, which is essentially a private
agreement under which operators, as between themselves,
agree to accept strict liability up to a maximum of
225 million per incident for pollution damage and the
cost of remedial measures in the event of a spillage
or escape of oil. Initially, OPOL was drafted to
apply to the operators of offshore facilities within
the United Kingdom jurisdiction, and was subsequently
extended to Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway. A pro¬
fessional organisation entitled the Offshore Pollution
Liability Association Ltd. has been formed in London
to administer the Agreement.
2. "Offshore facility"
As used in the Agreement, the term "offshore
45
facility" means:
"A. any well and any installation or portion thereof
of any kind, fixed or mobile, used for the
45. Clause 1.7.
295
purpose of exploring for, producing, treating
or transporting crude oil from the seabed or
its subsoil; and
B. any well used for the purpose of exploring for
or recovering gas or natural gas liquids from
the seabed or its subsoil during the period
that any such well is being drilled (except
for normal work-over operations);
which is located within the jurisdiction of a
Designated State to the extent that it is to
seaward of the low-water line along the coast
as marked on large scale charts officially re¬
cognized by the Government of such Designated
State:
Provided however that none of the following shall
be considered an Offshore Facility: -
(i) any abandoned well, or
(ii) any ship, barge or other craft not being
used for the storage of crude oil, commencing
at the loading manifold thereof."
The definition is not without problems. It is not free
46
from doubt whether the SWOPS should be considered an
Offshore Facility.
The importance of the definition may also be gauged
by the fact that in case of default by one of its
members each of the remaining parties should pay its
share of any claims for which the Association has
guaranteed to pay, the contribution being calculated
on a mutual basis in proportion to the number of
46. See above, p. 290.
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offshore facilities which the remaining parties are
47
operating.
3. OFOL and insurance
Each party to OPOL is obligated to establish and
maintain its "financial responsibility" to ensure that
it has the ability to meet the claims. The devices by
which the obligation can be fulfilled are not specified
in the Agreement itself. It is however evident from
the Rules for Establishment of Financial Responsibility
that the production of evidence of insurance, self-
insurance, or other means satisfactory to the Association
will suffice.
Unlike TOVALOP, OPOL provides no insurance affiliates
to the participating parties for insurance purposes. As
will be further discussed, such coverages can be obtained
in the insurance market, subject of course to the
capacity being available. The parties can also resort
to the insurance afforded by the O.I.L. under certain
48
circumstances.
Whatever the coverages may be, the operator must
47. By virtue of Clause II.C(4).
48. See below, p. 297.
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produce a certificate of the insurance, issued by an
insurance company or an insurance broker or agent
acceptable to the Association, and in a form specified
49
by the administering company. Conceivably, the cer¬
tificate should be worded in a manner which clearly
states, among other details, that the insurance policy
covers the operator's liability for claims under OPOL.
In the case of an O.I.L. insurance, the operator's
obligation under OPOL can be covered by means of an
OPOL Endorsement to the O.I.L. policy, part of which
reads as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this policy
but subject to the applicable annual aggregate and
deductible provisions the Underwriter agrees
to indemnify or pay on behalf of the named insured
any sum or sums the insured is required, directly
or indirectly, to pay pursuant to the provisions of
the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement or the
Articles of Association of the Offshore Pollution
Liability Association Limited as such are in effect
from time to time...."
In choosing between insurance and self-insurance, the
operator would surely assess the likely consequences.
49. See Rule (l) of the Rules for Establishment of
Financial Responsibility. 14 ILM 152 (1975).
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There are provisions requiring a self-insurer
to demonstrate financial capability by providing
50
its latest audited financial statement. To be
qualified to be a self-insurer, the operator has
to meet a number of other criteria. These other
criteria are largely of a specialised nature,
with which the present study does not intend to
deal in detail.
To some extent, 0P0L is similar in concept
to T0VAL0P. From the standpoint of insurance,
however, they represent two entirely different
bases, upon which two incommensurable insurance
frameworks have been built up. Added to the
complexity of the situation has been the novelty
of offshore technology, which has posed a threat
to the application of the two voluntary agreements.
As a corollary, the insurance position can be left
in doubt and uncertainty. Above all, this substantial
point would appear to present continuing difficulties,
to which the agreements as well as the underwriters'
ability must be constantly adjusted to adapt.
50. Rule (4).
299
D. Insurance considerations of the Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from
Exploration and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral
Resources 1976
1. Operators' strict liability
51
The Convention, which was done at London in 1976,
will enter into force on the ninetieth day following
the date of deposit of the fourth instrument of rati-
52
fication, acceptance, approval or accession.
Functionally, the Convention has characteristics
similar to the Brussels Civil Liability Convention
1969. As previously noted, this Convention places
strict liability on the operator. Article 3.1 provides:
"Except as provided in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of this
Article, the operator of the installation at the time
of an incident shall be liable for any pollution
damage resulting from the incident. When the inci¬
dent consists of a series of occurrences, liability
for pollution damage arising out of each occurrence
shall attach to the operator of the installations
at the time of that occurrence."
As defined, the operator means "the person, whether
licensee or not, designated as operator for the purposes
of this Convention by the Controlling State, or, in the
51. 16 ILM 1450 (1977)
52. Article 20.1.
300
absence of such designation, the person who is in
overall control of the activities carried on at the
53
installation."
The definition of the installation referred to
above is fairly broad. By Article 1, an installation
means, among others, "any well or other facility,
whether fixed or mobile, which is used for the purpose
of exploring for, producing, treating, storing, trans¬
mitting or regaining control of the flow of crude oil
from the seabed or its subsoil." It is easy to see
that a ship as defined in the 1959 Brussels Convention
should not be considered to be an installation in this
context.
A particularly noteworthy point is that the Conven¬
tion applies not only to pollution damage, but also to
preventive measures wherever taken to prevent or mini-
54
mise such pollution damage.
Although there are situations in which the operator
55
can be exempted from its liability, the potential for
53. Article 1.3.
54. See Article 2.
55. Articles 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
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an extremely heavy burden on the operator is still
evident. The answer to this must surely lie in the
limitation of liability adopted by the Convention,
which will be further discussed below.
2. Compulsory insurance
Underlying the whole fabric of the Convention is
the idea of compulsory insurance. Article 8.1 states:
"To cover his liability under this Convention, the
operator shall be required to have and maintain
insurance or other financial security to such amount,
of such type and on such terms as the Controlling
State shall specify, provided that that amount shall
not be less than 22 million Special Drawing Rights
until five years have elapsed from the date on which
this Convention is opened for signature and not less
than 35 million Special Drawing Rights thereafter.
However the Controlling State may exempt the operator
wholly or in part from the requirement to have and
maintain such insurance or other financial security
to cover his liability for pollution damage wholly
caused by an act of sabotage or terrorism."
As far as compulsory insurance is concerned, the Con¬
vention retains some features of the 1959 Brussels
Convention. Nevertheless, the tanker owner under the
1959 Convention is required to maintain insurance or
other financial security in the sums fixed for
determination of the limitation of liability. By
contrast, what has been set in the present Convention
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is a minimum requirement as quoted above, which may
56
be amended pursuant to appropriate procedures. In
consequence, the actual amounts can be above the
minimum, which would make uniformity unattainable.
Equally controversial has been the power of the
Controlling State to specify the type and terms of
the insurance, which has a marked effect on oil
companies in implementing their insurance programmes.
Conceivably, the restrictions upon operators in
effecting pollution insurance may differ in detail
from one Controlling State to another. This raises
the presumption that an insurance policy, however
designed, might not be acceptable to the Controlling
State. All these lend support to the view already
expressed by an author that offshore operators might
well be subjected to unreasonable and costly obligation
To these worries has been added the fact that competi¬
tion in the insurance industry can also be impeded.
56. See below, p. 306.
57. Dubais, "The 1976 Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations,"
(1977-78) 9 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 61,
at p. 67.
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Article 8.2, which also concerns the structures
58
of the compulsory insurance, seems to have presented
little difficulty. Where the operator is a State
Party, Article 3.5 has the effect that the operator
shall not be required to maintain insurance or other
financial security to cover its liability. This is not
in the interest of justice.
The foregoing observation does not alter the fact
that compulsory insurance is essential to pollution
liability. Nonetheless, the approach adopted by the
present Convention to the compulsory insurance appears
to be without apparent justification.
3. Limitation of liability and insurance
Limitation of liability is a vital ingredient of
the Convention. It has raised some issues which are
58. "An insurance or other financial security shall not
satisfy the requirements of this Article if it can
cease, for reasons other than the expiry of the period
of validity of the insurance or security, before two
months have elapsed from the date on which notice of
its termination is given to the competent public
authority of the Controlling State. The foregoing
provision shall similarly apply to any modification
which results in the insurance or security no longer
satisfying the requirements of this Article."
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worthy of note. Article 6.1 provides:
"The operator shall be entitled to limit his
liability under this Convention for each
installation and each incident to the amount
of 30 million Special Drawing Rights until five
years have elapsed from the date on which the
Convention is opened for signature and to the
amount of 40 million Special Drawing Rights
thereafter. "
In arriving at the amounts set out above, the drafters
of the Convention agreed to relate the limitation to
the international insurance market. However, views
varied widely on the level of the insurance coverage
then available. It has been suggested that the figures
set in Article 6.1 were out of line with the availa-
59
bilities on the insurance market for the risk.
What is more open to question is the fact that the
amounts to which the operator is entitled to limit
his liability are higher than the minimum requirement
set in Article 8.1 regulating the compulsory insurance.
This is largely due to the strong attitude taken by the
Norwegian delegation, the underlying theory being that
an entrepreneur who undertakes to carry out a dangerous
activity for profit should be held liable for the adverse
59. Dubais, op cit (supra note 57) at p. 67.
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consequences beyond and above the guarantee offered
60
by his underwriters. There is room for debate as to
whether this reasoning is realistic from a practical
standpoint.
A further complexity concerns the question of
constituting a fund for the purpose of availing the
operator of the benefit of limitation. It is required
by the Convention that the operator shall "constitute
a fund for the total sum representing the limit of
his liability with the court or other competent
authority of any one of the States Parties in which
61
action is brought under Article 11."
The details of constituting the fund are specified
62
in the Convention as follows:
"A fund constituted by one of the operators
mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 3 shall be
deemed to be constituted by all of them. The fund
can be constituted either by depositing the sum or
by producing a bank guarantee or other guarantee,
accepting under the legislation of the State Party
where the fund is constituted, and considered to be
adequate by the court or other competent authority."




It is difficult to deduce whether an insurance
certificate suffices to meet the requirements of
the "other guarantee". If the answer is affirmative,
can the operator become automatically entitled to
limitation of liability provided that the amounts
of its compulsory insurance are as high as those
specified in Article 6.1? This seems to be a moot
point as to which some confusion might be expected to
follow.
Further problems arise when amendments are made
to the amounts set out in the Convention. At this
point it is appropriate to consider the function of
the Committee established under Article 9.1. The
Committee, composed of a representative of each State
Party, may recommend to the States Parties an amendment
to any of the amounts if representatives of at least
three-quarters of the States Parties to the Convention
vote in favour of such a recommendation. Amongst
63
factors which should be taken into account in making
such a recommendation, the availability of reliable
insurance cover is of particular significance. A
63. As specified in Article 9.2.
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literal reading of Article 9 would suggest that the
possibility of reducing the amounts for determination
of limitation of liability to being consistent with
the minimum requirement set for the compulsory
insurance is very real. In consequence, this can have
the effect of removing the disparity in level between
limitation of liability and the compulsory insurance.
4. Direct action against the insurer
The notion of direct action crystallized in the
present Convention is not without precedent in Scottish
64
law. Nevertheless, it represents a departure from the
English common law principle of privity of contract
whereby only parties to the contract are permitted to
sue upon it. In the United States, various direct
action statutes have been enacted, which differ in
65
terms and effects. The essential basis of direct action
64. In Scottish private law, there are exceptions to the
general rule that a contract only creates rights and
liabilities between the parties to it. For example,
a contract between two parties may be held in appro¬
priate cases to confer a jus quaesitum tertio on a
third party. See Gloag on Contract (2nd ed. 1929)
pp. 234-247; Walker, Principles of Scottish Private
Law (1970) pp. 567-569.
65. The Louisiana direct action statute is the most cele¬
brated one; it has been the topic of numerous legal
articles.
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against the insurer is the belief that liability
insurance is for the benefit of the suffering third
parties rather than for the protection of the insureds.
Be that as it may, the existence of such statutes has
been a subject of controversy for many years in the
United States jurisdiction.
It is important to note that in the United States
jurisdiction policies of liability insurance can be
subdivided into two categories according to the nature
of the insurance, i.e. contracts of liability and
66
contracts of indemnity. In the case of a contract of
liability, the amount recoverable is not measured by
the extent of the insureds' loss, and is payable
67
whenever the specified event happens.
Unlike a contract of liability, a contract of
66. 44 Corpus Juris Secundum 481, 482.
Nevertheless, such a subdivision does not exist in
the UK jurisdiction. In British Cash and Parcel
Conveyors Ltd. v. Lamson Store Co. Ltd., [l908] 1 K.B.
1006, Fletcher Moulton L.J. stated that a contract of
liability insurance was a contract of indemnity. This
has become the established principle. See 25 Halsbury's
Laws of England (4th ed.) 350.
67. It would seem that such an insurance should fall
within the scope of contigency insurance in the
UK jurisdiction.
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indemnity is solely for the benefit of the insured
in that it reimburses the insured for the claims in
respect of his liability. Specifically, the happening
of the event does not of itself entitle the insured to
payment of the sum stipulated in the policy; the event
must in fact result in a pecuniary loss to the assured
who then becomes entitled to be indemnified by the
insurer. In other words, the assured cannot recover
more than what he establishes to be the actual amount
of his loss.
One of the most controversial aspects of direct
action concerns the legal confrontation between
contracts of liability and contracts of indemnity.
That they should be treated separately in applying
direct action rules is still the mainstream position
in the United States. Whether a direct action can be
brought against the underwriter of a contract of
indemnity depends upon the respective statutes and
the case law. This has in turn become a fruitful source
68
of litigation.
68. The decisions include Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Cushinq, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins, Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); and
the subsequent cases. The Cushing case also involved
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Against this background, it would seem that the
present Convention may have given cause for concern.
Article 8.3 provides:
"Any claim for compensation for pollution damage
may be grought directly against the insurer or other
person providing financial security for the operator* s
liability for pollution damage. In such case the
liability of the defendant shall be limited to the
amount specified in accordance with paragraph 1 of
this Article irrespective of the fact that the
pollution damage occurred as a result of an act or
omission by the operator himself, done deliberately
with actual knowledge that pollution damage would
result. The defendant may further avail himself of
the defences, other than the bankruptcy or winding-
up of the operator, which the operator himself would
have been entitled to invoke. Furthermore, the
defendant may avail himself of the defence that the
pollution damage resulted from the wilful misconduct
of the operator himself, but the defendant may not
avail himself of any other defence which he might
have been entitled to invoke in proceedings brought
by the operator against him. The defendant shall in
any event have the right to require the operator to
be joined in the proceedings."
Some points do deserve critical examination. The first
question to ask is whether the present Article applies
to contracts of indemnity without any qualification.
Bearing in mind that each Controlling State has the power
the issue of limitation of liability, which has been
noted in Chapter 4. See above, p. 155.
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69
to specify the type and terms of the insurance,
there is every likehood that some - if not all -
Controlling States would favour the form of a
70
contract of indemnity. In that case, does the
foregoing analysis permit an automatic presumption
that such a contract necessarily come within the
provisions of the Article? Is the Controlling
States's power to specify the type and terms of
the insurance sufficient to override the direct
action rule? It is submitted that these are
substantial points which cannot be ignored. A
71
number of United States decisions are evidence
that legal questions are bound to arise in this
connection, of which the originators of the
Convention seem to have taken little account.
According to the present Article, the liability
69. Article 8.1 of the Convention.
70. In the following section, an attempt is made
to discuss in general terms the seepage, pollu¬
tion and contamination insurance policy which
is now widely in use. The policy is a typical
contract of indemnity.
71. Supra note 68.
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of the insurer shall be limited to the amount in
accordance with Article 8.1. There are occasions on
which the insurer is entitled to limitation of liabi¬
lity whereas the operator is denied the benefit of
limitation. For example, if the damage occurred as
a result of an act or omission by the operator himself,
done deliberately with actual knowledge that pollution
damage would result, the operator is not entitled to
72
limitation of liability. In that situation, however,
the insurer's right to limit his own liability -
which should be distinguished from the operator's -
remains unaffected. The operator's liability then
becomes unlimited.
The present Article also has the effect that the
insurer may avail himself of the defence that the
pollution damage resulted from the wilful misconduct
of the operator. This, together with the fact that the
insurer's entitlement to limitation is unaffected, has
contributed to the belief that the protection for the
third parties under the present Article is in effect
of no great significance. It might also be successfully
argued that such an approach is not entirely consistent
72. Article 6.4 of the Convention.
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with the reasoning on which direct action statutes
are based.
E. Some observations on the insurance coverages
currently available
1. Essentials of the O.I.L. cover
Oil Insurance Limited (O.I.L.), a mutual insurance
company, was formed in Bermuda in 1970 by a number of
oil companies. The object was to provide reasonable
and effective insurance and reinsurance coverage against
certain risks in view of the fact that there was no
longer available to the companies on terms consistent
with sound business practice commercial insurance
73
covering such risks.
Pollution liability forms a substantial part of
74
the cover given by the O.I.L. policy. The provisions
are worded in the following manner:
"3. To indemnify or pay or behalf of the Assured any
sum or sums for which the Assured may be legally
liable, or has agreed in writing prior to a loss
73. The Recital to the shareholders' agreement.
74. Apart from pollution liability under consideration,
the undertakings include cost of control expenses
and removal of debris expenses.
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to assume for the benefit of others, excluding
subsidiaries and affiliates, as a result of personal
injury or bodily injury, including death, or loss
of or damage to, including loss of use thereof,
property of any kind or description other than
property insured under insuring agreement 1 arising
out of seepage, pollution or contamination caused
by an occurrence, provided, however, coverage under
this insuring agreement shall be in excess of the
limits of all other of the Assured's insurance
policies, which are then in force to insure its
liability for seepage, pollution, or contamination."
(Emphasis added)
It is the last sentence that merits attention. As a
special feature, the present coverage is one of excess.
This being the case, compensation is payable only if
other insurance policies are exhausted in terms of
amounts.
75
As has been stated, the O.I.L. insurance is one of
the methods in practice whereby the operator's obliga¬
tion under OPOL can be covered. This may also serve to
emphasise the sophistication of the coverage of pollution
insurance.
While it is not proposed to analyse the present
coverage in greater detail, one exclusion contained in
75. See above, pp. 295, 297.
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the policy should however be mentioned. It is designed
to exclude:
"With respect to insuring agreement 3, any liabi¬
lity of the Assured as an owner, operating agent
of an owner, or bareboat charter of:
(1) watercraft classified as a tank vessel designed
and constructed for the carriage by sea in bulk of
crude petroleum and hydrocarbon fuels and oils
derived therefrom; and
(2) vessels enrolled or eligible for enrolment
in TOVALOP." (Emphasis added)
Effectively, this exclusion has no more significance
than a confirmation of the proposition already put
forward that the division between vessel-source
pollution and seabed-source pollution can in no event
be eroded for insurance purposes. To reiterate, the
insurance covering vessel-source pollution is of an
entirely different nature, the essentials of which
have been briefly outlined.
2. Some important clauses of the Seepage, Pollution
76
and Contamination Insurance Policy
Apart from the Named Insured (the operator), the
following parties are also insureds under the present
76. The writer is indebted to Mr. Michael Howard for a




"(b) The Contractors and/or Sub-contractors of the
Named Insured and/or any parties -whom the Named
Insured has agreed to hold harmless in respect of
liability for bodily injury and for loss of, damage
to or loss of use of property or clean-up costs
pursuant to operating agreements with such parties."
(Emphasis added)
As has been previously noted, the I.A.D.C. contract
provides in clause 1005(b) that the operator should
save the drilling contractor harmless from and against
78
all claims arising from pollution. To this extent,
the provision quoted above in the present policy is
indicative of the way oil-associated insurance and
offshore operational practice inter-relate.
In the present context, those persons with whom
the operator has concluded operating agreements could
79
include the owners of supporting rigs like the Tharos,
and helicopters etc. It can therefore be assumed that
77. The Schedule to the policy.
The term "Insured" is further extended by virtue of
clause 4(a) to include any partner or employees of the
operator while acting within the scope of his duties
as such.
73. See above, p. 274.
79. See above, p. 62, note 66.
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the present policy is virtually for the benefit of
all the persons involved in the operations. Be that
as it may, it is felt that the operating agreements
referred to in the policy are likely to be confused
80
by the operating agreement entered into between the
joint-venturers.
81
The cover afforded is in the following terms:
"INSURING AGREEMENTS:
Whereas the Insured has agreed to pay the premium
as stated in the Schedule, Underwriters, subject
to the limitations, terms and conditions of this
policy, agree to indemnify the Insured against or
pay on behalf of the Insured:
(a) all sums which the Insured shall by law be
liable to pay as damages for bodily injury
(fatal or non-fatal) and/or loss of, damage
to or loss of use of property caused by or
alleged to have been caused directly or
indirectly by seepage, pollution or contami¬
nation arising out of the operations stated
in the Schedule.
(b) the cost of removing, nullifying or cleaning
up seepage, pollution or contaminating
substances emanating from the operations
stated in the Schedule, including the cost
of preventing the substances reaching the
shore.
Provided always that such Seepage, Pollution or
Contamination results in a claim being made during
80. For operating agreements, see above, p. 65.
81. Clause 1 of the policy.
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the period of Policy as stated in the Schedule
and of which immediate notice has been given in
accordance with Clause 5 hereof except that any
claim subsequently arising out of the circumstances
referred to in such notice shall for the purpose of
this Policy be deemed to have been made during the
currency of this Policy."
The fact that the policy is one of indemnity should be
kept in mind in implementing the direct action rule
which has been written into the 1976 Convention.
The terms seepage, pollution or contamination are
nowhere defined in the policy. It remains to be seen
whether problems of interpretation will arise therefrom.
The provisions dealing with limit of liability also
merit a short consideration. Clause 2 states:
"LIMIT OF LIABILITY:
The Underwriters' limit of liability hereunder shall
be Ultimate Net Loss in respect of any one claim
and/or series of claims arising out of one event and
in the aggregate during the Policy period."
As defined in the policy, the term Ultimate Net Loss
means "the sums paid in the settlement of claims covered
by this Policy (after making deductions for all reco¬
veries, salvages and other insurance) and shall include





It is important to bear in mind that such provisions
will become subject to Article 8 of the 1976 Convention
and the municipal law implementing the Convention once
the Convention comes into force. Article 8 has already
specified the minimum requirement, over which the
operator and its underwriters will have little control.
The policy under consideration contains an exclusion,
83
which provides:
"This Policy does not cover any liability which is
insured by or would, but for the existence of this
Policy, be insured by any other existing insurance(s)
except in respect of any excess beyond the amount
which would have been payable under such other
insurance(s) had this Policy not been effected."
It can be reasonably inferred that the thought behind
the exclusion is to prevent double insurance. Difficulty
might however arise as regards the applicable coverages
under the present insurance and the O.I.L. policy when
the two policies are co-existent. Nevertheless, a more
considered view is that in that situation the present
insurance should be the primary coverage if there are
no other circumstances leading to a contrary conclusion.
Support for the view can be extracted from the structures
83. Clause 8(b).
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of the two policies. That the O.I.L. coverage is
84
one of excess is clear from its cover. By contrast,
the provisions purporting to preclude double insurance
in the present policy take the form of an exclusion
rather than the cover, which can hardly be construed
as an excess insurance.
The exclusion of cost of control is also inserted
85
in the present policy. It should be pointed out that
cost of control is separate from, but related to,
pollution liability. In brief, such cost refers to
the expenses the operator incurs in regaining control
of a well. To guard against the risk, a separate
cost of control policy is in practice the most desirable
answer.
In addition to the above, the following exclusion
also calls for scrutiny. Clause 8(f) provides:
"This Policy does not cover any claims arising
directly or indirectly from seepage, pollution or
contamination if such seepage, pollution or
contamination
(i) is intended from the standpoint of the
84. See above, pp. 313, 314.
85. Clause 8(b).
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Insured or any other person or organization
acting or on behalf of the Insured, or
(ii) "
If the operator comes within the purview of this
exclusion, the consequences are actually two-fold:
not only can the underwriters disclaim their liability
by virtue of this exclusion, but the operator could be
denied the benefit of limitation of liability under
86
the 1976 Convention. In such a case, the operator
would be exposed to unlimited liability without
being protected by the insurance.
Under the present policy, it is warranted by the
37
insured that blowout preventers be installed. One
should be reminded of the fact that such a warranty
also exists in the policies covering offshore physical
88
damage. This is another sign, albeit minor, that oil-
86. Article 6.4 of the Convention.
87. Clause 14 of the policy.
88. See, for example, clause 9 of the London Standard
Drilling Barge Form; clause 6 of the Norwegian
DV-kasko. In the latter case, however, the re¬
quirement is considered a special safety regulation
in relation to section 49 of the 1964 Plan. See
above, pp. 249, 250.
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related policies do have significant features in
common despite their respective coverages.
F. Concluding remarks
With the conclusion of the 1976 Convention, OPOL
may become obsolete. Although it will be some time
before the impact of the Convention upon pollution
insurance can be fully appreciated, it is precisely
on this Convention and the municipal law implementing
it that the operator and its underwriters should
concentrate their attention. As the operator'
obligation - whether under OPOL or not - is now
coverable under certain specially-designed insurances,
policies parallelling the Convention will no doubt be
in great demand. At the time of writing, however,




This analysis hardly marks the end of the matter.
Apart from the coverages discussed above, there are
other respects in which the parties could be exposed
to risk, such as loss of profits and political risks.
With offshore technical marvels like floating airports
being developed, it is natural that the challenges to
lawyers and insurers are bound to continue. These
are only a foretaste of the examples where much more
consideration needs to be encouraged.
To conclude this work, a few final comments may
be appropriate. As far as the insurance coverages are
concerned, difficulties stem from a number of factors.
One major cause of concern remains the underwriters'
limited capacity on the risks, due to which many
insureds have been unable to obtain adequate coverage.
Ironically, with the policies involved being numerous,
the indications are that duplicate insurance or over¬
lapping between coverages has become another prominent
issue. All this renders a co-ordinated offshore
insurance framework essential for the maximisation
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of insurance efficiency. It is proposed that there
are four levels on which necessary co-ordination
should be maintained. First of all, it would be
incumbent upon the parties involved to distribute the
duty to obtain insurance properly. This has been
illuminated by the usual practice whereby the operator
assumes the responsibility of purchasing insurance
for other co-venturers. Another graphic example may
be given of the contractual distribution of insurance
coverages between the operator and the drilling
contractor. It is however misleading to approach
such contractual commitments without adequate
consideration of the special legal requirements
which may stipulate, for instance, that pollution
insurance should be obtained by the operator only.
Secondly, particular care is needed to ensure that
coverages against different risks are parallel to
each other. One practical illustration is the fact
that oil-associated companies may choose to implement
their employers' liability insurance separately or
on a global basis. The latter may well entail double
insurance when the companies insure their oil rigs
with P & I clubs which also provide, among others,
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employers' liability coverages. In considering
pollution insurance, on the other hand, account must
always be taken of the areas in which pollution
liability coverages may have already been afforded
to certain extent under the property damage policy
or third party liability insurance. The third strand
of the theory of co-ordination is that policies
covering the perils of the same nature should be in
perfect harmony with each other. To effect third
party liability insurance, for example, the respective
covers provided by the Comprehensive General Liability
insurance and the P & I insurance should be adequately
assessed as a basis for procuring the coverages intended.
Fourthly, insurance coverages should echo the varying
stages of the operations. For instance, insurance
requirements of the exploratory activities are in no
way identical to the coverages required during the
construction period. As there are areas where these
two sets of coverages inter-act, however, it is
important not to consider each set of policies in
isolation. Another obvious indication can be found
in the C.I.C.M. insurance. As has been observed,
coverages covering the production operations should
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be complementary to the C.I.C.M. insurance in respect
of the production phase.
Neither of these four tasks can be contemplated
without the other. In achieving these aims, it is
essential that each insurance policy should also be
evaluated on its constituent merits. From a practical
standpoint, the policies are ancillary to each other
within the whole fabric of the insurance plan. Broadly
speaking, there are no significant legal restrictions
on the ways in which the insurance coverages are
co-ordinated as proposed above, except that the Unfair
Contract Terms Act 1977 has become an obstacle to the
contractual distribution of the risks.
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that
the deficiency and inadequacy of the law have been
exposed. The problems to which the legal status of
offshore installations has given rise must be urgently
examined. There could be nothing more vital than to
clarify the confusion between such oil rigs and
conventional ships or vessels. To do this would be
a substantial step in rationalisation of the present
state of the law, and is also a prerequisite of the
reform in the law governing the insurance aspects of
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oil rigs. Onr the issue of the legal status, the
conclusion must be that the analogy with ships or
vessels is superficially attractive. Such an analogy
could be justified in terms neither of reflecting the
actual fact, nor of solving the problem. A more
long-term view should be to accommodate and cater for
the evolution of offshore technology, which is moving
clearly in the direction of complicating the formation
of offshore installations. As is clearly shown in the
present discussion, the situation has already arrived
in which any attempt to attach such novel designs to
the notion of ships or non-ships has proved to be an
over-simplification.
The supposition that offshore installations are
independent of the concept of ships or vessels does
not create the assumption that the rules of salvage
and collision cannot be made applicable to such rigs.
Nor is it legitimate to infer that rig owners should
not be allowed to limit their liability. Nevertheless,
this is not a generalisation which can necessarily be
extended to other established maritime principles.
In determining the applicability of those principles
to oil rigs, many relevant factors should be taken
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into consideration, as to which there are no easy
answers.
The question of the governing law merits a fuller
scrutiny than it has so far received. To reiterate,
the arguments for bringing oil rig insurance within
the purview of the 1906 Marine Insurance Act need to
be squarely confronted. It seems reasonable to assume
that to adapt oil rig insurance into conventional
marine insurance concepts would be erroneous. In the
absence of any solid legal ground, the mere fact that
many insurance and legal practitioners involved in
offshore activities have been frequently referring to
the 1906 Act cannot be relied upon as evidence to
validate the unqualified application of the Act to oil
rig insurance. Nor can anyone credibly suggest that
traditional marine insurance embraces oil rig insurance.
In practical terms, the issue cannot be resolved simply
by declaring that the Act should apply to oil rig
insurance, unless balanced by more constructive provisions
covering adequately the unique aspects of oil rig
insurance.
Finally, it must be conceded that increased safety
legislation has permitted considerable minimisation of
329
the risk. However minimal the practical significane
of some regulations may be, their implications on
oil-related insurance are never to be counted only
in safety context. It is necessary to stress that
any breach of the regulations on the part of the
insureds could well establish a valid argument in
favour of the underwriters. Seen in this light, it
is important to prevent the reinforcement of safety
regulations from going farther than is absolutely
necessary. Arguably, the cumulative effects of the
safety regulations tend to be advantageous to the
underwriters at the insureds' expense. There appear
to be instances where the insureds are placed in an
unjustifiably vulnerable position. That is an
injustice which should be remedied equitably.
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